Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. (1991)
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E.g., Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991).
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Tarrant Regional Water District v. Monty Bennett (2014)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991).
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First American Title Insurance Co. v. Combs (2008)
INS.CODE art. 9.59, § 4. [62] See Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. 1993); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 247, 249 (Tex. 1991) (upholding Comptroller's change in forty-two year franchise tax collection practice when change was in line with "the clear intent of the Legislature.").
upholding Comptroller's change in forty-two year franchise tax collection practice when change was in line with "the clear intent of the Legislature."
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Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A. (2008)
Texas Code Construction Act When interpreting a statute, we "`consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.'" Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex.1999) (quoting Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)).
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Cecile Erwin Young, in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Serv… (2025)
Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (“The Court must not interpret the statute in a manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.”); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991) (“In determining the meaning of a statute, a court must consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.
“In determining the meaning of a statute, a court must consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction. Interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.”
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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Gonzalez v. Meridian Security Insurance Company (2021)
The court in Hookham goes on to find that because Chapter 542 does not contain a statute of limitations, the court must construe the statute “in light of the entire act, its object, and its consequences.” Hookham, 2016 WL 8674387 , at *4 (first citing Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429 , 432–33 (Tex. 1998); then citing Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991)).
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in the Interest of M.K.J., a Minor Child (2021)
Id.; see also Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991) (“where the application of the statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the legislative body could not possibly have intended, we do not apply the statutory language literally.”).
“where the application of the statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the legislative body could not possibly have intended, we do not apply the statutory language literally.”
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Ebs Solutions, Inc. v. Glenn Hegar, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas And Ken Paxton, Atto… (2020)
See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tex. 2014); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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Texas Workforce Commission v. Wichita County (2016)
We must consider the “consequences that would follow from each construction.” Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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in Re R.B. and J.B. (2016)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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FLCT, Ltd. v. City of Frisco (2016)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Bennett, 453 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied); see Tex Gov’t Code Aim. § 311.023 (West 2013) (providing that in construing statute, a court may consider, among other things, the “(1) object sought to be attained; (2) circumstances [of enactment]; (3) legislative history; (4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on the same or similar subjects;…
providing that in construing statute, a court may consider, among other things, the “(1) object sought to be attained; (2
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American Zurich Insurance Company v. Daniel Samudio (2015)
Finally, in 1999 the Legislature did amend chapter 35. 93 See Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1991).
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RSL-3B-IL, Ltd. v. the Prudential Insurance Company of America and Prudential Structured Settlement Company F… (2015)
See Wilson v. Dvorak, 228 - 13 - S.W.3d 228, 232-3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied) ("We presume the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result in enacting a statute ... therefore, we avoid statutory interpretations that would produce absurd results"); Sharp v. House ofLloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991) ("Interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results are to be avoided"); see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 , 86 S…
"Interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results are to be avoided"
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Garrett Operators, Inc. v. City of Houston (2015)
When interpreting a statute, we “consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.” Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 2013).
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
Further, “[i]n determining the meaning of a statute, a court must consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.” Benish v. Grottie, 281 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (citing Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991)); see generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.001-.034 (West 2013) (setting out presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statutes). 1.
setting out presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statutes
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The CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. KOPPLOW DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellee/Cross-Appellant (2014)
When interpreting a statute, we “consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.” Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 2013).
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National American Insurance Company Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers' Compensation Rod Bord… (2013)
We consider the entire act, not isolated portions, as well as the nature and purpose of the act and the consequences that would follow from each construction. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. 2008); In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. 2001); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991). 14 The Guaranty Association is an unincorporated nonprofit legal entity created by the Guaranty Act and composed of all licensed property and casualty insurers…
Sharp v. House of Lloyd , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991).
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JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Successor by Merger to Bank One, N.A. and Michael Bobinchuck v. Texas Contract Ca… (2009)
See Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc. , 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991).
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in Re Richard Scheller (2009)
See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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Burk Collins, Fountain Mall, Inc., and Mall Group, Ltd. v. Tex Mall, L.P. and Michael Kest, Individually (2009)
While section 171.086(b) may contain language that permits a party to “file an application for a court order” confirming a partial award (in addition to other forms of relief) while the arbitration is pending, that language is purely procedural and does not grant the trial court the power to conduct judicial review of partial awards before the arbitrator’s decision becomes final.29 The mere fact that the legislature chose 28 … Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 2…
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Collins v. Tex Mall, L.P. (2009)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); see generally Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 311.001 -.034 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008) (Code Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute). 29 .
Code Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute
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Burk Collins, Fountain Mall, Inc., and Mall Group, Ltd. v. Tex Mall, L.P. and Michael Kest, Individually (2009)
Code Ann. § 171.086 (b)(6) (emphasis added). 23: Id. ྷ 171.087. 24: In re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008); City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003); Benish v. Grottie, 281 S.W.3d 184 , 192ཤྭ93 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. filed). 25: Benish , 281 S.W.3d at 192ཤྭ93. 26: See In re M.N. , 262 S.W.3d at 802 ; Benish , 281 S.W.3d at 192ཤྭ93. 27: Benish , 281 S.W.3d at 192ཤྭ93. 28: Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc ., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 19…
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Alton Armstrong v. State (2009)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd,\ Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991). \ ' var WPFootnote41 = ' The Henderson court aptly observed: \ \ Clearly the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried on over or by\ means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such\ business.
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Nancy Benish, R.N., F.N.P.-C. Christine Lashell Hopson, R.N. And Leonard T. Dingler, M.D. v. Amanda Grottie, … (2009)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991); see generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.001–.034 (Vernon 2005) (Code of Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute).
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Benish v. Grottie (2009)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); see generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.001-.034 (Vernon 2005) (Code of Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute).
Code of Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute
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Nancy Benish, R.N., F.N.P.-C. Christine Lashell Hopson, R.N. And Leonard T. Dingler, M.D. v. Amanda Grottie, … (2009)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc ., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991); see generally Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.001–.034 (Vernon 2005) (Code of Construction Act setting forth presumptions and matters to be considered in construing statute).
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Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Combs (2008)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1991). 41 .
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Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Susan Combs, Successor to Carole Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Acco… (2008)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991). 41: The Henderson court aptly observed: Clearly the tax was not a tax on the interstate business carried on over or by means of the bridge, because the bridge company did not transact such business.
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Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Susan Combs, Successor to Carole Strayhorn, Comptroller of Public Acco… (2008)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991). 30 3.
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Rogers v. Texas State Board of Public Accountancy (2008)
See Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex.2004) (explaining application of legislative acceptance doctrine in the context of an ambiguous statute); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex.1991) (applying doctrine of legislative acceptance to a "statute of doubtful meaning”). 8 .
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In Re Guardianship of Gibbs (2008)
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n. 5 (Tex.1994), abrogated on other grounds, Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991). 15 .
See Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc. , 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2004) (explaining application of legislative acceptance doctrine in the context of an ambiguous statute); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991) (applying doctrine of legislative acceptance to a "statute of doubtful meaning"). 8.
applying doctrine of legislative acceptance to a "statute of doubtful meaning"
See 29 Tex. Reg. 3331 7 See Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2004) (explaining application of legislative acceptance doctrine in the context of an ambiguous statute); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991) (applying doctrine of legislative acceptance to a “statute of doubtful meaning”). 9 (proposed Apr. 2, 2004), adopted 29 Tex. Reg. 5628 (2004) (former rule 519.2(2)).
applying doctrine of legislative acceptance to a “statute of doubtful meaning”
Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). 12: The parties do not assert that any of the statutes in this case are ambiguous. 13: Downs, 81 S.W.3d at 805 ; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); id. § 312.002(a) (providing that words shall be given their ordinary meaning). 14: C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994…
G OV’T C ODE A NN. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); id. § 312.002(a) (providing that words shall be given their ordinary meaning). 14 … C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W .2d 315, 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991). 15 … Helena Chem.
When looking at the entire act, we consider its context, "its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction." Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991).
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Juan Gomez and Rosin, Johnson, Gomez and Seca, Inc. D/B/A Titan Engineering & Surveying Co. v. STFG, Inc. STF… (2007)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd , Inc. , 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991); Del Indus. , Inc. v. Tex. Workers ' Comp.
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Hawkins v. Walker (2007)
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n. 5 (Tex.1994), abrogated on other grounds, Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991). 15 .
Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). 12: The parties do not assert that section 202.004 is ambiguous. 13: Downs, 81 S.W.3d at 805 ; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); id. § 312.002(a) (providing that words shall be given their ordinary meaning). 14: C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994), abrogated on ot…
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Astoria Industries of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc. (2007)
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n. 5 (Tex.1994), abrogated on other grounds, Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991). 16 .
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Wilson v. Dvorak (2007)
Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); Del Indus., Inc. v. Tex. Workers’ Comp.
Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). 14: Downs, 81 S.W.3d at 805 ; see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 2005) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); id. § 312.002(a) (providing that words shall be given their ordinary meaning). 15: C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2005); …
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in Re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, LLP (2007)
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson , 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n.5 (Tex. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Battaglia v. Alexander , 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc ., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991); Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc ., No. 02-05-00315-CV, 2006 WL 2986540 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2006, no pet. h.).
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In Re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P. (2007)
C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 903 S.W.2d 315 , 322 n. 5 (Tex.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Battaglia v. Alexander, 177 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.2005); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.1991); Astoria Indus, of Iowa, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., No. 02-05-00315-CV, — S.W.3d—,—, 2007 WL 937533, at *4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth March 29, 2007, no pet. h.).