In Re Albrecht (2002)

Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73, 78 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).

Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73, 78 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).

See Gonzales, 658 N.W.2d at 102–03 (requiring recent over[t] act where respondent was discharged from confinement for sexually violent offense, but was incarcerated for motor-vehicle-related violation); In re Albrecht, . . . 51 P.3d 73, 78 (Wash. 2002) (requiring proof of recent overt act, where at time the petition was filed respondent had completed two-year prison term for sexually violent offense but was serving jail sentence for violating the community placement portion …

See In re Det. ofAlbrecht 147 Wn.2d 1, 7 , 51 P. 3d 73 ( 2002) ( "[ t] he dangerousness must be current. ").

However, we decline to reach the question of whether a procedural bar, similar to one announced in State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168 , 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), applies. 9 According to the Washington court, a "recent overt act" is "any act that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm." In re Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73, 77 (Wash. 2002).

Accord In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d 1, 7-8 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002). ¶ 14 Proof of a recent overt act may be required to establish current dangerousness.

See RCW 71.09.030(5), which permits the State to file a sexually violent predator petition where "a person who at any time previously has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and has since been released from total confinement and has committed a recent overt act. " Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 10 , 51 P.3d 73 . [4] The lead opinion relies on Henrickson yet Albrecht distinguished the cases: Our opinion speaks only to the limited situation where the State files a sexual pr…

See Young, 122 Wash.2d at 41 , 857 P.2d 989 . *1001 ¶ 39 The constitutional justification for civil confinement is current dangerousness caused by a mental defect plus a recent overt act, which "satisfies the dangerousness element required by due process." Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 11 , 51 P.3d 73 ; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997).

Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 41-42 , 857 P.2d 989 (1993); see also RCW 71.09.020(10) ("`Recent overt act' means any act or threat that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and mental condition of the person engaging in the act."). [7] Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 11 , 51 P.3d 73 . [8] RCW 71.09.060; In re Det. of Henrickson, 140 Wash.2d 686, 697 , 2 …

See In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002). 147 Wn.2d 1 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002). 109 Wn.

Accord In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1, 7-8 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002). ¶14 Proof of a recent overt act may be required to establish current dangerousness.

Consequently, to require that the Department allege and prove a recent overt act while the individual is in a total confinement setting "would be impossible [for the Department] to meet" and "due process does not require that the absurd be done before a compelling state interest may be vindicated." In re Turay, 150 Wash.2d 71, 83 , 74 P.3d 1194 (2003); see also Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 8-9 , 51 P.3d 73 . ¶ 23 But when "the offender has been released into the community, proof…

See In re Pet, of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1, 8 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002).

See generally In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d 1, 7 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002).

See generally In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1, 7 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002).

See Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 5 , 51 P.3d 73 (offender arrested for violating a community placement condition 30 days after release from prison); Henrickson, 140 Wash.2d at 689, 691 , 2 P.3d 473 (offenders, Henrickson and Halgren, were released into the community for three years and three months, respectively, before reincarcerated); Young, 122 Wash.2d at 42 , 857 P.2d 989 (offender Cunningham was released and living in the community for over four months prior to the State's …

See In re Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73, 77-78 (Wash. 2002).

See In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1, 51 P.3d 73 (2002) (reviewing the question as a matter of law).

See Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 8 , 51 P.3d 73 ; RCW 71.09.030(5).

See Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 7 , 51 P.3d 73 .

See, e.g., In re Albrecht , 147 Wn.2d 1 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002).

See Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d at 11 , 51 P.3d 73 .

See In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wn.2d 1 , 51 P.3d 73 (2002) (court’s main objective in construing a statute is to carry out legislature’s intent); Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740, 757 , 49 P.3d 867 (2002) (court’s fundamental objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and carry out legislature’s intent).