Fortis, Inc. v. United States (2004)

Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F.Supp.2d 22, 27 (D.D.C.2004); *1333 Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137(JGK), 2004 WL 2085528, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov.30, 2004) (same); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 WL 2085528 , at *5-*13, 2004 U.S. Dist.

Nov.30, 2004) (same); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 WL 2085528 , at *5-*13, 2004 U.S. Dist.

Passenger Corp. v. United States, 338 F.Supp.2d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 2004); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 2085528, at *16 (S.D.N.Y.

Office Max, 309 F.Supp.2d at 1004 ; Fortis, 2004 WL 2085528 at *12 (“Ultimately, there is no indication that Revenue Ruling 79-404 was brought to the attention of Congress or that Congress in any subsequent reenactments considered the question involved in that Ruling.”); Reese, 2004 WL 2901579 at *12.

Fix, Fea- ture: No. 1: The Revenge of Preemption: How to Correct Unintended Consequences of the Military’s ‘Revenge Porn’ Statute, 2021 Army Lawyer 53 (2021), “if the statute needs to be amended, that task should be left to Congress.” Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 85 Gov’t Br. at 21. 12 United States v. Colletti, NMCCA No. 202300104 Opinion of the Court Appellant’s victims retained the original images, it is wire fraud, says the Gov…

“The reenactment doctrine . . . tends to be applied when there is reason, either based on the nature of the regulatory interpretations or the context of the reenactment, to presume that Congress was aware of the interpretation that it was supposedly adopting.” (Fortis, Inc. v. U.S. (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 179-180 [explaining that in Lorillard, the Supreme Court “specifically noted that the judicial Government; and [¶] (3) does not unreasonably burden interstate co…

“The reenactment doctrine . . . tends to be applied when there is reason, either based on the nature of the regulatory interpretations or the context of the reenactment, to presume that Congress was aware of the interpretation that it was supposedly adopting.” (Fords, Inc. v. U.S. (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 179, 180 [explaining that in Lorillard , the Supreme Court “specifically noted that the judicial interpretations underlying the issue were ‘well established’ and …

Group, Inc. v. U.S., 308 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1362 (S.D.Fla. 2004) (same); Fortis, Inc., v. United States of America, 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 169 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (same).

See Trans-Lux Corp., 696 F.2d at 967 (exemption under section 4252(d) provides that “the charges for intrapremise telephone services and associated services [are] not subject to the excise tax even though the telephones also had access to a local exchange system”); Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y.2004), aff'd, 447 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2006).

We have recognized, however, that this standard was potentially undermined by the Supreme Court’s holding in Mead that administrative rulings are not entitled to deference unless they carry the “force of law.” See Reimels v. Comm’r, 436 F.3d 344 , 347 n. 2 (2d Cir.2006); see also Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.2004).

See Fortis v. United States, 420 F.Supp.2d 166 (S.D.N.Y.2004); 420 F.Supp.2d 185 (S.D.N.Y.2005).

See Fortis, Inc. v. United States, No. 03 Civ. 5137, 2004 WL 2085528, *1 , 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y.

See Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 179 (S.D.N.Y.2004), aff'd, 447 F.3d 190 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to give deference either under Skidmore and its progeny or under Chevron to an administrative interpretation “inconsistent with the unambiguous meaning” of the relevant statute).

See also Fortis, Inc. v. U.S., 420 F.Supp.2d 166, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (“There is some doubt as to whether revenue rulings are necessarily entitled to [great deference under Weisbart ] after the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in Christensen and Mead.”).