People v. Chacon (1995)

The [aggravated] kidnapping for ransom [or extortion] statute applies ‘. . . to those situations involving a primary and secondary victim, where one of the victims is held or taken away and the other is subjected to a ransom or extortion demand.’ ” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 (Chacon), quoting Martinez.) But even assuming that Martinez was correctly decided, we conclude based on “the ‘scope and nature’ ” of Smith’s and Lewis’s confinements that there is su…

(People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) Cases and statutes define the term “property” in the context of theft-based offenses as the exclusive right to use or possess a thing or the exclusive ownership of a thing.

(See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 420 .) The evidence shows that Soto’s kidnapping of Rosa was continuous from the time he kidnapped her until she escaped; there was no break in the course of conduct upon their arrival at the hotel. “‘[F]orcible detention of a victim is an element of 12 kidnapping and as long as the detention continues, the crime continues.” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 60 (Chacon); see also People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044…

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a) [“The crimes involved 20 separate acts of violence or threats of violence”]; People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 67 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentence where crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence against separate victims].) And given the nature of the separate acts of violence, we do not conclude that there is a reasonable probability of a different result had counsel…

(See People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping for ransom].) “False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” (§ 236.) “No asportation is required. ‘[K]idnapping, be it simple or aggravated, requires a degree of asportation not found in the definition of false imprisonment.

(See People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping]; People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [where a defendant is convicted of a greater offense and a lesser included offense, “the conviction of [the greater] offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed”].) Count 5 is reversed.

(See People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping for ransom].) “False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” (§ 236.) “No asportation is required. ‘[K]idnapping, be it simple or aggravated, requires a degree of asportation not found in the definition of false imprisonment.

That the offenses occurred moments apart is not dispositive. “ ‘It is [the] defendant’s intent and objective, not temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible.’ ” (People v. Capistrano, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 886 ; People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 67 [that acts are proximate in time is not determinative in finding an indivisible course of conduct; multiple criminal objectives may divide those acts occurring closely tog…

(See People v. Serrano (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1677 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 305 ]; People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) The parties further agree that neither attempted extortion nor misdemeanor false imprisonment is included within the other because it is possible to commit either offense without committing the other.

(People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 707, 713 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 874 ]; Martinez, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at pp. 598-599; People v. Straight (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1374 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 10 ]; People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ]; People v. Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 314, 380; see also People v. Moreland (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 588, 594 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 215 ].) 14 Kidnapping for ransom is also broader than simple kidnapping in that …

As we previously have recognized, “the crime of kidnapping continues until such time as the kidnapper releases or otherwise disposes of the victim and [the defendant] has reached a place of temporary safety . . . .” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1159 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 ]; see also People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 632 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 754 P.2d 1070 ]; People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 60 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) In the present …

Third, the challenged penalty is compared with those imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. [Citations.] In undertaking this three-part analysis, we consider the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the commission of the offense. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ]; see also People v. Thongvilay (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 71, 87-88 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 ].) “ ‘Whether a particular punishment is dispr…

Third, the challenged penalty is compared with those imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. [Citations.] In undertaking this three-part analysis, we consider the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the commission of the offense. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ]; see also People v. Thongvilay (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 71, 87-88 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 ].) “ ‘Whether a particular punishment is dispr…

Defendant refers to People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 63 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) However, People v. Chacon held that life without parole was not a cruel or unusual penalty for violating section 209, subdivision (a), aggravated kidnapping, whether the victim suffered any bodily harm or was exposed to circumstances carrying a substantial likelihood of death.

(People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) He may not be convicted of both kidnapping and a lesser included offense. {Ibid.) The Attorney General concedes.

The trial court imposed an eight-month consecutive sentence for each of these two terrorist threat convictions. (§ 422.) “[S]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct. . . .” (People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 65 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) But multiple crimes are not one transaction where the defendant had a chance to reflect between offenses and each offense created a new risk of harm.

The trial court factually found that the escape with [the victim] created a `substantial risk of her death.' Substantial evidence supports this factual determination. [Citation.]" ( Id., at pp. 61-62, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 .) The "substantial likelihood of death" provision was added in response to People v. Schoenfeld (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 671 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 762 . ( People v. Chacon, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 59, fn. 3 , 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ; People v. Serrano, supra, 11 Cal.…

(People v. Chacon, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 59, fn. 3 ; People v. Serrano, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1676 ; People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1227, fn. 12 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 382 ]; Review of Selected 1982 California Legislation (1983) 14 Pacific L.J. 357, 601-602.) Schoenfeld involved the notorious Chowchilla kidnapping; it held the victims’ emotional distress, which led them to suffer nosebleeds, stomachaches, and fainting, did not constitute “bodily injury.” …

(People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 64 [43 Cal.Rptr .2d 434] [aggravated kidnapping for ransom]; People v. Castillo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 36, 66 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 382 ] [same]; People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1237 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 382 ] [same].) Both of the offenses that bring defendant within section 667.61 fit this description.

(See, e.g., People v. Chacon (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 52, 62 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 434 ].) 14 The trial court stated: “What does the last two paragraphs mean?

For example, the Legislature has chosen to punish kidnapping for the purpose of ransom, extortion or robbery with bodily harm by life imprisonment without possibility of parole even though no death resulted. (§ 209, subd. (a).) Courts have uniformly rejected claims such a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate “given the longstanding, even ancient, horror of kidnapping [citation] and the substantial risk to human life that it presents[.]” (People v. Castillo (1991) 23…