Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (2006)

The approach advanced in Steger has been the subject of criticism, both by the dissenting judge in Steger, see Steger, 228 F.3d at 894-96 (Loken, J., dissenting) as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1142 (S.D.Cal.2006); Har ris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (S.D.Cal.2005); Wilson v. Norbreck, LLC, No. CIVS040690DFLJFM, 2005 WL 3439714 , at *1 (E.D.Cal., Dec.14, 2005); White v. Divine Investmen…

The approach advanced in Steger has been the subject of criticism, both by the dissenting judge in Steger, see Steger, 228 F.3d at 894-96 (Loken, J., dissenting) as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1142 (S.D.Cal. 2006); Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (S.D.Cal.2005); Wilson v. Norbreck, LLP, No. CIVS040690DFLJFM, 2005 WL 3439714 , at *1 (E.D.Cal., Dec.14, 2005); White v. Divine Investmen…

The approach advanced in Steger has been the subject of criticism, both by the dissenting judge in Steger, see Steger, 228 F.3d at 894-96 (Loken, J., dissenting) as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (S.D.

The approach advanced in Steger has been the subject of criticism, both by the dissenting judge in Steger, see Steger, 228 F.3d at 894-96 (Loken, J., dissenting) as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (S.D.

"Although at the pleading stage general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice to establish standing, at the summary judgment stage they are not." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1134, 1141 (S.D.Cal.2006).

“Although at the pleading stage general factual alle- gations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to establish standing, at the summary judgment stage they are not.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1134, 1141 (S.D.

Accordingly, as is its prerogative, here the court has “ ‘limit[ed] its review to the documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein. ’ ” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1140 (S.D.Cal.2006) (quoting Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1030) (emphasis added).

Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of 9 discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also 10 prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural 11 barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 12 Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of 23 discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also 24 prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural 25 barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 26 Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of 8 discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also 9 prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural 10 barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” 11 Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA 12 claim of discrimination on account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff 13 must also prove that: (1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an 14 architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily 15 achievable.” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

“A plaintiff suffers an injury in fact from ADA noncompliance if he personally encounters the barrier complained of, or he has actual knowledge of the barrier complained of and has been deterred from visiting the public accommodation because of that barrier.” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1141 (S.D.

Further, “[t]o succeed on an ADA claim of discrimination on 17 account of one’s disability due to an architectural barrier, the plaintiff must also prove that: (1) the 18 existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited 19 under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 20 Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

“To state a claim under Title III based on the presence of architectural barriers in 6 an existing facility, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: ‘(1) the existing facility at the defendant’s 7 place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of 8 the barrier is readily achievable.’” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D. 9 Cal. 2006 ) (quoting Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1085 (D.

Ga. 28 2005); Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Because the ADA only provides injunctive relief, a plaintiff's ADA 27 ||claim may be mooted where a defendant voluntarily remedies the challenged conditions 28 || Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (“voluntary removal o: 1 |{alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff's ADA claim”); 2 || Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.

The record also shows some hesitation on Plaintiff’s part in requesting additional pain injections due to a concern over cartilage deterioration: [O]nly thing that they could do was give me injections for the relief of pain, but they always warned me … my orthopedist on the street and the other orthopedists, 1 See, e.g., Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1146 (S.D.

Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905 (citing 27 Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.

To state a claim for discrimination under the ADA 10 because of “the presence of architectural barriers in an existing facility, a plaintiff must allege and 11 prove that: ‘(1) the existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural 12 barrier prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.’” 13 Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

To state a claim for discrimination under the ADA because of “the presence 2 of architectural barriers in an existing facility, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: ‘(1) the 3 existing facility at the defendant’s place of business presents an architectural barrier prohibited 4 under the ADA, and (2) the removal of the barrier is readily achievable.’” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 5 Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Rohr presented a claim for the damaged cargo to its cargo insurance company and received payment for each of the two shipments. 12 Summary Judgment Standard Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment …

No. 38-1.] Legal Standard Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1139 (S.D.Cal.2006) (citing former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2)).

Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.Cal.2006) ("Although the ADAA[]G guidelines do not apply to facilities existing before the ADA's effective date, they `provide valuable guidance for determining whether an existing facility contains architectural barriers.'") (quoting Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 F.Supp. 2d 221, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). [8] On the other hand, for facilities built or altered after 1992, Title II's implementing regulations expressly re…

See Hubbard v. 7-Elev-en, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.Cal.2006); cf. Am.

See Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1141 (S.D.Cal.2006) (“Standing is measured at the time the complaint is filed.”) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 569 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 20 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

(U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 16 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv)); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134 , 1138 17 (S.D.

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 6 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 26 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 6 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 26 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 6 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134 , 1145 7 (S.D.

Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). 25 In the ADA context, “a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can 26 have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903 , 27 905 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.

Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 4 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134 , 5 1145 (S.D.

Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 6 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134 , 7 1145 (S.D.

See 2 Hubbard, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1138 (noting that a plaintiff alleging discrimination on 3 account of disability due to an architectural barrier must prove that the existing 4 state of the defendant’s premises violates the ADA). 5 Likewise, Plaintiff alleges summarily that the removal of the alleged 6 architectural barriers is readily achievable.

Cal. Oct. 17, 2018) (citing Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 15 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1145 (S.D. 16 Cal. 2006 ).

Haw. 2000); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 1 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (S.D.

See generally Hubbard vy. 7-Eleven, Inc., 8 | 433 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1149 (S.D.

Because a plaintiff can only sue for injunctive relief in an ADA case, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiffs ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.

“Because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e. for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiffs ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir.2011); accord Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1145 (S.D.Cal.2006).

See also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1149-1150 (S.D.Cal.2006).