In Re MM (1993)

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993) (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act”).

See M.M., 156 Ill.2d at 63 , 189 Ill.Dec. 1 , 619 N.E.2d at 708 ("[t]he narrow issue presented * * * is whether the juvenile court * * * may condition the court-appointed guardian's power to consent to adoption").

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993) (“we consider the Juvenile Court Act in concert with the Adoption Act”).

See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63 , 619 N.E.2d at 708 (“[t]he narrow issue presented *** is whether the juvenile court *** may condition the court-appointed guardian’s power to consent to adoption”).

Our supreme court has explained: “A ruling made by the circuit court in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is void. [Citation.]. [Citation].” People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291 , 306- 07 (2003); see also In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993) (“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation] as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested. [Citations.] Every act of the court beyo…

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993) (“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested”).

“An adoption proceeding *** is a creature of statutory enactment, nonexistent at common law.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993) (citing Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill. 2d 419, 436-37 (1977), Musselman v. Paragnik, 317 Ill. 597, 599 (1925), 2 C.J.S.

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65-66 , 619 N.E.2d 702, 710 (1993) ("[w]hen a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the *** courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute"); In re J.S.L., 197 Ill.

“After a cause has been heard, argued, and taken under advisement, no further application for judgment or notice to the parties is necessary before the court renders its judgment.” Woodward, 355 Ill. at 170 , 188 N.E. at 913 ; In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 64, 619 N.E.2d at 709.

Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 564 (2003) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).

Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, -11- 206 Ill. 2d 541, 564 (2003) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 66-67 (1993); see also S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 489 , quoting M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 69-70 (“court may not seize upon ‘the best interests of the child mandate’ to enlarge its statutory powers”).

Furthermore, our supreme court in In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 67 (1993), explained as follows: “Obviously, best interests considerations under the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act are not mutually exclusive.

App. 3d at 707 ). ¶ 153 “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation] as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993).

Michelle cites In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993) for the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction can be limited by statute.

“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the general question presented to it and grant the particular relief sought.” Id. (citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993)).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 67 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993).

As defendant notes, however, our supreme court has held that the rules of briefing “express[ ] no restriction on the nature or source of material which may be cited in support of an argument” and that “[a]n -8- 2022 IL App (2d) 210441-U opponent’s questions regarding the caliber of the proponent’s cited authority *** provide an insufficient basis to strike portions of the proponent’s brief.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 56 (1993).

Whether the authority cited may be nonprecedential, irrelevant, or incomplete will be determined by the reviewing court as a proper consideration in assessing the merits of a proponent’s argument.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 56 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993).

“With the exception of the circuit court’s power to review administrative action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993) (citing Ill.

Id. at 543-45 . “ ‘It is by reason of our constitution that our circuit courts acquire power to adjudge ***.’ ” Id. at 548 (quoting In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993)).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993).

Regardless of whether Eric continues to pursue relief based upon these allegations, we note that Illinois circuit courts “have an inherent plenary power to appoint guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the courts by the legislature.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 63 (1993) (citing People ex rel.

“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general questions involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested [citations].” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 67 (1993).

Id. at 221 (citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993)).

App. 3d at 308 ) and will not disturb it unless “it is unreasonable, arbitrary and not based on the evidence, or when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Guardianship Estate of Tatyanna T., 2012 IL App (1st) 112957, ¶ 19 . ¶ 38 Illinois circuit courts also “have an inherent plenary power to appoint guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the courts by the legislature.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2…

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 69 (1993) (“Any alteration to the statute, regardless of any perceived benefit or danger, must necessarily be sought from the legislature.”).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993).

Following the reasoning in McCormick, we conclude that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Anthony’s petition for a temporary order and his petition for permanent modification. ¶ 20 However, while the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction, it still had a duty to follow the UCCJEA in exercising its authority. “ ‘[T]he constitutional source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.’ ” I…

Following the reasoning in McCormick, we conclude that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Anthony's petition for a temporary order and his petition for permanent modification. ¶ 20 However, while the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction, it still had a duty to follow the UCCJEA in exercising its authority. " '[T]he constitutional source of a circuit court's jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.' " M…

As former Chief Justice Miller aptly stated, “the constitutional source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).

As former Chief Justice Miller aptly stated, “the constitutional source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to disregard the language of a statute.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.).

“As early as Cowles v. Cowles (1846), 8 Ill. 435, 437 [-38], this court upheld a custody decree, not on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by the Divorce Act, but under the ‘power of the court of Chancery to interfere with and control, not only the estates but the persons and custody of all minors within the limits of its jurisdiction.’ The legislature conferred no new authority or jurisdiction upon the court; ‘[i]t was by its original jurisdiction clothed with the same pow…

"As early as Cowles v. Cowles (1846), 8 Ill. 435, 437 [-38], this court upheld a custody decree, not on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by the Divorce Act, but under the 'power of the court of Chancery to interfere with and control, not only the estates but the persons and custody of all minors within the limits of its jurisdiction.' The legislature conferred no new authority or jurisdiction upon the court; '[i]t was by its original jurisdiction clothed with the same pow…

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993).

“When a court’s power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction and the court must proceed within the strictures of the statute ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408 , 416 (2001) (quoting In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 66 (1993)). ¶ 24 We hold the trial court erred when finding the contract contained an enforceable “forum selection clause.” This error, however, does not end our analysis as defenda…

App. 3d at 963 (quoting In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1993)). ¶ 32 Nicholas cites to Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Ill. 2d 449 (1958), which developed the “contract to adopt” theory.

The legislature may define the ‘justiciable matter’ in such a way as to preclude or limit the authority of the circuit court. [Citations.] When a court’s power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction [citations] and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute [citation].” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65-66 , 619 N.E.2d 702, 710 (1993).

The goals of a proceeding to terminate parental rights are as follows: “(1) to determine whether the natural parents are unfit[ ] and if so (2) to determine whether adoption will best serve the child’s needs.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993).

The goals of a proceeding to terminate parental rights are as follows: "(1) to determine whether the natural parents are unfit[] and if so (2) to determine whether adoption will best serve the child's needs." In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993); In re Dontrell H., 382 Ill.

See Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 45a-724(a)(2) and (3); 45a-731(5), (6) and (7)); In re Adoption of Doe, 130 Ohio App.3d 288 , 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072-73 (1998); In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo.App.1996); In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis.2d 492 , 516 N.W.2d 678, 682-83 (1994); In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53 , 189 Ill.Dec. 1 , 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill.1993); see also, Wheeler v. Wheeler, 281 Ga. 838, 642 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ga.2007)(Carley, J., dissenting from denial of discretionar…

See Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 45a-724(a)(2) and (3); 45a-731(5), (6) and (7)); In re Adoption of Doe, 130 Ohio App.3d 288 , 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072-73 (1998); In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo. App.1996); In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis.2d 492 , 516 N.W.2d 678, 682-83 (1994); In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53 , 189 Ill.Dec. 1 , 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill.1993); see also, Wheeler v. Wheeler, 281 Ga. 838 , 642 S.E.2d 103, 104 (Ga.2007)(Carley, J., dissenting from denial of discretion…

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993).

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993).

See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993) ("Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested").