Chudacoff v. UNIV. MED. CENTER OF SOUTHERN NEVADA (2011)
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· 362 citation events
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Oscar Valero v. Bank of America Home Loans (2016)
Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).
“To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
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Doe v. ESA P Portfolio LLC (2024)
But “[a] 19 motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) ‘generally shall be denied only upon showing of bad faith, 20 undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 21 None of these factors apply here. 22 a) Reasons for rejecting amendment are inapplicable here. 23 First, S.A.S.’s proposed amendments do not appear to be in bad faith.
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Naini v. King County Hospital District No 2 (2020)
The Ninth Circuit instead held that the individual defendant’s “mere non-voting membership,” absent any additional facts, was 25 “insufficient to show that she was an ‘integral participant’ in the deprivation of [the plaintiff’s] rights.” See id. at 1151 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773 , 780 26 (9th Cir. 2004)). 1 that the individual Defendants caused the Board to not renew his privileges; he must show that 2 they caused the Board to not renew h…
emphasis added
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Johnson v. Monts (2024)
Defendant has not filed a response to Ms. Johnson’s motion and 23 24 1 there is no showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party. 2 Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 3 The Court notes that it was unclear from Ms. Johnson’s motion whether she wishes for 4 Brandi Monts to remain a defendant or whether she intends to voluntarily dismiss her claims 5 against Ms. Monts.
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Snyder v. Robinson (2021)
Ctr. of S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143 , 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Rather, UMC is through and through a public hospital, and there is no dispute that the operation of [a public] hospital is state action.”)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Rather, UMC is through and through a public hospital, and there is no dispute that the operation of [a public] hospital is state action.”
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Probst v. Adams County Sheriff Department (2020)
Cal. Jan. 3, 2019); when a private party has contracted with the state to provide medical care to indigent citizens, Sliwinski, 2019 WL 581720 , at *4 (citing Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991)); and when “a publicly financed hospital . . . leased its management and operation to a private corporation.” Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1150 (citation omitted). is insufficient. e. Claim Against United States Postal Office Fifth, Probst alleges the United …
citation omitted
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Ingram v. Mouser (2020)
Cal. Jan. 3, 2019); when a private party has contracted with the state to provide medical care to indigent citizens, Sliwinski, 2019 WL 581720 , at *4 (citing Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991)); and when “a publicly financed hospital . . . leased its management and operation to a private corporation.” Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1150 (citation omitted).
citation omitted
In Chudacojf v. University Medical Center of South Nevada, the Ninth Circuit described the defendant hospital as public “through and through,” because it was “controlled and managed” by the state and the defendants’ authority “flow[ed] directly from the state.” 649 F.3d at 1150.
Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1149 (recognizing the mere fact that a private hospital or physicians are “subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State,” absent a sufficiently close nexus between the challenged action and the state).
recognizing the mere fact that a private hospital or physicians are “subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State,” absent a sufficiently close nexus between the challenged action and the state
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 8 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 9 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 10 A court ordinarily considers five factors in assessing whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 11 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 12 whether the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” Western Shoshone…
“refusing 8 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 9 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 19 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 20 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 21 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 22 faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 23 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft…
“refusing 19 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 20 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 25 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 26 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 27 A court ordinarily considers five factors in assessing whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 1 whether the plaintiff has previously amended its complaint.” Western Shoshone Nat’l Council v. 2 Molini, 951 F.2d 200 , 204 (9th Cir. 1991).
“refusing 25 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 26 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Straw v. Facebook (2025)
There are insufficient pleadings to allege that Facebook was in any way controlled by the 27 Indiana Supreme Court, that the Indiana Supreme Court delegated any duties to Facebook, or that 1 649 F.3d at 1150.
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Smallwood v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 11 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 12 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 13 A court ordinarily considers five factors in assessing whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 14 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 15 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcr…
“refusing 11 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 12 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Maxwell v. Pacione (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 23 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 24 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 25 A court ordinarily considers five factors in assessing whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 26 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 27 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcr…
“refusing 23 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 24 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Whitfield v. Saleh (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 24 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 25 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 26 2.
“refusing 24 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 25 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Scott v. Heredia (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 16 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 17 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 18 A court ordinarily considers five factors in assessing whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 19 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 20 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcr…
“refusing 16 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 17 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 11 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 12 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 13 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 14 faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 15 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft…
“refusing 11 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 12 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Gibralter, LLC v. DMS Flowers, LLC (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th 17 Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should 18 have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 19 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 20 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 21 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft…
“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should 18 have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Rondon Clavo v. Midwestern University (2025)
Id. at 1013–14 (holding university’s receipt of 2 government funds, compliance with generally-applicable laws, and being subject to 3 penalties such as loss of funding are all “insufficient to convert private action into that of 4 the state”); Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1149 (distinguishing public hospital, which may be 5 liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for physician credentialing decisions, from private 6 hospitals whose only links to the state are the receipt of federal …
distinguishing public hospital, which may be 5 liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for physician credentialing decisions, from private 6 hospitals whose only links to the state are the receipt of federal funds or being subject to 7 state regulation
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Gastelum v. Tilly's, Inc. (2025)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing 6 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 7 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 8 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 9 faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 10 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 37…
“refusing 6 Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, 7 would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Barton v. Real Innovation Inc (2024)
The court should freely give leave when 18 justice so requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only 19 upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” 20 Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 21 2011). 22 Plaintiff’s motion to strike these affirmative defenses (Dkt. 21) should be granted and 23 Real Innovation’s motion to amend its affirmative d…
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Feds for Medical Freedom v. Austin (2024)
The court should freely give leave when 13 justice so requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only 14 upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” 15 Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 16 2011). 17 The Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (Dkt. 1), Amended Complaint (Dkt. 11) and Second 18 Amended Complaint (Dkt. 72).
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Culver v. 3M Company (2024)
The court should freely give leave when 5 justice so requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only 6 upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” 7 Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 8 2011). 9 Additionally, “a complaint filed by a pro se litigant, however inartfully pleaded, must be 10 held to less stringent standards than formal pleading…
The court should freely give leave when 10 justice so requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only 11 upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” 12 Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 13 2011). 14 Additionally, “a complaint filed by a pro se litigant, however inartfully pleaded, must be 15 held to less stringent standards than formal ple…
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(PC) Rojas v. CDCR (2023)
Center of Southern Nevada, 16 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Ottele v. Martinez (2023)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 20 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 21 15(a)’s intent.”). 22 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 23 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 24 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft…
“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 20 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 21 15(a)’s intent.”
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(PC) Hill v. Kaye (2023)
Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d at 1149. 18 Turning to Defendant’s second ground for dismissal, the Motion does not appear to 19 dispute that Plaintiff had a serious medical need.
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Bailey v. City of Olympia Prosecutor (2023)
The court should freely give leave when justice so 3 requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only upon 4 showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff 5 v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 The Plaintiff’s motion to amend his Amended Complaint to add Jon Tunheim, the 7 elected prosecuting attorney for Thurston County, Washington and the …
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Ahn v. GEO Group, Inc. (2023)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 5 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 6 15(a)’s intent.”). 7 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 8 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 9 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375…
“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 5 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 6 15(a)’s intent.”
The court should freely give leave when justice so 19 requires.” A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), “generally shall be denied only upon 20 showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff 21 v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Reyes v. County of Kern (2023)
Med. 6 Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading 7 error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”). 8 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 9 faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 10 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcrof…
“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a technical pleading 7 error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 15(a)’s intent.”
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Hernandez Gomez v. The GEO Group, Inc. (2022)
Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143 , 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 26 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 27 15(a)’s intent.”). 1 A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 2 bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 3 whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 3…
“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 26 technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 27 15(a)’s intent.”
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Joseph v. Department of Corrections (2022)
Because Plaintiff withdrew her claims against DOC and Dahlstrom, McCarter, Wood, and Maseuli, injunctive relief against the remaining defendants and nominal damages are the only remaining prayers for relief remaining from the Third Amended Complaint. 18 See Chudacoff v. University Medical Center, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Taylor v. Lowe's Corporation (2020)
“A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) ‘generally shall be 12 denied only upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing 13 party.’” Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th 14 Cir. 2011)). 15 Defendant makes five primary arguments against granting leave to amend: “First, 16 Plaintiff’s delay is indefensible.” Dkt. 56, at 2.
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Klopman-Baerselman v. BorgWarner Morse TEC, LLC (2019)
Plaintiff does not make a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a 22 showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier 23 with reasonable diligence. 24 1 Additionally, in its Order, the Court correctly observed that “[a] motion to amend under 2 Rule 15(a)(2) ‘generally shall be denied only upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or 3 undue prejudice to the opposing party.’” Dkt. 428, at 6 (quoting Chudacof…
In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the Court considers factors including “bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152.
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Klopman-Baerselman v. BorgWarner Morse TEC, LLC (2019)
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” A motion to amend under 15 Rule 15(a)(2) “generally shall be denied only upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or 16 undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern 17 Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 Plaintiff has not moved to file an amended complaint.
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Weber v. City of Roy (2019)
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” A motion to amend under 9 Rule 15(a)(2) “generally shall be denied only upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or 10 undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff v. University Medical Center of Southern 11 Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 12 DISCUSSION 13 Defendants’ instant motion for leave to amend should be granted.
In Chudacoff, the defendant was a public hospital, not a testing company, 649 F.3d at 1146.
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LT International Ltd. v. Shuffle Master, Inc. (2014)
Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir.2011). .
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Hunter v. Ferebauer (2013)
Medical Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.2011) (“[T]o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both 1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).
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Chudacoff v. University Medical Center (2013)
The Ninth Circuit found that the actions of Defendants “as governing members of the Medical Staff are therefore fairly attributable to the state, and they cannot now escape liability for their direct and personal participation in Chudacoff s unlawful suspension of staff privileges by claiming private conduct.” Id. at 1150-51.
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Jimmy Moore v. City of Boise (2020)
See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1149 (explaining requirements for liability under § 1983).
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Lumumba v. Pierce County (2025)
See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 15 The supplemental complaint adds factual details regarding her preexisting medical conditions 16 and Defendants’ actions during her arrest and detention.
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Lundy v. Pierce County Sheriff's Department (2024)
See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152; Travelers, No. C10-1110-JCC, 2012 WL 10 12882900, at *2.
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Galla v. State of Oregon (2025)
See Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1149.
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Topolski v. Washington State Department of Licensing (2025)
“In exercising this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying 15 purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 16 technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Chudacoff, 17 649 F.3d at 1152. 18 19 III.
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Larsen v. PTT, LLC (2024)
“In exercising this discretion, a court must be 17 guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the 18 pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 19 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 47–48 (1957)); see also Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152. 20 IV.
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Baptiste, M.D. v. Department of Defense (2022)
OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1151 (“In the absence of evidence of her personal participation in the constitutional deprivation, [defendant’s] mere non-voting membership in the MEC is insufficient to show that she was an ‘integral participant’ in the deprivation of [plaintiff’s] rights, as is required to establish § 1983 liability.” (citation omitted)).