DeSMET EX REL. v. County of Rock Island (2006)

Estate of Hays v. County of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1043 (Ill. 2006).

Estate of Hays v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill.2d 497 , 302 Ill.Dec. 466 , 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1043 (2006).

DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 520, 848 N.E.2d at 1045 (“the police in this case did not respond at all”).

DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 520, 848 N.E.2d at 1045 ("the police in this case did not respond at all").

This is because, while section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2016)) is a “blanket immunity” with no exception for “willful and wanton conduct” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 515 (2006)), section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act provides that “[i]n no event” shall there be liability unless conduct “constitutes gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.” 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a) (West 2016).

This is because, while section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2016)) is a “blanket immunity” with no exception for “willful and wanton conduct” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 515 (2006)), section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act provides that “[i]n no event” shall there be liability unless conduct “constitutes gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.” 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a) (West 2016).

DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 508-09 (“[t]his court’s comments in Aikens suggest *** that the public duty rule, at least in this context, has been incorporated into the Tort Immunity Act as an ‘immunity’ ”).

This court was clear in DeSmet that - 16 - section 4-102 is implicated where “the assistance required *** falls within the statutory umbrella of ‘police protection services.’ ” DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 512.

See DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509 (“[W]e assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.”).

See DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 509 (“[W]e assume a defendant owes a duty, for the sake of analysis, in order to expedite the resolution of an immunity issue.”).

Because we are supposed to interpret statutes in accordance with their “plain language and meaning” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006)), we return to the text of section 5-5-3.2(b)(1): “(b) The following factors, related to all felonies, may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under Section 5-8-2 [(730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 2020))] upon any offender: - 12 - (1) When a defendant is convicted of any felony, after ha…

Estate of Hays v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006).

See also DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 508-09 (“[t]his court’s comments in Aikens suggest *** that the public duty rule, at least in this context, has been incorporated into the Tort Immunity Act as an ‘immunity’ ”).

Id. at 515 (“section 4-102 immunizes defendants against both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct”).

Id. at 515 (“section 4—102 immunizes defendants against both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct”).

See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, Illinois, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006) ("This court may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation.

Estate of Hays v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ill. 2006)) (“Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous,” a court is “not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations[,] or conditions that the legislature did not express.”).

Estate of Hays v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 515 (2006)), nor is there a special duty exception.

DeSmet v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 515 (2006).

(He informs us that he both owns a percentage of the eighth-floor elevator lobby and has an ingress/egress easement over it.) For purposes of section 4-22(a)(6), he maintains that, “[w]here an enactment is clear and unambiguous, [courts] are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations[,] or conditions that the legislature [(or, in this case, the city council)] did not express.” DeSmet v. County of Roc…

When a defendant raises tort immunity in a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504 (2006)), but the mere characterization of conduct as willful and wanton is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss (Cipolla v. Bloom Township High School District No. 206, 69 Ill.

(Dkt. 63 at 14-17 (citing DeSmet v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1042 (Ill. 2006).) Plaintiff did not respond to this argument; accordingly, Plaintiff has effectively conceded the point, and the state- law claims in the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed.

The various immunities afforded to governmental entities pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act essentially serve as affirmative defenses, which if properly raised and proven by a public entity, bar a plaintiff’s right to recover for a tort claim (id. at 44) and “ ‘ “prevent the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damages claims” ’ ” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006) (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprise…

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006).

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504 (2006).

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504 (2006).

Estate of Hays v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ill. 2006) (holding that “[w]here an enactment is clear and unambiguous,” a court is “not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express”)—the free previews promote a subscription service that provides information separate from the aspects of a person’s identity revealed in the free previews. 454…

Estate of Hays v. Cnty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ill. 2006) (holding that “[w]here an enactment is clear and unambiguous,” a court is “not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express”)—the free previews promote a subscription service that provides information separate from the aspects of a person’s identity revealed in the free previews. 454…

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006). “[T]he purpose of the Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government” (id.) and, in doing so, “to ensure that public funds [are] not dissipated by private damage awards” (Ware v. City of Chicago, 375 Ill.

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 508-09 (2006) (“This court’s comments in [Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273 (1991),] suggest *** that the public duty rule, at least in this context, has been incorporated into [the Act] as an ‘immunity.’ ”); see also Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273 , 278 n.1 (1991) (“Under the rule, a police department’s duty to preserve the well-being of the community is owed to the public at large, rather than specific individuals.”). ¶ …

We can neither restrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.’ ” Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 23 (quoting Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 448 (2002)); see DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006) (“This court may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation.”); Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 394 (and cases cited therein) (same).

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006).

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006). “[T]he purpose of the Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government” (id.) and, in doing so, “to ensure that public funds [are] not dissipated by private damage awards” (Ware v. City of Chicago, 375 Ill.

The various immunities afforded to governmental entities pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act essentially serve as affirmative defenses, which if properly raised and proven by a public entity, bar a plaintiff’s right to recover for a tort claim (id. at 44) and “ ‘ “prevent the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damages claims” ’ ” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006) (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprise…

The various immunities afforded to governmental entities pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act essentially serve as affirmative defenses, which if properly raised and proven by a public entity, bar a plaintiff’s right to recover for a tort claim (id. at 44) and “ ‘ “prevent the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damages claims” ’ ” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006) (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprise…

Courts have applied this rule to a variety of “governmental services.” See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 508 (2006) (noting that the rule has been applied “in various contexts” (citing Sims-Hearn v. Office of the Medical Examiner, 359 Ill.

Estate of Hays v. Cty. of Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (Ill. 2006).

Rock Island, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1039 (Ill. 2006) (emphasis in original), and that the act of reporting a crime to dispatch qualifies as such a police protection service.

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504 (2006).

“Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.” DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 23 Our determination that plaintiff’s State Farm policy is not “any other insurance” within the meaning of section 546(a) also does not conflict with the policies underlying the creation of …

“When an immunity provision ‘is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.’ ” Id. (quoting DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006)). ¶ 18 Section 2-105 of the Act provides: “A local public entity is not liable for injury caused by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequa…

“Where an enactment is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.” DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 23 Our determination that plaintiff’s State Farm policy is not “any other insurance” within the meaning of section 546(a) also does not conflict with the policies underlying the creation of …

“When an immunity provision ‘is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or -6­ No. 1-16-0664 conditions that the legislature did not express.’ ” Id. (quoting DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006)). ¶ 18 Section 2-105 of the Act provides: “A local public entity is not liable for injury caused by its failure to make an inspection, or by reason of …

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 508 (2006) (quoting Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 282 (1991)).

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 16 We find that answer to whether the 20% buyout as defined in the CBA should be included in Bricker's pensionable salary hinges on whether the 20% buyout in the CBA was 6 1-15-2089 "approved through the appropriations ordinance of the municipality." Section 4-118.1(d) of the Illinois Pension Code, defines "salary" as: "(d) 'Salary' means the annual salary, including longevity, attached to the firefighter's rank…

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 17 We find that answer to whether the 20% buyout as defined in the CBA should be included in Bricker's pensionable salary hinges on whether the 20% buyout in the CBA was 6 1-15-2089 "approved through the appropriations ordinance of the municipality." Section 4-118.1(d) of the Illinois Pension Code, defines "salary" as: "(d) 'Salary' means the annual salary, including longevity, attached to the firefighter's rank…

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006). ¶ 17 We find that answer to whether the 20% buyout as defined in the CBA should be included in Bricker's pensionable salary hinges on whether the 20% buyout in the CBA was 6 1-15-2089 "approved through the appropriations ordinance of the municipality." Section 4-118.1(d) of the Illinois Pension Code, defines "salary" as: "(d) 'Salary' means the annual salary, including longevity, attached to the firefighter's rank…

DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 508 (2006) (quoting Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 282 (1991)).

Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 375 , 385 (1994) (“mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations in a complaint are disregarded on a motion to dismiss”), abrogated on other grounds by DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 518 (2006). ¶ 25 Moreover, we do not find defendants’ conduct in signing a petition which included an allegation that plaintiff had threatened to report church members to the IRS to be extreme and outrageous.

See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 510 (2006) (“This court may not legislate, rewrite or extend legislation.