Manufactured Housing Communities v. State (2000)

Accordingly, “the statute deprives park owners of a fundamental attribute of ownership.” Id. at 194; see also id. (“The instant case falls within the rule that would generally find a taking where a regulation deprives the owner of a fundamental attribute of property ownership.”).

Manufactured Hous., 13 P.3d at 187.

Manufactured Hous., 13 P.3d at 187.

If the State passes a regulation destroying one or more of the fundamental attributes of ownership, there is no textual basis for concluding that the property owner cannot prevail under Article II, Section 29 on a claim that her property has been “taken or damaged.” Cf. Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 187 (Wash. 2000). ¶152 The Court’s contrary interpretation, limiting the reach of Article II, Section 29 to direct appropriations, amounts to the improp…

The Washington Supreme Court has “consistently held that ‘a beneficial use is not necessarily a public use.’ ” Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347 , 13 P.3d 183, 189 (2000) (citations omitted).

Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347, 366 , 13 P.3d 183, 192 (2000).

See Manufactured Housing, 142 Wash.2d at 368 , 13 P.3d 183 . ¶ 20 Robroy acknowledged that the holder of an ordinary option has a greater interest in land than the holder of a right of first refusal.

See, e.g., [Mfd.] Hous[.] Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wn.2d 347, 360-61 , 13 P.3d 183 (2000).

See Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 192, 193 (Wash. 2000); see also Greenfield Country Est., 666 N.E.2d at 992 (noting that a right of first refusal limits an owner’s freedom to transfer property).

See Mfr'd Hous., 142 Wash.2d at 356 n.7, 13 P.3d 183 .