Wesselman v. United States (2007)

Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 , 114 S.Ct. 996 , 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), the Court lacks jurisdiction over “ ‘[c]laims that the IRS has incorrectly determined the amount of taxes owed’ or any other claims that do not directly arise from the IRS’s collection activities.” Wesselman v. United States (“Wesselman II”), 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 101 (D.D.C.2007) (Huvelle, J.) (quoting Buaiz, 471 F.Supp.2d at 136 ); accord P…

Because “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), the Court lacks jurisdiction over “‘[c]laims that the IRS has incorrectly determined the amount of taxes owed’ or any other claims that do not directly arise from the IRS’s collection activities.” Wesselman v. United States (“Wesselman II”), 501 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2007) (Huvelle, J.) (quoting Buaiz, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 136 ); accord Pragovich, 2009 WL 693257, at *…

A number of circuits, as well as several judges in this district, have examined the plain language of this statute and have concluded that a cause of action exists only for claims related to the collection of income taxes and not for claims related to the investigation or assessment of taxes. 1 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 66 F.3d 220, 222-23 (9th Cir.1995) (“[A] taxpayer cannot seek damages under [section] 7433 for improper assessment of taxes.”) (internal quotations…

Plaintiff also asserts that each of his allegations raises "a separate and distinct violation of [26 U.S.C. § ] 7214." (Compl.16.) As this Court has previously explained, this claim fails "because Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to claims for damages under § 7214" and “[ajbsent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Wesselman v. United States, 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 100 (D.D.C.2007). (citations o…

Alternatively, a claim for improper collection practices alleges that “the IRS did not follow the prescribed methods of acquiring assets.” Id. 5 collection of income tax.”); Buaiz v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[O]nly actions in connection with the collection of taxes are actionable; conduct associated with investigation or assessment of income tax is beyond the statute’s waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Wesselman v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 2d…

See, e.g., Spahr, 501 F.Supp.2d at 97 ; Wesselman v. United States, 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 102-03 (D.D.C.2007).

However this claim lacks merit because the plaintiff failed to identify what, if anything, was improper about the notice of the lien, and in any event “[i]t is well settled that the form and content of a notice of federal tax lien are controlled by federal, not state, law.” Spahr, 501 F.Supp.2d at 98; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (f)(3) (“The form and content of [a notice of federal tax liens] shall be prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury].

He asserts violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 , and, as Judge Huvelle explained in dismissing similar claims under Section 7214, “‘Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to claims for damages under § 7214’ and ‘[a]bsent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’” Eliason v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 2d 63 , 64 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Wesselman v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 2d 98, 100 (D.D.C. 2007)).

He asserts violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7214 , and, as Judge Huvelle explained in dismissing similar claims under Section 7214, “ ‘Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to claims for damages under § 7214’ and ‘[ajbsent a waiver of sovereign immunity, a claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” Eliason v. United States, 551 F.Supp.2d 63 , 64 n. 1 (D.D.C.2008) (quoting Wesselman v. United States, 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 100 (D.D.C.2007)).

See Wesselman v. United States, 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Ross v. United States, 460 F.Supp.2d 139, 149 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Holt v. Davidson, 441 F.Supp.2d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2006) and Larsen v. United States Navy, 346 F.Supp.2d 122, 128 (D.D.C.2004)).

See Wesselman v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Ross v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 2d 139, 149 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Holt v. Davidson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D.D.C. 2006) and Larsen v. United States Navy, 346 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (D.D.C. 2004)).

See Wesselman v. U.S., 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 102 (D.D.C.2007) (merely parroting the language of § 6304(b) insufficient to survive motion do dismiss).

Pro. § 12(b)(1); accord, Wesselman, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 100-101 .

Pro. § 12(b)(1); accord, Wesselman, 501 F.Supp.2d at 100-101 .

See Wesselman v. United States, 501 F.Supp.2d 98, 102-103 (D.D.C.2007).