Bilderback v. State (2000)

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 252 (Wyo. 2000); accord Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 917 (10th Cir.1999).

See Landeroz v. State 2011 WY 168, ¶¶ 19 , 267 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Wyo.2011); Meyers v. State, 2007 WY 118, ¶¶ 1-3 , 164 P.3d 544, 545 (Wyo.2007), Hernandez v. State, 2007 WY 105, ¶¶ 45-47 , 162 P.3d 472, 482-83 (Wyo.2007); Mattern v. State, 2007 WY 24, 132-36 , 151 P.3d 1116, 1180-31 (Wyo.2007); Maes, ¶ 1, 114 P.3d at 709 (Wyo. 2005); Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156 , 55 P.3d 1259 (Wyo.2002) (rejecting the notion that the general intent crime of second degree murder is compatible…

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo.2000).

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 (Wyo.2000).

In this regard, he cites Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254-55 (Wyo. 2000), where this Court held that the separate crimes of attempted second-degree murder and using a firearm to commit a felony merged for sentencing purposes where the appellant "did not commit any other act which could have constituted attempted second-degree murder other than using the firearm." Finally, he argues that only one prosecution is permissible for a continuing offense, and that acquittal or …

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 (Wyo.2000).

As part of the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that, given the facts of the case, the doctrine of merger, addressed in Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 255 (Wyo.2000), did not apply.

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 (Wyo.2000); Glasrud v. City of Laramie, 934 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Wyo.1997).

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 255 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Whetstine, 344 Pa.Super. 246 , 496 A.2d 777, 779-80 (1985)).

James, ¶ 13, 271 P.3d at 1019 (quoting Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo.2000)); see also Winstead, ¶ 14, 261 P.3d at 746; Najera, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d at 994 ; Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967, 970 (Wyo.1998); Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo.1995); Rivero v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 944 (Wyo.1992). [127] The facts or evidence test requires the following additional analysis to determine whether convictions should merge for sentencing: In deciding whether offenses merge, the…

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo.2000). [¥53] Applying these principles to Mr. Bromley's claim, it is clear he could not be sentenced separately for the possession conviction and for the possession with the intent to deliver conviction if the two convictions involved precisely the same methamphetamine.

Furthermore, under the rationale of cases like Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190 (Wyo.1995) and Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254-55 (Wyo.2000), even a cursory review of the facts demonstrates Mr. Gould could have committed either of his crimes without necessarily committing the other.

Also see Umbach v. State, 2002 WY 42, ¶ 8 , 42 P.3d 1006, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002); and Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253-55 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 41] Strickland also relies on Wyo.

Citing Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo.2000), he contends these two convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes because the facts necessary to prove aggravated robbery describe the only possible way in which he could have committed felony murder (for which aggravated robbery was the underlying felony) and so sentencing him for both violated his constitutional rights against double jeopardy.

Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo.2000).

See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 69 Mich. App. 465, 467-468 (1976); Mathre v. State, 619 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 2000); Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 251-252 (Wyo. 2000).

The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides three protections to persons accused of crimes: "It protects the accused who has been acquitted against a second prosecution for the same offense; it protects the accused who has been convicted against a second prosecution for the same offense; and it protects the accused against multiple punishments of the same offense." Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 864 (Wyo.1992); see also Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶ 20 , 3…

See, eg., Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo.2000); Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234 (Wyo.1996); and Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484 (Wyo.1992).

See Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 252 (Wyo.2000); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo.1983); and Leitel, 579 P.2d at 424 .

See also, Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 , 251 n. 1 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 30] Mr. Blakeman’s first two criticisms of his trial counsel’s performance are valid only if EG’s testimony about her telephone conversations with Mr. Blakeman amounted to other bad acts evidence which should have been excluded from the trial evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), which provides: (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. — Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character …

See, eg., Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo.2000); Gabriel v. State, 925 P.2d 234 (Wyo.1996); and Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484 (Wyo.1992).