In Re HE (2008)

(See In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 697-698 [danger to emotional well-being not sufficient]; but see In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720-721 .) We disagree.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720 (H.E.) [“case law has long construed section 361 as allowing removal where ‘return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being’”].) In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in a parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past conduct, his or her response to the conditions that gave rise to court intervention, current circum…

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720 (H.E.) [“case law has long construed section 361 as allowing removal where ‘return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being’”].) In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in a parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past conduct, his or her response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention, curre…

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 720 [“case law has long construed section 361 as allowing removal where ‘return of the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being’ (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 308 . . . , citing in part former § 361, subd. (b)), which anticipated the current language of subdivision (c)(1)”]; see also In re H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 723-724 [“Our review on appeal follows …

(See In re H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 725; R.T. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914 .) The agency points out, however, that the standard of review in postpermanency proceedings may differ, relying on In re Christian K. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 620 (Christian K.).

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].) Father also argues, “Should the dependency case close, [the no-contact] order would prejudice him in family court which could address child custody issues.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].) We thus reject the Attorney General’s argument that on this record, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) authorizes Daphne J.’s inclusion in the protective order.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].) In addition, appellants’ briefing indicates that if they were granted leave to amend, they could show that implementation of the settlements would “require[ ] certain preliminary steps by public officials” giving rise to mand…

This is simply a 47 non-sequitur given the facts of Corona.21 (See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].) For all these reasons, we reverse the amount of the sanctions award, and remand the matter to the family court to determine an amount of attorney fees and costs th…

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [removal order may be based on risk of emotional harm].) The social worker reports in this case chronicle substantial mental health and educational needs, in addition to physical deficits, facing these minors.

(See H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 724.) The record reflects that mother’s issues with emotional instability and yelling were not recent developments, and she had already received services, including therapy and parenting classes to address her behavior and emotional dysregulation.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725 [“reasonable efforts . . . need only be reasonable under the circumstances, not perfect”].) In summary, there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings, under a clear and convincing standard, that the children would be placed in substantial danger if they were returned in Father’s care.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725 [“reasonable efforts . . . need only be reasonable under the circumstances, not perfect”].) Carolina does not specify what more the Department should have done.

(See In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 725 [DCFS is entitled to rely on services 9The record does not reflect whether the child and family team meeting took place or what was discussed during the meeting. 24 provided by outside sources in demonstrating “reasonable efforts”].) Thereafter, DCFS became involved and not only communicated with the hospital staff concerning the parents’ progress, but also reinforced with the parents that it was important that they demonstrate…

(In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 ; see id. at p. 136 [removal warranted where parents engaged in a pattern of domestic violence, “some of which [their daughter] heard or saw,” thus placing her at substantial risk of harm]; In re H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 721 [court may “protect [a] younger sibling” from the same type of emotional harm suffered by her older sister even before “actual harm develop[s]”].) Sergio H.’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Dep…

To be sure, this absence of insight may well be a sufficient basis to find Casey’s removal from Brandon’s custody necessary to protect Casey (cf. In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 724 [mother’s lack of insight into emotional harm her behavior had inflicted on her children was substantial evidence supporting removal order]), but those facts were not identified 9 As the juvenile court recognized, Brandon’s status as a nonoffending parent does not preclude removal of Casey…

(Ibid.) In contrast, a dependent child cannot be removed from the home of a parent at disposition unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia, “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home,” and there are no reasonable alternative means to protect the minor. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); rule 5.695(d)(1); see In re H.E. (20…

(In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164 ; see In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 388 [“‘The standard for removal on a supplemental petition is the same as removal on an original petition’”].) Conditions for removal include where “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the . . . emotional well-being of the minor” if the child were returned to the home, and there are no “reasonable means” to protect the minor without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see In re H…

These allegations do not describe acts in furtherance of defendant’s rights of petition or free speech and are not encompassed by the anti-SLAPP statute,” italics added]; see also In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 721 [“ ‘Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.’ ”].) Second, Siam is the sole authority upon which Mart…

DCFS asserts that mother “would likely not have participated at the section 366.26 hearing” because “the evidence establishes mother knew that [J.R.] was in claim that the juvenile court violated a statute by adjudicating a dependency petition in the parent’s absence, but rejecting the parent’s related due process claim because “one can say with confidence that ‘[n]o other result was possible’ even if he had been present,” thereby indicating that the high court subjected the…

DCFS asserts that mother “would likely not have participated at the section 366.26 hearing” because “the evidence establishes mother knew that [J.R.] was in claim that the juvenile court violated a statute by adjudicating a dependency petition in the parent’s absence, but rejecting the parent’s related due process claim because “one can say with confidence that ‘[n]o other result was possible’ even if he had been present,” thereby indicating that the high court subjected the…

The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 .) 18 “Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. [Citation.] Services will be found reasonable if [DCFS] has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, off…

The court shall consider, as a reasonable means to protect the minor, each of the following: [¶] (A) The option of removing an offending parent or guardian from the home. [¶] (B) Allowing a nonoffending parent or guardian to retain physical custody as long as that parent or guardian presents a plan acceptable to the court demonstrating that he or she *1115 will be able to protect the child from future harm.” (Italics added.) The foregoing provision has been understood as per…