United States v. Taylor (2004)

Nguyen, 928 F.Supp. at 1544 ; Davis, 912 F.Supp. at 946 ; see also United States v. Mayhew, 380 F.Supp.2d 936, 950-51 (S.D.Ohio 2005); United States v. Taylor, 316 F.Supp.2d 730, 742-43 (N.D.Ind.2004).

United States v. Mayhew, 380 F.Supp.2d 936, 950-51 (S.D.Ohio 2005); United States v. Taylor, 316 F.Supp.2d 730, 742-43 (N.D.Ind.2004); United States v. Davis, No. CR.A. 01-282, 2003 WL 1873088 , at *10 (E.D.La.

See United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11 th Cir.1999) (noting that notice of aggravating factors under FDPA “is different from notice of specific evidence”); United States v. Taylor, 316 F.Supp.2d 730, 741 (N.D.Ind.2004) (noting that § 3593(a) requires no more than filing notice stating that government intends to seek death penalty and setting forth aggravating factors that government intends to prove); Edelin, 128 F.Supp.2d at 42 (same); Nguyen, 928 F.Supp. at 1…

The Eleventh Circuit similarly stated that “[t]he Government is not required to provide specific evidence in its notice of intent [to seek the death penalty].” Battle, 173 F.3d at 1347 ; see also United States v. Taylor, 316 F.Supp.2d 730, 741 (N.D.Ind.2004) (“[E]ach Notice of Intent informs the Defendant that the Govern ment intends to seek the death penalty and lists the aggravating factors that the Government will seek to prove.

See United States v. Taylor, 316 F.Supp.2d 730, 742-43 (N.D.Ind.2004) (“[T]his Court finds that the Government has properly included ‘low-rehabilitative potential’ as a circumstance to be considered as evidence of the Defendants’ future dangerousness.”); United States v. Davis, No. CR.A. 01-282, 2003 WL 1873088 , at *10 (E.D.La.