County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977)

Thus, McDougal is estopped to assert that the prohibition . . . against the sale of water is invalid, and he is bound by the limitation." 138 Cal.Rptr. at 476 , 564 P.2d at 18 . 6 The court specifically added, in a footnote to this quote, that in view of this holding it did not need to reach the constitutional question as to whether the permit's prohibition on the export of water was valid. 138 Cal.Rptr. at 476 , 564 P.2d at 18, n.3 .

The court specifically added, in a footnote to this quote, that in view of this holding it did not need to reach the constitutional question as to whether the permit’s prohibition on the export of water was valid. 138 Cal.Rptr. at 476 , 564 P.2d at 18, n.3 .

County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.3d 505, 511 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14, 18 (1977).

(See Prince v. Hill (1915) 170 Cal. 192, 195 [ 149 P. 578 ]; County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal. Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) This rule is closely related to the rule that a party may not, except in rare instances, change his theory from that upon which the case was tried.

On the other hand, in the context of environmental regulations, a Connecticut appellate court held that a permit “to conduct a regulated activity runs with the land” (Fromer v. Two Hundred Post Associates, 32 Conn. App. 799, 802 , 631 A.2d 347, 349 (1993)) and the California Supreme Court held that a conditional use permit runs with the land (County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal. 3d 505, 510 , 564 P.2d 14, 17 , 138 Cal. Rptr. 472, 475 (1977), citing Cohn v. County Board of…

(Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1013 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 884 P.2d 988 ]; County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; A. F. Estabrook Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1918) 177 Cal. 767, 771 [ 177 P. 848 ]; Prince v. Hill (1915) 170 Cal. 192, 195 [ 149 P. 578 ]; San Francisco v. Pacific Bank (1891) 89 Cal. 23, 25 [ 26 P. 615 ]; Kellogg v. Cochran (1890) 87 Cal. 192, 200 [ 25 P. 677 ]; Payne & Dewey v. Treadwe…

“It is a fundamental rule of appellate practice that an appellate court need not consider issues raised for the first time by a petition for rehearing.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 778, 782 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 324 ]; County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; see also, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1) [as a matter of policy, on petition for review we normally will not consider any issue that could have been …

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Edmonds v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 642, 650 [ 255 P.2d 772 ]; J-Marion Co. v. County of Sacramento (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 517, 523 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 723 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) TKPOA has pointed to nothing which would indicate that this rule is not fully applicable to it in this instance. 20 Upon a considerat…

After a thorough analysis of the issues raised for the first time on petition for hearing (but see County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]) and the contentions regarding alleged defects in our opinion, the memorandum concluded that real party’s contentions—new or rehashed—were meritless and did not warrant a rehearing.

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) But the only work done on the premises was the removal of dry rot and repairs to the roof and deck.

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510, 511 .) SDS argues that it is not enough to accept the benefit of a permit in order to be bound; a party must also accept its burden.

Judicial estoppel applies when “(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4t…

On the other hand, in the context of environmental regulations, a Connecticut appellate court held that a permit "to conduct a regulated activity runs with the land" (Fromer v. Two Hundred Post Associates, 32 Conn. App. 799, 802 , 631 A.2d 347, 349 (1993)) and the California Supreme Court held that a conditional use permit runs with the land (County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal. 3d 505, 510 , 564 P.2d 14, 17 , 138 Cal. Rptr. 472, 475 (1977), citing Cohn v. County Board of…

County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.3d 505 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14, 18 (1977) ("A number of cases have held that a landowner or his successor in title is barred from challenging a condition imposed upon the granting of a special permit if he has acquiesced therein by either specifically agreeing to the condition or failing to challenge its validity, and accepted the benefits afforded by the permit.”), appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question b…

See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 157 Cal.Rptr. 372 , 598 P.2d 25, 30 (1979) (holding that in denial of development case, proper remedy is invalidation of ordinance, not suit for monetary damages), aff’d, 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.3d 505 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14, 18 (1977) (dealing with rights of successor in title to challenge existing condition on land use), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 , 98 S.Ct. 4…

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) Where a use is consistent with applicable zoning, and a conditional use permit is either not required of has been obtained, then the next step generally would be to obtain a building permit, the issuance of which is presumptively a ministerial rather than discretionary act.

(Id. at p. 858; County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) A condition must be reasonably related to the use of the property for which the conditional use permit is requested. (§ 65909.) A condition which relates solely to the applicant for the conditional use permit does not relate to the use and zoning of the property.

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State of California, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d 642, 654 .) “If the conditions imposed by the city in the[] permit were invalid, Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 provided plaintiffs with the right and procedures to eliminate them.

(See County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) Accordingly, the declarations of restrictions run with the land and bind appellants even though they were not parties to the deed restrictions.

(Rossco Holdings Inc. v. State of California (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 642, 654 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 736 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ]; Cal. Zoning Practice, supra, § 12.11, at pp. 328-329.) “A landowner cannot challenge a condition imposed upon the granting of a permit after acquiescence in the condition by either specifically agreeing to the condition or failing to challenge its validity, and accepting the benefits afforded by the …

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ], states the rule similarly: “It is fundamental that a landowner who accepts a building permit and complies with its conditions waives the right to assert the invalidity of the conditions and sue the issuing public entity for the costs of complying with them. ...

(See County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].)

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) 7 That subdivision provides in pertinent part that “Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims.” * Ret…

Government Code section 65909 provides: “No local governmental body, or any agency thereof, may condition the issuance of any . . . use permit ... [^[] ... for any purpose not reasonably related to the use of the property for which the . . . use permit is requested.” Contrary local law or rulings “are deemed inoperative [§ 65909].” (Our italics; Wiltshire v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 296, 305 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 199 ].) County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d …

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) When a conditional use permit is obtained, the permittee may make those uses of the property authorized by the zoning ordinance in the absence of a permit and in addition those uses authorized by the permit.

(DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 179 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 367 P.2d 865 ], and cases cited.) Because the briefs in Raiders I contained nothing on the commerce clause issue and because denial of rehearing decides nothing on points raised for the first time in the rehearing petition (County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 513 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]), law of the case did not preclude commerce clause review in the trial court.

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; but see McLain Western #1 v. County of San Diego (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 772, 775-776 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 594 ].) It has been held that a violator’s good faith belief in the legality of his actions presented a defense to the imposition of civil penalties if such belief is found to have been reasonably entertained.

(Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 128 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 514 P.2d 111 ] County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 77-78 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) A landowner who complied with the conditions of a permit was said to have waived the right to bring a later legal challenge against the conditions.

(County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ]; Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 74, 76 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 804 ].) Instead, the property owner is generally limited to having the condition invalidated by a proceeding for writ of mandate.

(See, e.g., County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) Georgia-Pacific challenged the validity of the access conditions by bringing this action, which it commenced shortly after the permits were issued by the Commission.

(See County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ].) That court stated at page 511, “A number of cases have held that a landowner or his successor in title is barred from challenging a condition imposed upon the granting of a special permit if he has acquiesced therein by either specifically agreeing to the condition or failing to challenge its validity, and accepted the benefits afforded by the permit.

See County of Imperial v. McDougal , 19 Cal.3d 505 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 , [17] (1977).

(Id. at pp. 1606-1607.) The court explained that the company “could not, consistent with section 1126, manifest its acceptance of the conditions [placed on the new permit] and then wait until nearly two years later to challenge the premise on which they were self-evidently based.” (Id. at p. 1607; see also County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 511 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14 ] [challenge barred if landowner “has acquiesced therein by either specifically …

"It is fundamental that a landowner who accepts a building permit and complies with its conditions waives the right to assert the invalidity of the conditions and sue the issuing authority for the costs of complying with them." Id. at 805; see also, County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.3d 505 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 , 564 P.2d 14, 18 (1977); Schott v. City of Kingman, 461 F.2d 593 (9th Cir.1972). [T24] More recently, a California court of appeals rejected a landowner's belated…

Usually, “a proceeding [for a writ of administrative mandate] under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of the local-level agency. [Citation.] Unless a party seeks a declaration a statute or ordinance controlling development is facially unconstitutional as applied to all property governed and not to a particular parcel of land, an action for declaratory relief may not be had. [Cita…

See County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal. 3d 505 , 564 P.2d 14 , 138 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1977); Northpointe Plaza v. Rochester, 457 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. App. 1990).

See County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.3d 505 , 564 P.2d 14 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 472 (1977).

N.S. 525].) In determining whether or not the delay has been unreasonable, regard will be had to any circumstances which justify the delay, to the nature of the case and the relief demanded, and to the question whether the rights of the defendants, or of other persons, have been prejudiced by the delay.’ (See also Cahill v. Superior Court[ (1904)] 145 Cal. [42,] 46-47, to the same effect.)” (Lewis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 736, 740-741 .) …

Section 30801 declares that "[a]ny aggrieved person shall have a right to judicial review of any decision or action of the commission by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in accordance with Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure within 60 days after the decision or action has become final." (Italics added.) "[S]ection 30801's 60-day period constitutes a statute of limitations and generally bars untimely efforts to challenge coastal commission rulings." (Strother…

(Travis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 774 .) “[A]n action is not removed from the purview of section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(E) merely because the plaintiff claims the permit or condition was imposed under a facially unconstitutional or preempted law.” (Id. at p. 768; see also County of Imperial v. McDougal (1977) 19 Cal.3d 505, 510-511 [landowner barred from challenging condition imposed on granting of permit if he or she failed to challenge its validity and accepted the benef…