Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder (2003)

Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998); see Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).

Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 156; Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Manna, 227 Ill. 2d 128, 136-37 (2007).” Accordingly, the County was required to “produce a justification for its classifications” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 156 (2003)), but was not required to produce evidentiary support. ¶ 103 Next, the County argues that the Tax Ordinance does not violate the uniformity clause because the distinction between gambling devi…

Rational basis review simply does not permit this kind of fact- based evidentiary challenge to the judgments made by a legislative body when enacting legislation. - 16 - No. 1-23-2174 See Arangold, 204 Ill. 2d at 148 (“litigants may not challenge the factual underpinnings of *** legislative judgments under due process analysis”). ¶ 34 While it is permissible on summary judgment for a plaintiff to submit evidence by way of affidavit to show that a legislative enactment is not…

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

“To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003).

On the contrary, “ ‘[n]othing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied.’ ” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 151 (2003) (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1937)).

See, e.g., Arangold Corp., 204 Ill. 2d at 151 (“ ‘[n]othing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied’ ”), quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 , 81 L.

See, e.g., Arangold Corp., 204 Ill. 2d at 151 (“ ‘[njothing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expenditure, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied’ ”), quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 , 81 L.

“The legislature’s judgments in drafting a statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and ‘may be based on rational speculation 11 unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d at 7 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003)). ¶ 33 As noted, the UPWF statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: “It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of busi…

To hold otherwise would undermine the well-settled principle that a statute bears a strong presumption of constitutionality and that the party challenging the statute has the burden of demonstrating the statute’s unconstitutionality.” (Emphasis omitted.) Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 156-57 (2003). ¶ 98 We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the City summary judgment on the uniformity-clause count.

People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2010) (quoting Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003)).

People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2010) (quoting Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003)).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003). ¶ 19 A. Remedy ¶ 20 Zimel’s first contention on appeal is that summary judgment was improper because the trial court has discretion to grant or deny relief in a quo warranto action.

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003). ¶ 15 1.

To survive scrutiny under this clause, “a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. - 16 - Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”). ¶ 59 More fundamentally, the test does not require narrow tailoring; it only requires rationality and is highly deferential.

Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998); Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact- finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

The standards for evaluating a challenge to a statute based on the uniformity clause are well established: To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a “ ‘nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.’ ” Marks v. Vanderventer, 2015 IL 116226, ¶ 19 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill…

Empress Casino Joliet Corp., 231 Ill. 2d at 69 . “ ‘To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people 18 taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.’ ” Id. (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003)).

Marks v. Vanderventer, 2015 IL 116226, ¶ 19 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003)). ¶ 40 The uniformity clause was intended to be a broader limitation on legislative power to 16 No. 1-18-1379 classify for nonproperty tax purposes than the limitation of the equal protection clause (Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 117 Ill. 2d 454, 469 (1987)) and was meant to insure that taxpayers would receive added protection in the state cons…

To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, the tax classification must satisfy a two-prong test: the classification must “(1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003). ¶ 49 Plaintiffs note that under Tax Ruling No. 2, section 5, hotels/motels are classified as propertie…

Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998); Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).

“The legislature’s judgments in drafting a statute are not subject to judicial fact finding and ‘may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d at 7 (quoting Arangold v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003)).

“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

To survive, a uniformity-clause challenge, a tax classification must “(1) be based on a real and-' substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Giannoulias, 231 Ill.2d 62, 72 , 324 Ill.Dec. 491 , 896 N.E.2d 277, 286 (2008) (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill.2d 142, 153 , 272 Ill.Dec. 600 , 787 N.E.2d 786, 793 (2003) …

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003). ¶ 12 Casey's argues that the trial court erred by finding that the distributor was the "intended -6- No. 14-3485 taxpayer" of the 2012 tax increase.

To survive a uniformity clause challenge, a “nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

To survive a uniformity clause challenge, a “nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not -6- taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003). ¶ 10 Moreover, in this case, the parties agree the facts are undisputed and the Fund raises statutory interpretation questions on appeal, which are questions of law we review de novo.

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 , 787 N.E.2d 786, 789 (2003).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 , 787 N.E.2d 786, 789 (2003).

“Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality.” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 (2003).

To survive a uniformity-clause challenge, “ ‘a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.’ ” Empress I, 231 Ill. 2d at 69 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003)).

To survive a uniformity-clause challenge, “ ‘a nonproperty tax classification must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.’ ” Empress I, 231 Ill. 2d at 69 (quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 153 (2003)).

Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 146 , 787 N.E.2d 786, 789 (2003).

Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998); see Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (“The judgments made by the legislature in crafting a statute are not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data”).