First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman (1999)

It is “largely a question of foreseeability” that answers if “the in- jury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.” Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d at 258 (quoting 6 No. 24-1886 First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 260 (1999) (emphasis in original)).

See First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 256 (“To recover damages based upon a defendant’s alleged statutory violation, a plaintiff must show that *** (3) the violation proximately caused her injury”).

App. Ct. 2018) (“When . . . the plaintiff’s injury ‘results not from the defendant’s negligence directly but from the subsequent, independent act of a third person,’ courts determine cause in fact by employing the ‘substantial factor’ test.”) (quoting First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999)).

See First Springfield, 242 Ill.Dec. 113 , 720 N.E.2d at 1071 (“[I]f the negligence charged does nothing more than furnish a condition by which the injury is made possible, and that condition causes an injury by the subsequent, independent act of a third person, the creation of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.”).

See First Springfield Bank, 242 Ill.Dec. 113 , 720 N.E.2d at 1071 (“The test that should be applied in all proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of the first party’s own negligence.”).

See id. at 1071 (“[I]f the negligence charged does nothing more than furnish a condition by which the injury is made possible, and that condition causes an injury by the subsequent, independent act of a third person, the creation of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.”).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999).

The key inquiry into cause in fact is whether the defendant’s conduct was “a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 ; see also First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 259 (“a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury”).

The key inquiry into cause in fact is whether the defendant's conduct was "a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." Lee , 152 Ill. 2d at 455 ; see also First Springfield Bank & Trust , 188 Ill. 2d at 259 ("a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury").

First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999). “[I]t is fundamental in the law of negligence that there may be more than one proximate cause of injury, and that one is liable for its negligent conduct whether it contributed in whole or in part to the plaintiff's injury, so long as it was one of the proximate causes of injury.” Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 9, 11 (Ill. 1974) (citations omitted).

True, Cobian should not have been where she was, as defendant says, but that is as far as the analogy to Korb and Mumaugh goes. ¶ 79 Lastly, in First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 260-61 (1999), an illegally parked truck was not the proximate cause of the pedestrian’s death because it was not reasonably foreseeable that the parking violation would cause the pedestrian to ignore a marked crosswalk, jaywalk in front of the truck, and get hit by a car who…

The Hudson court stated: “Legal cause ‘is essentially a question of foreseeability’; the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999)) .

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999) (citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 ).

The condition-versus-cause analysis is just “another way of presenting the cause-in-fact analysis.” Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459 , ¶ 66 (citing First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill.2d 252, 259 (Ill. 1999)).

Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”). ¶ 38 Because proximate cause ordinarily is a question for the trier of fact, a judgment n.o.v. should not be granted in favor of the plaintiff unless “ ‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly - 13 - favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ ” First S…

Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”). ¶ 38 Because proximate cause ordinarily is a question for the trier of fact, a judgment n.o.v. should not be granted in favor of the plaintiff unless “ ‘all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ ” First Springfi…

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999). “[I]f the negligence charged does nothing more than furnish a condition by which the injury is made possible, and that condition causes an injury by the subsequent, independent act of a third person, the creation of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.” Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257 .

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999).

See First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d at 256 (“To recover damages based upon a defendant’s alleged statutory violation, a plaintiff must show that *** (3) the violation proximately caused her injury.”).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999).

If a third-party’s tort contributed to the injury the question is whether “the intervening efficient cause [w]as a natural and probable result of the [defendant]’s own negligence.” Scott, 131 F.4th at 920 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999)) (alteration in original).

Similarly, in First Springfield Bank 20 and Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 261-62 (1999), our supreme court held that the act of parking a tractor trailer 41 feet from a marked crosswalk was merely a condition that enhanced the possibility of the injury.

First Springfield Bank v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58 (1999).

Id. at 407 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1999)). ¶ 39 Ferrara challenges plaintiffs’ negligence claims on three bases.

App. Ct. 2000) (citing First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ill. 1999)); Seminole Lakes Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Esnard, 263 So. 3d 56, 58 (Fla. Dist.

Merits of Negligence Claim To prevail on a negligence claim under Illinois law, a plaintiff must prove “that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that [the] defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Blood v. VH-1 Music First, 668 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ill. 1999)).

See Schultz, 2022 IL 126856, ¶ 38 ; Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 259 (2004); First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1999).

Proximate causation exists where the defendant’s negligence was “a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury.” Wille v. Freeland, 2015 IL App (2d) 140964-U , at ¶ 21 (2015) (quoting First Springfield Bank & Tr. v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999)).

In Cervantes, the court noted, citing First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58 (1999), that the analogies between criminal and civil cases in which persons are injured or killed is so close that the principle of proximate cause applies to both kinds of cases.

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 256 , 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (1999). ¶ 82 Although a drastic means to resolve litigation (see Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 , 888 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2008)), summary judgment is proper when pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 I…

In doing so, Cosovic attempts to distinguish the cases cited by the circuit court regarding the condition-vs- cause analysis on the grounds that the caselaw requires the court to determine whether “the defendant’s negligence was a material and substantial factor in bringing about the injury, and, if so, was the injury of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.” First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 (1999…

“Legal cause is ‘essentially a question of foreseeability’; the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (2006)). -6- No. 1-20-0049 ¶ 23 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we find a rational trier of fact coul…

Cause in fact exists when the defendant’s actions are “a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” People v. Mumaugh, 2018 IL App (3d) 140961, ¶ 28 . - 11 - No. 1-20-0294 ¶ 47 Legal cause involves the “ ‘question of foreseeability,’ ” that is, “ ‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d…

“Cause in fact” requires that the defendant’s negligence was “a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury” (First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999)) and it is reasonably certain that the injury would not have occurred but for that negligence (Mann, 356 Ill.

First Springfield Bank Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill.2d 252, 256 (1999).

To show negligence under Illinois law, a plaintiff must prove “that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Blood v. VH-1 Music First, 668 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill.2d 252 , 242 Ill.Dec. 113 , 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (1999)).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999).

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 259 (1999).

Id.A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999) (citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 ).

“A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999) (citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 ).

App. 3d 997, 1011 (2010) (quoting Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 317 (1942)); see also First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999) (“The test that should be applied in all proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of the first party’s own negligence.”).

App. 3d 997, 1011 (2010) (quoting Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 317 (1942)); see also First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999) (“The test that should be applied in all proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of the first party’s own negligence.”).

He argues that the theft of his vehicle by an unknown person and the subsequent negligent driving of Barnes or Bellanger were intervening causes of Woodard’s death such that Castro’s negligence cannot be a cause in fact of Woodard’s death as a matter of law. ¶ 21 “When, as here, the plaintiff’s injury ‘ results not from the defendant’s negligence directly but from the subsequent, independent act of a third person, ’ courts determine cause in fact by employing the ‘substantia…

“To succeed on a negligence claim in Illinois, a plaintiff ‘must allege and prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (1999)).

Id. ¶ 19 Legal cause is the “ ‘question of foreseeability,’ ” that is, “ ‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999)).

The critical inquiry on proximate cause is whether a defendant’s alleged negligence was “a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury, and, if so, was the injury of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct?” First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258-59 (1999).

The first, the “condition vs. cause” dichotomy (see First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58 , 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (1999)), is the standard relied upon by defendants.

First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ill. 1999); Barnett v. Ludwig and Co., 960 N.E.2d 722, 730 (Ill.