Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey (2009)

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (a)-(b); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009).

Even assuming Chen’s demonstration of past persecution, however, the noted presumption is convincingly rebutted by a change in circumstances that allowed the agency to conclude that Chen’s fear of future sterilization is “no longer well-founded.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Muka-sey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d at 116 ; Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that a well-fo…

We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo, see Yi Long Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2007), and its factual findings “under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,’” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B)); see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 2007).

“We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo, and its factual findings . . . under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although a record “littered” with such a notation might necessitate a remand where it impairs appellate review of a claim, Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009), the missing testimony does not impair review because it does not relate to the inconsistent descriptions of his political involvement or resolve the absence of corroboration.

See, e.g., Gurung, 929 F.3d at 60-61 ; Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 287-89 (2d Cir. 2009); Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Wanglin Li v. Barr, 784 F. App’x 39 , 40-41 (2d Cir. 2019); Lin Zheng v. Sessions, 728 F. App’x 56 , 58-59 (2d Cir. 2018); Rong Wu v. Holder, 483 F. App’x 651, 652 (2d Cir. 2012); Kone v. Holder, 419 F. App’x 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2011). 9 supported the IJ’s finding that Rattu was not credible, and that the IJ was …

“Aliens, of course, are entitled 20 to due process” and may be removed “only after proceedings 21 conforming to traditional standards of fairness.” Dong Zhong 22 Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 286 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal 3 1 quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he failure of an 2 IJ to give any consideration to . . . an undeniably probative 3 piece of evidence amounts to a denial of the traditional 4 standards of fairness that due process demands.” Id. 5 Moreover, “[…

An individual who does not 2 1 claim past persecution—and Tiemogo does not—may establish asylum eligibility by 2 demonstrating a fear of future persecution that is well founded—that is, a “subjective fear 3 that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) 4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2). 5 See generally Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asyl…

Future Persecution To secure asylum absent past persecution, an applicant must demonstrate an independent well-founded fear of future persecution, which “is a subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating an independent well-founded fear of future persecution, which “is a subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonabl…

Future Persecution 7 Absent past persecution, an applicant may still 8 establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating an 9 independent well-founded fear of future persecution, which 10 is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong 11 Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) 12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Y.C. v. 13 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum 14 claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibil…

An individual like Rivera Moncada may establish asylum eligibility by demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must 3 show a reasonable possibility of future pe…

Future Persecution 19 Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish 20 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating an independent well- 21 founded fear of future persecution, which “is a subjective 22 fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. 6 1 Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 2 marks omitted).

Future Persecution 10 Absent past persecution, an applicant may still 11 establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating an 12 independent well-founded fear of future persecution, which 13 is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong 14 Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) 15 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Y.C. v. 16 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum 17 claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possi…

See 2 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 3 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 4 Because Yuan was not harmed in the past, she had the 5 burden to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future 6 persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(1), (2); Dong Zhong Zheng 7 v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009); Ramsameachire 8 v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).

The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B); Su Chun Hu v. Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009). 2 Zhu did not allege any past harm, so to obtain asylum he had the burden to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 120…

Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution Because he did not meet his burden of showing past persecution, Lin had the burden to demonstrate a well- founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013)(“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of future…

See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(1), (2); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009).

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2).

A well-founded fear is “a subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Muhasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2006)).

Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility…

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of …

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of …

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2).

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is “a subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Tambadou v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of future persecution.” (internal quotat…

Asylum & Related Relief Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2).

Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum claim, the applican…

Furthermore, the failure to determine whether past persecution was established deprived Lian of the opportunity to benefit from the presumption of a well founded fear of future persecution that arises from past persecution, see id. § 208.13(b)(i); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009), a presumption that could be rebutted only if the IJ makes specific findings concerning either changed circumstances or relocation, with the burden of proof on the Gover…

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (a)(2)(B), (3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir.2009).

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (a)(2)(B), (3), *98 1252(a)(2)(D); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir.2009).

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (a)(2)(B), (3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir.2009).

Moreover, while we have recognized “that the failure of an IJ to give any consideration to [] an undeniably probative piece of evidence amounts to a denial of the traditional standards of fairness that due process demands,” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 286 (2d Cir.2009), Shrestha points to no supporting evidence in the record that was overlooked.

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (a)(2)(B), (3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir.2009).

While we acknowledge the IJ’s lack of clarity in his decision, see Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir.2009), even if the agency erred by failing to address each of Babar’s evi-dentiary submissions, see Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir.2007), remand would be futile because we can confidently “predict that the agency would reach the same decision absent the errors that were made.” Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting…

Moreover, to the extent Dong further argues that the IJ erred as a matter of law in failing to consider the date of entry alleged by the government on Dong’s initial Notice to Appear, see Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285-86 (2d Cir.2009), Dong’s failure to exhaust this issue before the BIA precludes us from reviewing it, see Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.2004). 2.

We treat the BIA’s factual findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B).

Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009); 10 Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 2007).3 A petitioner may thus, in 11 certain circumstances, establish asylum eligibility on the basis of the past persecution 12 without regard to any well-founded fear of future persecution in what is frequently 13 referred to as “humanitarian asylum.” Jalloh, 498 F.3d at 151 .

Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009); Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir.2007). 3 A petitioner may thus, in certain circumstances, establish asylum eligibility on the basis of the past persecution without regard to any well-founded fear of future persecution in what is frequently referred to as “humanitarian asylum.” Jalloh, 498 F.3d at 151 .

Not only is the transcript replete with nearly two hundred notations of ‘indiscernible,’ but key portions of the hearing are all but incomprehensible.”); Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir.2009) ("We are not strangers to the problem of incomplete transcripts in immigration cases.” (citations omitted)); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (‘‘[W]e are compelled to comment upon the quality of the record before us.... [T]he transcript of [the] asyl…

Not only is the transcript replete with nearly two hundred notations of ‘indiscernible,’ but key portions of the hearing are all but incomprehensible.”); Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir.2009) ("We are not strangers to the problem of incomplete transcripts in immigration cases.” (citations omitted)); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (‘‘[W]e are compelled to comment upon the quality of the record before us.... [T]he transcript of [the] asyl…

Fear can remain well-founded “even if there is only a slight, though 20 discernible, chance of persecution” so long as a person’s “subjective fear . . . is objectively 13 08-0212-ag Baba v. Holder 1 reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal 2 quotation marks omitted). 3 The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that the circumstances in Togo had changed to such an 4 extent that any fear that Baba may have about being persecuted upon repatri…

Fear can remain well-founded “even if there is only a slight, though discernible, chance of persecution” so long as a person’s “subjective fear ... is objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc); cf. Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285-86 (2d Cir.2009) (finding jurisdiction over due process argument that agency ignored probative evidence).

See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc); cf. Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285-86 (2d Cir.2009) (finding jurisdiction over due process argument that agency ignored probative evidence).

See Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 285 (2d Cir. 2009); Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d at 882 (explaining that, in immigration context, ineffective assistance claims are analyzed under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).

See Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y 10 Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (“This Court, and 11 others, previously have rejected similar claims involving 12 ‘unfulfilled’ threats.” (collecting cases)). 13 Absent past persecution, Molina-Hernandez had the burden 14 of showing a well-founded fear of future persecution, which 15 is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.” Dong 16 Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) 17 (citations and internal quotation…

We review adverse credibility determinations under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B); see Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009).

See Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir.2009) (A well-founded fear is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable.”) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).

See Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 287 n. 6 (2d Cir.2009).

See Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that a well-founded fear is a “subjective fear that is objectively reasonable”) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted).