Badillo v. American Brands, Inc. (2001)

In Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435 (2001) (en banc), the plaintiffs and the proposed class members included groups of smokers and groups of “casino employees (both nonsmokers and former smokers) who claim exposure to environmental or secondhand tobacco smoke at work.” Id. at 38, 16 P.3d at 438.

See Vega v. Eastern Courtyard Assocs., 117 Nev. ___ , ___ n. 5, 24 P.3d 219 , 220 n. 5 (2001) (noting that this court will not consider an issue when resolution of the issue would not affect the outcome of a case); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. ___ , ___, 16 P.3d 435, 440 (2001) (stating that this court need not consider an issue that has not been fully raised by appellant or meaningfully briefed by either party). [3] See NRCP 56(c); Butler v. Bogdanovich, 101 N…

Id. at 38, 16 P.3d at 438.

See In Re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (7th Cir.1995); see also Badillo, 16 P.3d at 441 (“Nor is there agreement whether present physical injury is required ... [s]ome jurisdictions do not require present physical injury, while others do.”).

The court reasoned that "[w]hen recognized as a remedy, medical monitoring is usually tied to a cause of action in trespass, nuisance, strict liability, or negligence." 16 P.3d at 440 (citations omitted).

See, Price v. High Pointe Oil Co., Inc., 493 Mich. 238, 260 , 828 N.W.2d 660, 672-73 (2013) (“when it comes to alteration of the common law, the traditional rule must prevail absent compelling reasons for change”); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34, 42 , 16 P.3d 435, 440 (2001) (concluding that while court had power to “create a common law cause of action,” it would “construe such power narrowly and exercise it cautiously”).

See, Price v. High Pointe Oil Co., Inc., 493 Mich. 238, 260 , 828 N.W.2d 660, 672-73 (2013) (“when it comes to alteration of the common law, the traditional rule must prevail absent compelling reasons for change”); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34, 42 , 16 P.3d 435, 440 (2001) (concluding that while court had power to “create a common law cause of action,” it would “construe such power narrowly and exercise it cautiously”).

Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) (permitting medical monitoring damages when liability is established under a traditional tort law theory of recovery); and Nevada, Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 437 (Nev. 2001) (“We conclude that Nevada common law does not recognize a medical monitoring cause of action but the remedy of medical monitoring may be available.”).

LEXIS 106433 , at *7 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 10, 2009) (medical monitoring recognized as a form of tort damages in Ohio); Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 601 (W.D.Wash.2001) (declining to create new and independent tort for medical monitoring because flight attendants exposed to second-hand smoke, with present injury, could seek medical monitoring as remedy to a negligence cause of action); Meyer v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo.2007) (medical monitoring is a compens…

Co., 473 Mich. 63 , 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Mich.2005) (holding that Michigan law does not recognize a medical monitoring action absent present injury); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435, 440-41 (Nev.2001) (holding that Nevada law does not recognize a medical monitoring cause of action absent a present injury); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079 , 207 Or.App. 532, 556-57 (Or.Ct.App.2006) (holding that Oregon law does not permit recovery for…

See Lowe, 183 P.3d at 187 ("[W]e hold that negligent conduct that results only in a significantly increased risk of future injury that requires medical monitoring does not give rise to a claim for negligence."); Badillo, 16 P.3d at 441 ("[W]e are unpersuaded on the facts of this case to recognize a cause of action or remedy for medical monitoring for exposure to hazardous substances.").

Co., 473 Mich. 63 , 701 N.W.2d 684, 686 (2005) (holding that Michigan law does not recognize a medical monitoring action absent present injury); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435, 440-41 (2001) (holding that Nevada law does not recognize a medical monitoring cause of action absent a present injury); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079 , 207 Or.App. 532, 556-57 (Or.Ct.App.2006) (holding that Oregon law does not permit recovery for a medica…

See Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858 (referring to medical monitoring claims as “a complex and sweeping change to traditional tort law”); Badillo, 16 P.3d at 438 (stating that “[mjedical monitoring is a novel, non-traditional tort and remedy”).

See Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435 (2001).

See Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435 (2001).

See Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34, 38 , 16 P.3d 435, 437 (2001) (declining to answer a certified question). 7 However, the remaining questions posed by the bankruptcy court squarely fit within the Volvo criteria.

See, e.g., Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 117 Nev. 34 , 16 P.3d 435 (2001); Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 206 W.Va. 133 , 522 S.E.2d 424, 429-430 (1999); Bourgeois v. A.P.

See, e.g., Badillo, 16 P.3d at 438 ("Medical monitoring is a novel, non-traditional tort and remedy.”). 11 .

See Badillo v. American Brands Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438-39 (Nev. 2001) (noting that, at most, only 17 states plus the District of Columbia have recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring).