Commonwealth v. Glover (1983)

See e.g., Atkinson, 528 A.2d at 218 (motion filed by defendant at sentencing five and one-half years after his conviction was not timely assertion); Tillia, 518 A.2d at 1258 (motion filed five months after scheduled but postponed post-trial motion hearing was not timely assertion); Glover, 458 A.2d at 938 (motion filed thirty-nine months after original sentence vacated and post-verdict motions reinstated was not timely assertion).

Cf. Glover, 458 A.2d at 938 (concluding an untimely assertion of a speedy trial right under Barker and minimal prejudice outweighed a forty-two-month delay, attributed to the Commonwealth, to decide post-verdict motions and impose sentence).

In this regard, the court noted that a deliberate attempt to delay should be weighed heavily against the government while `[a] more neutral reason such as negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.' West, 868 A.2d at 1274 -75 (quoting Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524 , 458 A.2d 935, 938-39 (1983)).

Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. at 527-528 , 458 A.2d at 937 (footnote omitted).

Commonwealth v. Glover, 502 Pa. 524 , 528, 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983).

An appellate court may only review the decision of the lower court by taking into account matters that are of record. (“It is well established that an appellate court may not consider facts unless they are duly certified in the record.”); Commonwealth v. Walsh, 252 Pa.Super. 111, 113, 380 A.2d 1307, 1308 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 180 , 386 A.2d 495, 499 (1978) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court may consider only matters that appear of record.”); Comm…

Commonwealth v. Glover, 458 A.2d 935, 938-39 (Pa. 1983).

Commonwealth v. Glover, 458 A.2d 935, 937-38 (Pa. 1983).

(Alston’s Br. at 11-12, citing Com. v. Glover, 458 A.2d 935, 937 (Pa. 1983).) According to Alston, the Board’s ongoing delays under this process have placed Alston “in a position where, even if he were afforded the relief he was seeking, he would not have enough time to have the requested relief credited to his sentence or his appeal 15 would be dismissed as moot because his maximum sentence would be completed.” (Alston’s Br. at 12.) The Board responds that any delays in iss…

Under the Barker standard, we first examine the threshold question of whether “the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983) (applying Barker).

Glass, 586 A.2d at 371 -72 (quoting Commonwealth v. Glover, 458 A.2d 935, 937 (Pa.1983)) (internal citations omitted); see also Commonwealth -4- J-S08036-15 v. Diaz, 51 A.3d 884, 887 (Pa.Super.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Anders, 725 A.2d 170, 172-173 (Pa.1999)) (“[A] defendant who is sentenced in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405 [now Pa.R.Crim.P. 704], is entitled to a discharge only where the defendant can demonstrate that the delay in sentencing prejudiced him or her. . .…

Under the Barker standard, we first examine the threshold question of whether “the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry.” Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983) (applying Barker).

Anders, 699 A.2d at 1264 , citing Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983). ¶ 14 The Commonwealth concedes that the delay in the matter presently before us is sufficient to warrant further inquiry.

Anders , at 1263 (citing Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983)). .

Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983). 6 An untimely sentence may also implicate a defendant’s right to a direct appeal.

As to the second factor, it has been stated that a deliberate attempt to delay should be weighed heavily against the government while “[a] more neutral reason such as negligence .... should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 938-39 (1983).

Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ; Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 529 , 458 A.2d 935, 938 (1983).

These factors were described in Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983) as follows: In determining whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated, it must first be determined whether the delay itself is sufficient to trigger further inquiry.

Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 528 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983).

Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 529 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983), citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

See Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 527 , 458 A.2d 935, 937 (1983); see also United States ex rel.

See Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. at 529-30 , 458 A.2d at 938 .

See Commonwealth v. Greer, 382 Pa.Super. 127 , 554 A.2d 980, 984 (1989) (concluding that 7 1/2 year delay in sentencing defendant weighed in his favor under this prong of the Barker analysis). ¶ 21 With regard to the second prong, i.e., the reason for the delay, we have said that "a deliberate attempt to delay should be weighed heavily against the government while `[a] more neutral reason such as negligence ... should be weighted less *1275 heavily but nevertheless should be…

See Commonwealth v. Glover, 303 Pa.Super. 229 , 449 A.2d 662 (1982), aff'd, 500 Pa. 524 , 458 A.2d 935 (1983) (jury could infer intent to inflict serious bodily injury from evidence that appellant repeatedly kicked the victim, hit him in the head with his fists, and acted not alone, but with two other men); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 267 Pa.Super. 103 , 406 A.2d 539 (1979) (evidence showing that two men attacked a lone undercover officer who was posing as an elderly male; stru…

See Commonwealth v. Glover, 303 Pa.Super. 229 , 449 A.2d 662 (1982), aff'd, 500 Pa. 524 , 528, 458 A.2d 935 , 937 (1983).

Id., at 414 U.S. at 26 , 94 S.Ct. at 190 ; see, Commonwealth v. Glover, supra., 500 Pa. at 530 , 458 A.2d at 938 .

See also Commonwealth v. Glover, 500 Pa. 524, 529 , 458 A.2d 935 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

See Commonwealth v. Glover, 449 A.2d 662, 666 (Pa. Super. 1982), affirmed, 458 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1983) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for aggravated assault where defendant, acting with two other men, struck victim repeatedly).