State v. Lopez (2007)

However, merely “because the jury may infer intent to kill from conduct designed to ensure that the intended victim actually was dead [does not mean that] the jury may not infer intent to kill if the intended victim was alive when the defendant left the scene, regardless of the. other circumstances of the crime.” State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 819 , 911 A.2d 1099, 1126 (2007).

For example, intent may be inferred from the events leading up to, and immediately following, the conduct in question; see State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 814-15 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007); the accused’s physical acts and the general surrounding circumstances.

See State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) (‘‘[e]vidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that the defendant harbored hostility toward the intended victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish motive’’).

Counsel may not, however, comment on or suggest an inference from facts not in evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez , 280 Conn. 779 , 803, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) ; see, e.g., id., at 804, 911 A.2d 1099 ("the prosecutor did not rely on a fact not in evidence when he drew the jury's attention to the fact that the testimony of the witnesses who could not specifically identify the defendant was not inconsistent with the testimony of the two witnesses who d…

See id. (concluding that trial court properly admitted prior misconduct evidence for purpose of establishing motive in murder case where defendant had threatened two victims with gun two to three weeks before shooting them).

See State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 801 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

Although we ordinarily decline to address claims made for the first time in a reply brief; see, e.g., State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779 , 816 n.25, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007); we nevertheless respond to this argument in the interest of providing a logical construction of the entire statute.

Although we agree with the defendant that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, we agree with the state that this impropriety was harmless. 16 It is well settled that an instructional impropriety that is constitutional in nature is harmful beyond a reasonable doubt, and, thus a reversible impropriety, “when it is shown that it is reasonably possible . . . that the jury [was] misled.” 17 (Internal quotation marks *463 omitted.) State v. Aviles, supra, 277 Conn. 310 …

See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779 , 816 n.25, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) (“[i]t is a well established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Czarnecki v. Plastics Liquidating Co., 179 Conn. 261 , 262 n.l, 425 A.2d 1289 (1979) (“[t]hose claims of error not briefed are considered abandoned”).

See State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 814 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) (“[a] verdict of guilty of attempted murder requires a finding of the specific intent to cause death” [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Chasse, 51 Conn. App. 345, 369 , 721 A.2d 1212 (1998) (“the specific intent to damage or destroy a building is an essential element of the crimes of *403 first and second degree arson”), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 960 , 723 A.2d 816 (1999); see also State v. Dupree, 196 C…

See State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 808 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

See State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 803 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007); State v. Rowe, 279 Conn. 139, 159 , 900 A.2d 1276 (2006).

Conn. Code Evid. § 1-4 (evidence admissible for one purpose but not for another is admissible for that purpose; court may restrict evidence to its proper scope); see, e.g., State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 794-95 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) (evidence of defendant’s prior crimes admissible to prove knowledge, intent, motive or common design but not to prove bad character or propensity for criminality).