Lancaster v. State (2002)

Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45 , ¶ 15, 439 P.3d 753 , 757–58 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Griggs, ¶ 98, 367 P.3d at 1136 ) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo. 2002), overruled by Jones, ¶ 17, 439 P.3d 753 at 758 ). [¶20] Mr. LaJeunesse concedes the first three of these requirements were met.

"Because of the limited purpose for which the statement may be offered, the party contesting admission of the statement is entitled to a limiting instruction to that effect." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 15 , 43 P.3d 80, 87-88 (Wyo.2002).

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo.2002). [€¥99] The first element of the test is clearly satisfied as JM and CM testified at trial.

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 11-12 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (some internal citations omitted). [T6] The appellant's first argument is that the district court abused its discretion by admitting two statements from the doctor's testimony.

In arriving at that conclusion, we relied on factors usually applied to determine prejudicial error: The prosecutor did not ask improper questions, did not emphasize the two statements, did not follow up on them, did not refer to them during closing arguments, and did not attempt to exploit them in any way. 7 Id. [¶18] Following Beartusk, subsequent cases stated that to determine whether an improper comment on the right to remain silent occurred, we “consider whether the pro…

In arriving at that conclusion, we relied on factors usually applied to determine prejudicial error: The prosecutor did not ask improper questions, did not emphasize the two statements, did not follow up on them, did not refer to them during closing arguments, and did not attempt to exploit them in any way. 7 Id. [¶18] Following Beartusk, subsequent cases stated that to determine whether an improper comment on the right to remain silent occurred, we “consider whether the pro…

“However, ‘[t]he charge of fabrication or improper motive need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination; . . . it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the thrust of the defenses and testimony presented.’” Id. (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18 , 43 P.3d 80, 89 (Wyo. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Jones, ¶ 25, 439 P.3d at 761-62 ). [¶20] Mr. Thompson did not impeach Ms. Booth-Thompson’s credibility in a manner …

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 36 , 43 P.3d 80, 95 (Wyo. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45 , 439 P.3d 753 (Wyo. 2019).

See Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, 130 , 131 P.3d 348, 356 (Wyo.2006) (aggravated assault and battery); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 45 , 43 P.3d 80, 98 (Wyo.2002) (intent to kill); Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 676 (Wyo.1999) (intent to kill); Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 668 (Wyo.1993) (intent to kill).

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 61 , 43 P.3d 80, 102-03 (Wyo.2002) (emphasis in original).

"The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32 , 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002).

A trial court's evidentiary rulings `"are entitled to considerable deference,"' and will not be reversed on appeal so long as `"there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling. . . ."'" Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 16 , 63 P.3d 875, 883 (Wyo. 2003) ( quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002).

“It is the consistency, rather than the substance of the consistent statement, which takes such a statement out of the realm of objectionable hearsay and tends to prove the value of the original statement.” Maier, ¶ 12, 273 P.3d at 1087 (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d 80, 88-89 (Wyo. 2002) (other quotation omitted)).

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)).

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)).

Hicks, 2021 WY 2, ¶ 26 , 478 P.3d at 660 (citing Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 , 1276- 77 (Wyo. 1986), receded from on other grounds by Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 16 , 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo. 2002)).

When it comes to testimonial evidence, this Court has emphasized the trial court “must ascertain exactly why the jury wants to view the [testimonial evidence], must decide whether the [evidence] will give the jury key facts without unduly emphasizing a witness’s testimony, and must only show the relevant portions under carefully controlled procedures.” Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1276-77 (Wyo. 1986), receded from on other grounds by Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 16…

The district court stated the jury “necessarily understands that the lighting is not exactly as it was at the time of the incident; for one, it was filmed during daylight hours, and I think there’s some daylight going through [the window].” The court further explained, “it would be incumbent upon counsel to have pointed out [the difference in the lighting conditions] to the jury when the trial was being conducted[.]” [¶26] We addressed what materials the jury should be allow…

Id. at ¶ 28, 449 P.3d at 322 (citing Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 36 , 43 P.3d 80, 95 (Wyo. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45 , 439 P.3d 753 (Wyo. 2019)).

When a claim of ineffectiveness rests on counsel’s failure to raise an issue in a motion to suppress 6 This is particularly true when defense counsel did move to suppress, but did not challenge the duration of the stop. 6 evidence, “prejudice will result where, in the absence of that evidence, ‘only a limited amount of evidence was available to the prosecution to support a conviction.’” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 59 , 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Dickeson, 843…

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)).

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)). [¶24] Similarly, “we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” Yellowbear v. State, 2008 WY 4, ¶ 66 , 174 P.3d 1270, 1295…

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)). [¶58] We previously applied the abuse of discretion standard to review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion in a circumstance analogous to…

It should not be considered by you for any other purpose, and I'm specifically instructing you that it should not be considered directly as proof of the matters asserted within that tape. 2002 WY 45, ¶ 10 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002).

“Determining whether the trial court' abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court' could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (citing Trwjillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000)).

“Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000)).

"Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000)).

"Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (citing Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000)).

"The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue." Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 39 , 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo.2005) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32 , 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002)). [119] As we explained above, see supra 112, while the statement regarding "gaps" in the appellant's criminal history was gauche-and at worst not entirely accurate-the gist of the statement was to capture the appellant's lengthy crimina…

"Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002).

"The burden of establishing prosecu-torial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32 , 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002); Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38 , 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo.2005). [131] Jones identifies four alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative effect of which allegedly denied him a fair trial: 1.

Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26 , 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo.2007) (citing Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo.2002)).

We are not contending that the story changed, Your Honor. 5 . - In Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 22 , 43 P.3d 80, 91 (Wyo.2002), we undertook a brief discussion concerning a party's contention that a prior consistent statement may be admissible even when not offered to rebut one of the claims specified in 801(d)(1)(B).

See Duke, ¶ 80, 99 P.3d at 952 (counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue lesser-included offense instruction which lacked a legal basis and would have been refused by trial court); Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 35 , 100 P.3d 1229, 1238 (Wyo.2004) (counsel not ineffective for failing to seek exclusion of evidence properly admissible under W.R.E. 404(b)); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58 , 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo.2002) (ineffectiveness cannot be premised on counsel's…

"Counsel is not ineffective for failing to [make] a motion that would not have been granted." Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 53 , 105 P.3d 1049, 1071 (Wyo.2005) (citing Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58 , 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wy.2002)).

Finally, in Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 69 , 43 P.3d 80, 105 (Wyo.2002), we described how a community caretaker case may become an eventual arrest: The lesson to be learned from these cases is that resolution of a search and seizure issue in the context of an investigatory stop that becomes an arrest requires application of a totality of the cireum-stances test.

Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶¶16 , 63 P.3d 875, 883 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶11 , 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002); Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo.2000)).

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 39 , 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo.2002).

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 39-40 , 43 P.3d 80, 96-97 (Wyo.2002); Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11, ¶ 24 , 17 P.3d 34, 39 (Wyo.2001). [116] In analyzing right-to-gilence claims, we consider the "entire context in which the statements were made" and we will "not take sentences and phrases out of context." Spinmer, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d at 1024 (quoting Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 373 (Wyo.2000)).

“The burden of establishing prose-cutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32 , 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002).

We also consider “ ‘whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, *29 and whether he attempted to exploit the issue in any way.’” Spinner, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19 , 75 P.3d at 1024 (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 39 , 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo.2002)).

Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 405, at 18182 (2d ed.2004) (the use of a prior consistent statement is not intended to enable a party to prove important details lying beyond that testimony merely because they are consistent with its general tenor); Lancaster v. State, 43 P.3d 80, 89 (Wyo.2002)(“[M]aterial information presented for the first time to support a prior ‘consistent statement’ has no antecedent with which to be consistent or inconsistent and is, therefore, inadmiss…

We said: “although some of the isolated questions and answers may have been irrelevant, taken as a whole, the testimony was relevant as proof of [the serious bodily injury] element of the crime.” Id. [¶ 29] More recently, in Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶46 , 43 P.3d 80, 98-99 (Wyo.2002), we held the challenged victim impact testimony in totality was relevant to the issue of whether the defendant intended to kill the victim, while testimony concerning the “emotional fallo…

“The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue.” Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32 , 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002).

When ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged due to counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion, “[prejudice to a defendant can only be shown where, had the *133 motion been made, it would have been granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, ‘ “only a limited amount of evidence was available to the prosecution to support a conviction.” ’ ” Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8 , 63 P.3d 904, 909 (Wyo.2003), abrogated on other grounds by TJS v. State, 2005 WY 68 , 113 P.…

The appellant’s burden to show prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel at the suppression hearing is akin to the showing required for failing to file a suppression motion: "[p]rejudice to a defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, ' "only a limited amount of evidence was available to the prosecution to support a conviction.” ’ " Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶ 8 , 63 P.…

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58 , 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo.2002); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo.1995), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 944 , 122 S.Ct. 2631 , 153 L.Ed.2d 812 (2002); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo.1992).

Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 61 , 43 P.3d 80, 102-03 (Wyo.2002) (emphasis in original).

We also consider " 'whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to exploit the issue in any way.' " Spinner, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19 , 75 P.3d at 1024 (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 39 , 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo.2002)). [¶13] In Tortolito, the victim and a bus driver told police that Tortolito had committed a robbery.

However, "[nlei-ther the federal nor the state constitution forbids all searches and seizures; rather, they prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 61 , 43 P.3d 80, ¶ 61 (Wyo.2002) (citing Guerra v. State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo.1995)).