State v. Druktenis (2004)

Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 , 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (holding that the public disclosure of Connecticut’s sex offender registry did not violate the Due Process Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350, 371 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (holding that statute providing for civil commitment of persons who, due to a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder,” were likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence,” did not violate t…

See State v. Druktenis, 14 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 44 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 ; Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 25 . 15 Because the record is incomplete and Defendant does not contend that he challenged 16 the improper certification when the jury raised the matter in its question to the judge, 17 we proceed under the assumption that he failed to request any remedy at that time. 18 See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 44 (observing that where the defendant provided 19 the court with a lim…

We have similarly stated that “the party objecting to the legislative classification has the burden of demonstrating that the classification bears no rational relationship to a conceivable legislative purpose.” Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 104 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

State v. Druktenis , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 , 1078 (App. 2004) ("One convicted of a heinous sex offense starts a quest for constitutional protection from a much different and clearly less favorable position than those who to date have obtained privacy protection in the United States Supreme Court.").

State v. Druktenis, 86 P.3d 1050, 1068 (N.M.

New Mexico case law recognizes the “varying types and degrees of adverse consequences [of SORNA’s registration requirements] for an offender . . . [and nevertheless] conclude[s] that they are not excessive in relation to the public safety purpose of SORNA.” State v. Drunktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 34 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 ; see id. (“The purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to punish or stigmatize and ostraciz…

IV, § 34 (providing that “[n]o act of the [L]egislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case”); State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 39-43 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 2 (noting that a change in the law that takes effect while a defendant is serving probation is the applicable law for purposes of a subsequent probation revocation proceeding because the case was not pending for purposes of Articl…

Although the eases interpreting the word “pending” within the context of the constitutional provision do not specifically say whether a case that is on appeal is “pending,” in State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 39, 43 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 , this Court suggested that for purposes of this constitutional provision, an appeal would be considered pending. {53} Reliance on this line of cases is misplaced.

(See Doe v Tandeske, 361 F3d 594 [9th Cir 2004]; State v Druktenis, 135 NM 223 , 249-252, 86 P3d 1050, 1076-1079 [2004]; Gunderson v Hvass, 339 F3d 639, 643 [8th Cir 2003]; Akella v Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F Supp 2d 716, 727-731 [ED Mich 1999]; Lanni v Engler, 994 F Supp 849, 856 [ED Mich 1998]; Doe v Weld, 954 F Supp 425, 436 [D Mass 1996].) The rights petitioners claim are fundamental are the liberty interests associated with the stigma of being labeled as sex o…

Ed. 2d at 180-81 , 123 S. Ct. at 1150-51 ; Femedeer v. Haun , 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000); State of New Mexico v. Druktenis , 135 N.M. 223 , ___, 86 P.3d 1050, 1062 (2004); Haislop v. Edgell , 215 W.

Ed. 2d at 180-81 , 123 S. Ct. at 1150-51 ; Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000); State of New Mexico v. Druktenis, 135 N.M. 223, 235 , 86 P.3d 1050, 1062 (2004); Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.

See id. at 235 , 86 P.3d 1050 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 103-04 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ) (recognizing the applicability of the Smith analysis to NMSORNA).

See Druktenis, 135 N.M. at 241 , 86 P.3d at 1068 ; Hood, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59 .

See Druktenis, 135 N.M. at 241 , 86 P.3d at 1068 ; Hood, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 758–59.

See Druktenis , 135 N.M. at 241 , 86 P.3d at 1068 ; Hood , 790 N.Y.S.2d at 758–59.

See 2004r-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 91-94, 100-01, 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (stating that fundamental rights emanated from natural law, and “for the liberty interest to be a fundamental one, the interest must be one traditionally protected by our society, or rooted in history and tradition”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant); see also State v. Pacheco, 2007-NMSC-009, ¶ 10 , 141 N.M. 340 , 155 P.3d 745 (explaining that fundamental rights …

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 47 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 ; Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun.

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 15 , 135 N.M. 223 , 14 86 P.3d 1050 . (“In regard to Ex Post Facto Clause . . . constitutional attacks, there 15 exists a presumption of constitutionality, and the party attacking the constitutionality 16 of the statute has the burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional beyond all 17 reasonable doubt.”). 18 {27} In this case, Defendants argue that the sanctions (money damages) authorized 17 1 under FATA are penal in nature.

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 15 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 . (“In regard to Ex Post Facto Clause . . . constitutional attacks, there exists a presumption of constitutionality, and the party attacking the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt.”). {27} In this case, Defendants argue that the sanctions (money damages) authorized under FATA are penal in nature.

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 2 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 .

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, . . . we [will not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 44 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“It is [the d]efendant’s obligation to provide this Court with a sufficient record proper.”); State v. Hunter, 2001- NMCA-078, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 76 , 33 P.3d 296 (“Matters not of record present no issue for review.”).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA- 2 032, ¶ 47, 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 ; Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun.

See State v. Druktenis, 2We do note, however, that although the district court did not cite any authority in support of this specific finding, it did cite general authority describing what due process involves (notice and opportunity to be heard) from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, which we find inapplicable to these circumstances as stated below. 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 46 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).

See State v. 17 Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 46 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (citing United 2 We do note, however, that although the district court did not cite any authority in support of this specific finding, it did cite general authority describing what due process involves (notice and opportunity to be heard) from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, which we find inapplicable to these circumstances as stated below. 17 1 States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (…

See State v. Salas, 2017-NMCA-057, ¶ 42 , 400 P.3d 251 (“This Court reviews due process claims de novo.”). {12} A procedural due process claim requires us to “analyze whether there exist adequate procedures to assure that all the process that is constitutionally due has been provided before the final deprivation of a protected interest through [s]tate action.” State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 47 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 .

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 77 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant); State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29 , 147 N.M. 761 , 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will “not review un…

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that appellate courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant). {13} We turn to the State’s preserved arguments, which focus on the admissibility of documents printed …

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (refusing to review “even constitutional issues” if they were not preserved and were not raised for the first time on appeal in reply).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 .

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 122 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003-NMCA-077, ¶ 9 , 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 9 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[The d]efendant retained an attorney to negotiate a plea agreement.”).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 14 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (applying a de novo standard of review to challenges to a sex offender registration statute on grounds that the statute violated the ex post facto clauses and substantive and procedural due process).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 14 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (applying a de novo standard of review to challenges to a sex offender registration statute on grounds that the statute violated the ex post facto clauses and substantive and procedural due process).

SORNA provides that “[a] sex offender who willfully or knowingly fails to comply with [SORNA’s] registration requirements ... is guilty of a fourth degree felony[.]” Section 29-11A-4(N); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 22 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 . {27} A plain reading of the Jacob Wetter-ling Act and Megan’s Law demonstrates that Congress intended for the states to be the primary information gatherers and compliance enforcers for a national sex offender registration re…

See generally State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶¶ 50-52 , 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (discussing the meaning of substantive due process).

See State v. Druktenis, 2004- NMCA-032, ¶ 44, 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“It is [the d]efendant’s obligation to provide this Court with a sufficient record proper.”); State v. Hunter, 2001-NMCA-078, ¶ 18 , 131 N.M. 76 , 33 P.3d 296 (“Matters not of record present no issue for review.”). {7} Because Defendant has not established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we reject his claim.

See State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA- 032, ¶ 122, 135 N.M. 223 , 86 P.3d 1050 (“[G]enerally, [we] will [not] address issues not preserved below and raised for the first time on appeal.”); State v. Gutierrez, 2003- NMCA-077, ¶ 9, 133 N.M. 797 , 70 P.3d 787 (stating that courts normally do not review for fundamental or plain error when not requested by the appellant).

Section 29-11A-5(A)-(B); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 21 .

Section 29-11A-5(A)-(B); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 21 .

Section 29-11A-5(A)-(B); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 21 .

As stated in his brief, “[n]ot all of the following facts are supported 2 1 by the record.” We will not consider such facts, “and counsel should not refer to 2 matters not of record in their briefs.” In re Aaron L., 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 27 , 128 3 N.M. 641 , 996 P.2d 431 ; State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001 ¶ 53 , 126 N.M. 438 , 971 4 P.2d 829 (filed 1998) (“Where there is a doubtful or deficient record, every 5 presumption must be indulged by the reviewing court in favor of the corre…

See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 34 . {4} “Our main goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.

See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 34 . {4} “Our main goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.

See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 32 ; Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, ¶ 35 .

See Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 32 ; Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, ¶ 35 .