Housing Auth. v. PA CIVIL SERVICE COM'N (1999)

Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Comm'n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945-46 (1999) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 947 (Pa. 1999) (“[M]andatory veterans’ preference [must] be afforded to any veteran who is applying for a civil service position and who is on an [e]ligible [l]ist due to his performance on the civil service examination.”) (emphasis added).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 947 (Pa. 1999) (“[M]andatory veterans’ preference [must] be afforded to any veteran who is applying for a civil service position and who is on an [e]ligible [l]ist due to his performance on the civil service examination.”) (emphasis added); Brickhouse v. Spring-Ford Area Sch.

The Commission reasoned that regardless of whether Blake’s cadet service was “active duty,” his particular service lacked a reasonable relation to “the preference of veterans for the proper performance of public duties.” Id. (citing Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. State Civil Service Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 948 (1999)).

Instead of addressing that issue, the Commission concluded that Blake failed to overcome a constitutional prohibition barring the award of a veteran’s preference, because the Commission could not find a ‘“reasonable relation’ between ‘[Blake]’s particular service as a West Point cadet and the preference of veterans for the proper performance of public duties.’” 7 (Adjudication at 14; quoting Housing Authority of the County o f Chester v. State Civil Service Commission, 556 P…

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

In determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be “read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute.” Housing Authority of Chester County v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621, 640 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 946 (1999).

Comm., 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute.” Housing Authority of Chester County v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621, 640 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Moreover, the Act also requires that we presume that the General Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (fundamental presumption in "ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute" is that "the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable"); Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Civil Service Com'n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 947 (1999) ("…

See P.R., supra. As the Commonwealth has noted, the Act also requires that we presume that the General Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (fundamental presumption in “ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute” is that “the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable”); Housing Auth. of Chester v. Civil Service Comm., 556 Pa. 621 , 730…

See Waugh v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 558 Pa. 400 , 737 A.2d 733 (1999); Housing Authority of Chester v. Civil Service Com’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935 (1999)(“the first principle of statutory construction is that courts will not interpret legislative enactments in a manner which imputes absurdity to the legislative enactment”).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 947 (Pa. 1999) (“[M]andatory veterans’ preference [must] be afforded to any veteran who is applying for a civil service position and who is on an [e]ligible [l]ist due to his performance on the civil service examination.”) (emphasis added).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999) (“A conflict between various statutes or parts thereof is to be avoided and, if possible, the apparently conflicting provisions must be construed together with the more specific provisions prevailing over the general ones.”); see also 1 Pa. C.S. § 1933, supra.45 We will not read a conflict into the statutory language at issue that simply is not there.46 45 We similarly reject any suggestion that the General Assembly delegated the “respons…

Comm’n, . . . 730 A.2d 935, 942 ([Pa.] 1999) (citing Girard [Sch.

Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Com’n (“Housing Authority”), 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999); Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065 , 1076–77 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Com’n (“Housing Authority”), 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999); Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065 , 1076–77 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999).

Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Com’n (“Housing Authority”), 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999); Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065 , 1076–77 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Maloney, 73 A.2d 707, 712 (Pa. 1950)).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 942 (Pa. 1999)). 33 Eagle Env’t, 884 A.2d at 877. 34 See supra n.4 and the cases cited therein. 35 Snyder Bros., 198 A.3d at 1083 (Wecht, J., concurring). 36 See id.

These acts can serve to bind the public, too, because they dictate how the agency carries out its operations, but they lack the formal notice-and-comment procedures. [J-55-2022] - 8 of legislative power by an administrative agency, pursuant to a grant of legislative power by the legislative body, and [are] valid and as binding upon a court as a statute,” Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 730 A.2d 935, 942 (Pa. 1999), p…

Comm'n, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (Pa. 1999). 20 Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1168 (Pa. 2009) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)). 21 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715(b). [J-21-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 7 Needless to say, the Majority is forced to take this inconsistent approach because, otherwise, its preferred interpretation quickly collapses upon itself.

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999) (properly-enacted [J-33-2022] - 18 statute may enhance or diminish the scope of a party’s authority to proceed); see, e.g., Ken R. ex rel.

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (Pa. 1999)).

Comm., 730 A.2d 935, 945 (Pa. 1999)).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999) (acknowledging distinction between federal and state standing frameworks, but only examining statutory source of standing when federal framework not met); Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196 , 202–03 (Tenn. 2009). 7 See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149 (“[N]o similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999) (acknowledging distinction between federal and state standing frameworks, but only examining statutory source of standing when federal framework not met); Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196 , 202–03 (Tenn. 2009). 7 See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149 (“[N]o similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 941 (Pa. 1999) (acknowledging distinction between federal and state standing frameworks, but only examining statutory source of standing when federal framework not met); Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196 , 202–03 (Tenn. 2009). 7 See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1149 (“[N]o similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999) (“When the meaning of a word or phrase is clear when used in one section, it will be construed to mean the same thing in another section of the same statute.”)).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999) (“The first principle of statutory construction is that courts will not interpret legislative enactments in a manner which imputes absurdity to the legislative enactment”). [J-10A-2019 and J-10B-2019] - 24 We recently applied the “impossible of execution” presumption in Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019).

Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. 1999) (“The first principle of statutory construction is that courts will not interpret legislative enactments in a manner which imputes absurdity to the legislative enactment”). [J-10A-2019 and J-10B-2019] - 24 We recently applied the “impossible of execution” presumption in Hudson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019).

Comm., 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999), When construing one section of a statute, courts must read that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in light of, the other sections.

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999)). [W]here the legislature includes specific language in one section of the statute and excludes it from another, the language should not be implied where excluded. ... [W]here a section of a statute contains a given provision, the omission of such a provision from a similar section is significant to show a different legislative intent, Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas.

Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 948 (1999).

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999)).

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Auth. of County of Chester v. Pa. State Civil , 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

Indeed, this Court has long maintained that, “[w]hile we strive to interpret statutes in a manner which avoids constitutional questions, we will not ignore the plain meaning of the statute to do so.” Housing Auth. of Chester Cnty. v. CSC, 556 Pa. 621, 644 , 730 A.2d 935, 948 (1999).

Indeed, this Court has long maintained that, “[w]hile we strive to interpret statutes in a manner which avoids constitutional questions, we will not ignore the plain meaning of the statute to do so.” Housing Auth. of Chester Cnty. v. CSC, 556 Pa. 621, 644, 730 A.2d 935, 948 (1999).

Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999) (citations omitted).

Cf. Housing Auth. of Chester Cnty. v. CSC, 556 Pa. 621, 644 , 730 A.2d 935, 948 (1999) (“While we strive to interpret statutes in a manner which avoids constitutional questions, we will not ignore the plain meaning of the statute to do so.”).

Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 946 (1999).

In determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be “read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute.” Housing Auth. of Chester County v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Comm’n, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999).

See Commonwealth v. Wituszynski, 567 Pa. 49 , 784 A.2d 1284, 1288 (2001) (citing Waugh v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 558 Pa. 400 , 737 A.2d 733 (1999) and Housing Authority of County of Chester v. Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa. 621 , 730 A.2d 935 (1999) (“the first principle of statutory construction is that courts will not interpret legislative enactments in a manner which imputes absurdity to the legislative enactment”)). *618 Bearing these principles in mind,…

See Housing Authority of the County of Chester v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 556 Pa 621, 640, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (1999) (“[i]t is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute”).