United States v. Martinez (2010)

United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2010).

United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).

T.B., 511 U.S. 127 , 114 S.Ct. 1419 , 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994); United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2010).

“Despite Batson’s three part framework, ‘the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding improper motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’ ” United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 , 126 S.Ct. 969 , 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006)).

Cf. United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that defendant did not make prima facie showing where government exercised first four strikes against men where more than half of the prospective jurors were men at the start of the peremptory challenge stage, and by the time the government exercised its third and fourth challenges, the defense had removed seven women, making the odds nearly two to one that a male juror would be stricken).

The Court agrees, and will not grant a new trial on this basis. discriminatory motive.” United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98 (1986)).

See Gonzalez, 311 Kan. at 303; see also Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 958 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).

See Gonzalez, 311 Kan. at 303; see also Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 958 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).

In evaluating a Batson challenge, a trial court employs a “three-part burden-shifting framework to assess whether the challenged peremptory strike is based on an impermissible discriminatory motive.” United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98 ).

Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) (“[Neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of conduct.”). “[T]he exercise of a peremptory challenge by any party, including a defendant in a criminal case, constitutes state action because it is the exercise of the power to choose ‘the institution of government on which our judicial syst…

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in employing a deferential standard to review a trial court’s prima facie Batson determination, declared that “[wjhile one could fairly argue that the determination of a Batson prima facie case could be subject to a two-step review — clear error for factual findings and de novo for rulings of law — in this context the inquiries often are not clearly delineated.” United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109…

App’x at 350. 11 We have held that the race- and sex-neutral explanations offered in 12 response to a Batson challenge “need not be persuasive or even plausible for the 13 non-movant to meet his obligation at step two of the Batson procedure and 14 thereby advance the inquiry to the third step.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186 , 15 195 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted) (race-based Batson challenge); see 16 United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (s…

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 102 (2d Cir.2010) (30 years), cert. denied sub nom.

See Watson, 130 Nev. at 778-79, 335 P.3d at 168 (noting that the shift in percentage composition of the venire due to defense strikes is a relevant point of reference to consider in evaluating the step one showing) (citing United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2010)); cf. United States v. Hernandez-Quintania, 874 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2017) (considering the empaneled jury’s racial makeup as one factor in addressing step one).

See e.g., United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2010); State v. Taylor, 694 A.2d 977, 980 (N.H. 1997).

See e.g., United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2010); State v. Taylor, 694 A.2d 977, 980 (N.H. 1997).

Indeed, the difference between a two-step approach to a mixed question and the abuse of discretion standard is often minimal, because *105 "the exercise of discretion based on clearly erroneous facts or incorrect rulings of law would necessarily constitute an abuse of discretion." United States v. Martinez , 621 F.3d 101 , 109-10 (2d Cir. 2010) ; see id. ("While one could fairly argue that the [ruling below] would be subject to a two-step review-clear error for factual findi…

Contrary to Petitioner's suggestion, the presence or absence of a pri-ma facie case of discrimination is not a purely factual question; rather, it is a "mixed question of law and fact.” Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir.2007); accord United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109-10 (2d Cir.2010).

See United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom.

See United States v. Martinez, 621 F3d 101, 109-110 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining why abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on whether a prima facie case of discrimination was shown). (b) Watkins also contends that the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its eight peremptory strikes against African-Americans.

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 621 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that burden only shifts from moving party to non-moving party in Batson inquiry if the moving party establishes a prima facie case); Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 668 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that trial court proceeds to step two of Batson only once party bringing Batson challenged has satisfied step one).