In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation (2004)

Motor Vehicles III, 350 F.Supp.2d at 168, 207 .

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178 (D.Maine, 2004) (“Unlike the FTC statute, the Arizona statute does not include a prohibition on unfair methods of competition, and it does not prohibit unfair acts and practices in addition to deceptive acts and practices.”).

See also In re NMV, 350 F.Supp.2d at 197 (“An antitrust violation may violate section 349, but only if it is deceptive.”).

Ann. § 44^-1522(C); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Expori Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 177-78 (D.Me.2004).

Moreover, unlike with the court’s review of Alaska’s statute, here there is at least persuasive authority directly on point that provides some guidance suggesting that indirect purchaser suits alleging antitrust violations can also state claims under ADTPA. 11 *1109 Plaintiffs specifically point to In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178-79 (D.Me.2004), in which the court considered the precise issue here, and stated that it “find[s]…

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178-179 (D.Me.2004) (finding that allegations of a conspiracy to keep Canadian cars out of the United States’ market “unconscionable” under ADTPA, but failure to disclose conspiracy insufficient to constitute “false or deceptive” act).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 179-80 (D.Me.2004) (dismissing CCPA claim where plaintiffs failed to allege “fraudulent or deceptive conduct by the defendants, and certainly none that is material, i.e., a deception that caused the plaintiffs’ injury (overpayment)”); Rhino Linings, 62 P.3d at 149-50 (distinguishing Hall on basis that Rhino Linings plaintiff and defendant were contractually bound, and that defendant breached contract by engaging another dealer in violatio…

(NMV), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 171-172 (D.Me.2004).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 187 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 193 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 210 (D.

Code Ann. § 30-14-103 ("Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful); see In re New Motor Vehicles , 350 F.Supp.2d at 193 ("application of the Montana consumer protection statute is not limited to those who engage directly in consumer transactions").

Pa. 2009); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig. (“NMV”), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178 (D.

Unjust enrichment claims can generally take one of two forms: (1) parasitic, which means it “arise[s] from contracts, torts, or other predicate wrongs”; or (2) autonomous, where the unjust enrichment claim alone “may also serve as independent grounds for restitution in the absence of mistake, wrongdoing, or breach of contract.” In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d at 207-08 (citation omitted).

See, e.g., In re Digital Music Antitrust Litigation, 812 F.Supp.2d 390, 412 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[I]t is beyond peradventure that indirect purchasers may not employ unjust enrichment to skirt the limitation on recovery imposed by [Illinois Brick].”); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation (“In re NMV”), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 211 (D.Me.2004) (holding similarly).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 196-97 (D.Me. 2004)) (holding that allegations that defendants concerted behavior which resulted in increased price of vehicles and which conduct allegedly affected retail prices throughout the country and in every state necessarily had substantial effects in Tennessee where it was reasonable to infer that defendants wholesaled their vehicles to dealers who sold them in Tennessee); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F.Sup…

See Leider, 387 F.Supp.2d at 295-96 (finding anticompetitive conduct alone to be insufficient for § 349 claim where antitrust allegations lacked degree of subterfuge necessary for the claim); In re New Motor Vehicles, 350 F.Supp.2d at 196-97 (“An antitrust violation may violate section 349, but only if it is deceptive.”); Sperry v. Crompton Corp., No. 17872/02, slip op. at 4-5 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.

Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 173 (D.Me.2004) (denying motion to dismiss indirect purchaser claim under TTPA for failure to allege substantial effects on Tennessee commerce because factual allegations generated inference that defendant-manufacturers wholesaled their vehicles to dealers in Tennessee and made significant profits from Tennessee transactions); Freeman, 172 S.W.3d at 523 (suggesting by negative implication that allegation of influence of *506 anti-competitive conduc…

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 189 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 183 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d at 190, 202-03 .

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 211 (D.

It further undisputed on this record that Gian personally incurred substantial legal fees in connection with defending the Suffolk action in which he was never 6 When a federal trial court sits in diversity, “[s]tate trial court rulings provide guidance but are not controlling unless they are treated as precedents within the state itself.” In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 193 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 177 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 188 (D.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 211 (D.Me. 2004) (concluding “it would subvert the statutory scheme to allow these same indirect purchasers to secure, for the statutory violation, restitutionary relief at common law (or in equity).”).

See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F.Supp.2d 538, 586 (M.D.Pa.2009); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 196 (D.Maine 2004).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 189-90 (D.Me.2004) (Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 799 F.Supp.2d 777, 786-87 (N.D.Ohio 2011) (Pennsylvania).

See also In re Chocolate, 602 F.Supp.2d at 586; In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 196 (D.Me.2004).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 192 (D.Me.2004).

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 209 (D.Me.2004); see also In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F.Supp.2d 1365, 1380 (S.D.Fla.2001) (“State legislatures and courts that adopted the Illinois Brick rule against indirect purchaser antitrust suits did not intend to allow ‘an end run around the policies allowing only direct purchasers to recover.’” (quoting Abbott Labs.

See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F.Supp.2d 538, 582-83 (M.D.Pa.2009) (“Chocolate Confectionary ”) (conspiracy to fix and stabilize chocolate confectionary prices); In re Neto Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178 (D.Me.2004) (“NMV”) (conspiracy to keep Canadian-manufactured vehicles from entering the U.S. automobile market).

See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 401 F.Supp.2d 461, 464 (D.Md.2005) (“[T]he specific bar on indirect purchaser recovery incorporated into South Carolina’s antitrust statutes prohibits Plaintiffs general common-law [unjust enrichment] claim.”); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 211 (D.Me.2004) (“For those states that have maintained the Illinois Brick prohibition on indirect purchaser recovery, I conclude that it w…

Plaintiffs in that case claimed that defendant automobile companies and national dealer associations had "conspired among themselves and with unnamed dealers to prevent less-expensive Canadian vehicles from entering the American market." Id. at 167.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 172 (D.Me.2004) (finding that “it is logical to assume that the state intended its antitrust coverage to be as broad as possible”).

They cite In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation, 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 208 (D.Me.2004) (Hornby, J.), for the proposition that allowing a restitution claim in all fifty states would undermine the purposes of substantive antitrust law and consumer-protection law.

Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 190 (D.Me.2004), the court, citing to Lerfald v. Gen.

In In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig. (“NMV”), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 171 (D.Me.2004), the defendants raised the same argument that Intel raises here, that Mississippi’s antitrust laws are limited to intrastate conduct and the plaintiffs’ failure to allege state specific activity required dismissal of their complaint.

Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F Supp 2d 160, 196-197 [2004]; cf. Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins.

In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 196-97 (D.Me.2004) (“An antitrust violation may violate section 349, but only if it is deceptive.”); Peter J.

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 178-79 (D.Me.2004).

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitnist Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 172 (D.Me.2004) ("The statutory language is ambiguous as to whether it is a part of the conspiracy or a part of the trade or commerce that must be within the state.

See NMV, 350 F.Supp.2d at 211-12 (rejecting indirect purchasers’ restitution claims in those jurisdictions which had not adopted an Illinois Brick repealer).

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 160 , 197–98 (D.

It further noted that the plaintiffs, like EPPs here, "provide no Colorado or other case where a plaintiff proceeded with a CCPA claim based on an unfair but not deceptive trade practice." 737 F.Supp.2d at 408 ; accord In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. , 350 F.Supp.2d at 180 n.28.

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig. (“NMV”), 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 182-83 (D.Me.2004).

See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 350 F.Supp.2d 160, 211 (D.Me.2004) (“Certainly no restitutionary remedy can escape the limitations the United States Supreme Court imposed on federal antitrust recovery in Illinois Brick, and the plaintiffs do not argue that it can.