Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010)

Clayworth, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d at 1083 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Id., 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d at 1087 (citation omitted).

Clayworth, 233 P.3d at 1083 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Corp., 490 U.S. 93 , 99–100 (1989) (holding that the Sherman Act, which does not allow indirect purchaser actions, does not preempt state laws that allow indirect purchasers to obtain relief); see also, e.g., Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 613 (applying Alabama antitrust law in indirect purchaser action by Alabama pharmacies against out- of-state drug manufacturers); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1070 (Cal. 2010) (applying California antitrust law in …

The California Su preme Court has held that the purpose of Proposition 64 was to “curtail the prior practice of filing suits on behalf of clients who have not used the defendant’s product or service, viewed the defendant’s advertising, or had any other business dealings with the defendant.” Clayworbh v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066, 1086-87 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 , 246 P.3d 877, 895 (2011); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066, 1088 (2010).

See id. (“To distribute their pharmaceuticals, Manufacturers depend on a network of wholesalers and retailers[;] pharmacies acted as retailers for Manufacturers’ drugs and thus had indirect business dealings with Manufacturers”).

(Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ] [plaintiffs “lost money: the overcharges they paid”]; Fireside Bank v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1069, 1090 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 861 , 155 P.3d 268 ] [plaintiff was deprived of a “fair opportunity to redeem the financed vehicle, followed by an unlawful demand for payment”]; Aron, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 802-803 [plaintiff had standing where he paid more to refuel rental tru…

See 233 P.3d at 1086 (“[U]nder the Cartwright Act as under federal law, . . . a pass-on defense generally may not be asserted.”).

Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758, 789 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 (2010) (“Pharmacies paid more than they otherwise would have because of a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of state law.”).

(Nov. 2, 2004)), which substantially modified the standing requirements for private parties to bring UCL claims, stating in its preamble that the measure was intended to redress abuses by private attorneys who “‘[f]ile frivolous lawsuits as a means of generating attorney’s fees without creating a corresponding public benefit,’ ‘[f]ile lawsuits where no client has been injured in fact,’ ‘[f]ile lawsuits for clients who have not used the defendant’s product or service, viewed …

See 21 Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1087 (Cal. 2010) (“[S]ection 17204 requires only 22 that party have ‘lost money or property,’ and [plaintiffs] indisputably lost money when 23 they paid an allegedly illegal overcharge.”).

Given the potential contradiction, we find Minor’s argument to be unpersuasive. 2 “‘“‘Parens patriae,’ literally ‘parent of the country,’ refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability . . . .”’” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 776, fn. 14 .) 2 Except for this modification, the opinion remains unchanged.

This is so because mitigation, while it might diminish a party's recovery, does not diminish the 7 party’s interest in proving it is entitled to recovery. 8 Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 789 (2010).

And 21 for good reason: the question whether a plaintiff has satisfied their statutory standing 22 requirements is distinct from the question of how much damages they can actually recover. 23 See, e.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 789 (2010) (explaining the difference 24 between “the issue of standing [and] the issue of the remedies to which a party may be 25 entitled”).

That a party may ultimately be unable to prove a right to damages . . . does not demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to them.” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788-789 [holding pharmacies had standing to assert Unfair Competition Law claims against drug manufacturer, and rejecting argument that “ultimately Pharmacies suffered no compensable loss because they were able to mitigate fully any injury by passing on the overcharges”].) …

The Hanover Shoe rule and the treble damages provision of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (a), both allow antitrust plaintiffs to receive “a potential windfall,” Def.’s Reply Br. 6; see Clayworth, 233 P.3d at 1083 (“[T]reble damages may overcompensate injured plaintiffs, but they do so in order to maximize deterrence.”). necessarily be lifted; defendants may assert a pass-on defense as needed to avoid duplication in the recovery of damages.

For instance, in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788 (Clayworth), the Supreme Court held that retail pharmacies had standing under the UCL to assert claims against drug makers allegedly engaged in price fixing, even though the plaintiff pharmacies did not lose any money from the alleged price-fixing scheme because they had passed on any overcharges to their customers.

Terex Corp. v. S. Track & Pump, Inc., 117 A.3d 537 , 544 n.24 (Del. 2015); see also Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1080 (Cal. 2010) (“[Courts] may presume that when the Legislature borrows a federal statute and enacts it into state law, it has considered and is aware of the legislative history behind that enactment.”); Com.

See Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066 , 1087–88 (Cal. 2010) (“If a 23 party has standing under [California Business & Professions Code §] 17204 . . . , it may 24 seek injunctive relief under section 17203.”).

(See Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051 , 1066 13 [“‘The rule of [mitigation of damages] comes into play after a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damages may still be averted . . 14 . .’” (quoting Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 65, p. 458)].) This is so because mitigation, while it might diminish a party's 15 recovery, does not diminish the party's interest in proving it is entitled to recovery. 16 17 Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 7…

In Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., the California Supreme Court found retail pharmacies could sustain an action under the California UCL against defendant drug manufacturers for restitution despite only having “indirect business dealings with [the m]anufacturers.” 233 P.3d 1066, 1087 (Cal. 2010) (citing Shersher, 154 Cal. App. 4th at 1499–1500).

Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1087 (Cal. 2010); see also In re Myford Touch Consumer Litig., No. 13-CV-3072 (EMC), 2016 WL 7734558 , at *19 (N.D.

This array of remedies arises 2 from the Cartwright Act’s “focus[] on the punishment of violators for the larger purpose of 3 promoting free competition.” Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 783 (2010).

(Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 790 [“[T]he right to seek injunctive relief under section 17203 is not dependent on the right to seek restitution”].) But appellants conceded the no-premium-wages policy ended in June 2007 and did not seek to enjoin it.

(Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 790 [“[T]he right to seek injunctive relief under section 17203 is not dependent on the right to seek restitution”].) But appellants conceded the no-premium-wages policy ended in June 2007 and did not seek to enjoin it.

(See Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 789 [section 17204 does not require “that plaintiffs prove compensable loss at the outset”].) To establish standing under section 17204, a plaintiff need only “allege an ‘ “identifiable trifle” ’ [citation] of economic injury.” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 330, fn. 15 .) We conclude the complaint adequately alleges the required trifle. 18 The complaint alleges Rossetta spent “a significant amo…

(E.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 777 [noting how “the problem of duplicative recoveries could be addressed by allowing damages already paid to be offset”].) Pabst resists this conclusion with two further arguments.

(See Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. 23 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 789 [whether a party may be ultimately unable to obtain remedies “does not demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to them”].) 2.

Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066, 1087 (2010) (citations omitted).

(See, e.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788 [Pharmacy plaintiffs had standing under UCL as indirect purchaser where “loss was the result of an unfair business practice: Pharmacies paid more than they otherwise would have because of a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of state law.”]; Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 741, 753 [“[A] jury can infer the fact of injury when a conspiracy to fix prices has been established and plaintiff…

“Section 17203 makes injunctive relief ‘the primary form of relief available under the UCL,’ while restitution is merely ‘ancillary.’ ” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 790 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) Without any showing of loss to plaintiffs, there can be no restoration of money “which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” (§ 17203, italics added.) 11 While a full refund may be proper when a product confers no benefit on…

(Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 772 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) The act’s principal goal is the preservation of consumer welfare.

(Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 770 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) We read ambiguous statutes in the way that most closely aligns with their purpose.

Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758, 789 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 (2010) (“While Manufacturers argue that ultimately Pharmacies suffered no- com-pensable loss because they were able to mitigate fully any injury by passing on the overcharges, this argument conflates the issue of standing with the issue of the remedies to which a party may be entitled.”).

(See In re Chantal S., at p. 201.) 7 " ' " 'Parens patriae,' literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability . . . ." ' " (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 776, fn. 14 , italics added, quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1148, fn. 6 .) 11 Here, the juvenile court believed that preplacement visits would be necessary to…

Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17204; see Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that credit card holder had standing to assert UCL claim against credit card issuer); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066, 1087 (2010) (finding that pharmacies, having "had business dealings with” pharmaceutical companies, had standing to assert UCL claim). .

Background As the case comes to this court following the trial court’s grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we “recite the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (here, plaintiffs).” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 764 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) On the evening of April 27, 2007, defendant Jessica Mañosa (Mañosa) hosted a party at a vacant rental residence owned by her parents, defendants Carlos and Mary Maños…

“Continuances are discouraged [citation] and we reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810-811 .) 2 “‘“‘Parens patriae,’ literally ‘parent of the country,’ refers traditionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability . . . .”’” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 776, fn. 14 .) 9 During the discussion between the …

If the text is sufficiently clear to offer conclusive evidence of the statute’s meaning, we need look no further. [Citation.] If it is susceptible of multiple interpretations, however, we will divine the statute’s meaning by turning to a variety of extrinsic sources, including the legislative history [citation], the nature of the overall statutory *666 scheme [citation], and consideration of the sorts of problems the Legislature was attempting to solve when it enacted the st…

(Nov. 2, 2004).) The California Supreme Court has explained the intent of Proposition 64’s “change was to confine standing to those actually injured by a defendant’s business practices and to curtail the prior practice of filing suits on behalf of ‘ “clients who have not used the defendant’s product or service, viewed the defendant’s advertising, or had any other business dealing with the defendant ....”’ [Citation.]” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788 [ 1…

See Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51 Cal.4th 310 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 , 246 P.3d 877, 895 (2011); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal.4th 758 , 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066, 1088 (2010).” (Pom II, supra, 619 F.3d at pp. 1178-1179.) The court in Pom II left open the question whether, on remand, Pom Wonderful LLC would be able to demonstrate standing under the UCL.

(E.g., Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 770 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) The committee reports explaining the construction clause reveal an intent that a state law should qualify for protection from preemption whenever at a minimum some part of it is superior to the ADA in the protection it affords, such that an individual with a disability might choose to invoke it, even if the law may in other respects provide procedures or remedies that are ar…

(See Stats. 1907, ch. 530, p. 984 [the Cartwright Act is ‘An act to define trust and to provide for criminal penalties and civil damages, and punishment of [entities connected with trusts], and to promote free competition in commerce and all classes of business in this state’].)” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 783 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) A successful plaintiff can recover treble damages. (§ 16750, subd. (a).) A Cartwright Act violation re…

Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 327 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 444 P.2d 481 ] (Chicago Title), distinguished on another point in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 781, fn. 18 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 666 , 233 P.3d 1066 ].) Although a court must on demurrer accept as true properly pleaded facts, a demurrer does not admit contentions or conclusions of law or fact.

See Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1085 (2010) (holding pass-through evidence is no more relevant to the issue of mitigation than it is to proving damages) (citing Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach.

(Prop. 64, § 1, subds. (b), (d); see § 17204.)” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788 .) To determine whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a private UCL action, the plaintiff must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the cla…

See Clayworth v. Pfizer, 18 Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 789 (2010) (finding that the plaintiffs had UCL standing even though they were able to fully mitigate their economic losses because a party’s inability to “prove a right to 19 damages . . . does not demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to them”); 20 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 336 (2011) (“We thus rejected in Clayworth the 21 argument that if plaintiffs could demonstrate no co…

See Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758, 763 (2010); Paper Sys.

Code, §§ 17203, 17535; see Korea Supply Co v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144 .) These forms of relief are “wholly independent remedies” (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 790 ), and each requires a different showing.