Woldt v. People (2003)

See Missouri v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (noting that weighing "require[s] factual findings that are prerequisites to the trier of fact's determination that a defendant is death eligible"); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo.2003) (en banc) (invalidating a superseded Colorado death penalty statute because three steps of the sentencing process, including weighing, "required judges to make findings of fact that render a defendant eligible for death")…

See Missouri v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (noting that weighing “require[s] factual find- ings that are prerequisites to the trier of fact’s determination that a defendant is death eligible”); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (invalidating a superseded Colorado death penalty statute because three steps of the sen- tencing process, including weighing, “required judges to make findings of fact that render a defendant eligible for de…

A standard of beyond a reasonable doubt applies to eligibility fact-finding.” Id. at 263.

A standard of beyond a reasonable doubt applies to eligibility fact-finding." Id. at 263.

A standard of beyond a reasonable doubt applies to eligibility fact-finding." Id. at 263.

See Harlan, 8 P.3d at 499 ; Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 736 ; see also Woldt, 64 P.3d at 264 (“Colorado’s fourth step requires the trier of fact to consider all relevant evidence.”)(emphasis added).

Before the trial court ruled on Canister’s motion, we announced Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259 (Colo.2003), declaring Colorado’s three judge capital sentencing statute “to be unconstitutional on its face under Ring.” The trial court in Canister’s case found that section 18-1.4-102(l)(e) violated constitutional prohibitions against special legislation, bills of attainder and, in light of Woldt , ex post facto laws.

II, § 11, address the injustice that arises when government action alters the legal consequences of an event or act after the fact.” Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo. 2003).

“Because we respect the roles of the legislative and executive branches, we presume that statutes are constitutional . . . .” Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo. 2003).

"A statute is facially unconstitutional only if no conceivable set of cireum-stances exist under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner." People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 499 (Colo.2007) (citing Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo.2003)).

See Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456 , 886 A.2d 562, 578, 582-84 (2005) (Raker, Green, JJ. & Bell, C.J., dissenting); Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33 , 53 & n. 18 (Fla.2003) (Anstead, C.J., dissenting); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 256-59 (Mo.2003); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 264-67 (Colo.2003). ..

Moreover, "[wle cannot give effect to a provision that 'punishes as a crime conduct which was innocent when done, makes more onerous the punishment for a crime after its commission, or deprives a defendant of a defense that was available at the time the crime was committed." Id. (quoting Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo.2008)).

That procedure was declared unconstitutional in Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 262 (Colo.2003); there, the death penalty was reversed and the case was remanded for resen-tencing to life imprisonment without parole. .

Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265-66 (Colo. 2003).

See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Mo.2003); Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265-66 (Colo.2003); Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 802-03 , 59 P.3d 450 (2002). 19 .Several state supreme courts apply a similar approach, finding that the jury's post-eligibility functions are acts of discretion.

See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ; Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259 (Colo.2003).

A statute is facially unconstitutional only if “no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner.” Id. at 1021 (quoting Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo.2003).) If a statute can be construed in a manner that adheres to constitutional requirements, we must adopt that construction.

Colorado’s Mental Retardation Statute At the outset, we acknowledge that we deem a statute to be facially unconstitutional only if “no conceivable set of circumstances exists-under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner.” Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo.2003).

When applying Apprendi , “the label which the legislature applies to the fact — ■ sentencing factor or element — is irrelevant because inquiry properly focuses on effect, not form.” Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 263 (Colo.2003).

See Wold{, 64 P.3d at 266-67 (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find any facts necessary to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty).

See Woldt, 64 P.3d at 271 .

See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 269 (Colo.2003) (explaining that the plain meaning of the word "may" usually indicates discretion).

See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 269 (Colo. 2003) (explaining that the plain meaning of the word “may” usually indicates discretion). ¶ 22 True, our supreme court has never directly addressed the issue.1 But in People v. Gingles, 2014 COA 163, ¶ 32 , the division 1In at least one older case, however, the supreme court has said it would “elect not” to address an unpreserved issue.

See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo.2003) ("We cannot give effect to a provision that 'punishes as a crime conduct which was innocent when done, makes more onerous the punishment for a crime after its commission, or deprives a defendant of a defense that was available at the time the crime was committed.'" (quoting People v. Dist.

See Ring, 536 U.S. at 620-21 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 (noting that the Ring majority "effectively declares five States' capital sentencing schemes unconstitutional" and also creates questions about the sentencing schemes in four other states, including Florida, that would lead to claims filed by prisoners on death row) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). [25] See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 259 (Colo.2003) (holding that Colorado's death penalty statute violated the Sixth Amendment and was…

See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (holding that, because Ring mandates that fact finding for death penalty eligibility belongs solely to the jury, Colorado's three-judge death sentencing provision was facially unconstitutional); see also Ring v. Arizona, supra (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

See Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 266 (Colo.2003)(determining constitutionality of a statute).