State v. Lambert (1985)

See State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 145 , 499 A.2d 761, 764 (1985) (“The State’s ultimate affirmative duty to establish the validity of a plea does not excuse defendant’s insufficient effort to come forward on his claim.”).

We have recognized that “[a] brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stop and inquiry, is permitted in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).

Balancing the public's interest in safety against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, see State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985), the scale of justice in this case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other prudent course.

State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).

See State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 145 , 499 A.2d 761, 764 (1985) (“The State’s ultimate affirmative duty to establish the validity of a plea does not excuse defendant’s insufficient effort to come forward on his claim.”).

The police “may conduct warrantless stops when ‘specific and articulable facts . . . , taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Schmitt, 150 Vt. 503, 507 , 554 A.2d 666, 668 (1988) (quoting State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985)).

Under both the Vermont and the United States Constitutions, we have recognized that “[a] brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stop and inquiry, is permitted in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985) (quotation and citation omitted).

Under both the Vermont and the' United States Constitutions, we have recognized that "[a] brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stops and inquiry, is permitted in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142 ; 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985) (quotation and citation omitted).

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 ; State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).

Commnr., 413 N.W.2d 329 , 331 n.l (N.D. 1987); State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D. 1992); State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590, 593 (N.D. 1993)(concurring opinion); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144 (1985); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 196, 200-201 (1993), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 773 (1994), rev’d, 250 Va. 243, 247-248 (1995); State v. Chisholm, 39 Wash. App. 864, 867 (1985); State v. …

In evaluating reasonable and articulable suspicion, “‘[t]he totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.’” State v. Paquette, 151 Vt. 631, 635 , 563 A.2d 632, 635 (1989) (quoting State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143-44 , 499 A.2d 761, 763 (1985)).

Investigatory stops are permitted where “specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences taken therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” State v. Ryea, 153 Vt. 451, 454 , 571 A.2d 674, 675 (1990); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).

“In attempting to determine whether a stop is justified, ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture — must be taken into account.’ ” State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143-44 , 499 A.2d 761, 763 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

Police officers may conduct warrantless stops when “ ‘specific and articulable facts . . . , taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143 , 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

See, e.g., State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 144 , 499 A.2d 761, 763 (1985) (upholding stop based upon wife's hearsay report that defendant might be driving while intoxicated).

See State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143-44 , 499 A.2d 761, 762-63 (1985); see also State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1986) (passenger in parked car, suspected of public intoxication, could be ordered “to perform dexterity tests to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest for intoxication.”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057 (1987).