United States v. Mohammad Hassan (2014)

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 151 (4th Cir. 2014).

See Hassan , 742 F.3d at 146 ("A person intending to only be 'in for a penny,' with the slightest connection to an established conspiracy, actually risks being 'in for a pound.' ").

The authentication burden under Rule 901, however, “is not high.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly a prima facie showing is required.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014).

See Kobito, 994 F.3d at 700; United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 148 (4th Cir. 2014).

See Kobito, 994 F.3d at 700 ; United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 148 (4th Cir. 2014).

Diaz-Alvarado testified that on the night of the murder the group set out to “do something” about “another chavala[].” J.A. 892. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4330 Doc: 105 Filed: 04/14/2025 Pg: 12 of 14 error occurs only when the proffered “instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to…

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[w]e apply a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial court’s “decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). 2.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[w]e apply a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial court’s “decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). 2.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, “[w]e apply a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial court’s “decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). 2.

Id.; United States v. Banks, 29 F.4th 168, 181 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

“We apply a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review . . . and a trial court’s ‘decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.’ ” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)).

Here, we apply “a highly deferential standard of review to . . . a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection,” and that decision “will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, we apply “a highly deferential standard of review to . . . a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection,” and that decision “will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The difference was between “second-hand information” and “foundational personal perception needed under Rule 701.” Id.; see also United States v. White, No. 21-4197, 2023 WL 3597546 , at 45 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4671 Doc: 68 Filed: 06/24/2024 Pg: 46 of 49 *3 (4th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the personal knowledge requirement is not satisfied by post-hoc assessments about a conversation one had not participated in.”) (citations omitted); Walker, 32 F.4…

We apply “a highly deferential standard of review to 15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1393 Doc: 53 Filed: 05/03/2024 Pg: 16 of 29 such an issue, and a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the context of lay opinion testimony as to the meaning of conversations, we have repeatedly held that the personal knowledge requirement is not satisfied by “‘post- hoc assessments’ about a conversation [one] had not participated in.” United States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 325 (4th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 136 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have ruled that testimony regarding a witness’s …

Accordingly, “a trial court’s ‘decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.’” 4 USCA4 Appeal: 21-4094 Doc: 23 Filed: 04/05/2023 Pg: 5 of 6 United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 265 ).

While Hoffler’s role in the conspiracy may have been more limited than that of Pippens and Johnson, “[m]any conspirators may be less culpable than their coconspirators without being substantially so,” United States v. Guerrero-Deleon, 713 F. App’x 163, 166 (4th Cir. 2017) (unpublished), and a mitigating-role reduction “is not automatically awarded to the least culpable conspirator,” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 150 (4th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 135 (4th Cir. 2014). 8 USCA4 Appeal: 18-4161 Doc: 247 Filed: 08/09/2022 Pg: 9 of 12 Rule 106 is not a device for a party to evade testifying and facing cross-examination.

Stated another way, “testimony regarding a witness’s understanding of what the defendant meant by certain statements is permissible lay testimony, so long as the witness’s understanding is predicated on his knowledge and participation in the conversation.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 136 (4th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 135 (4th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 135 (4th Cir. 2014).

See United States v. Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d 693, 699-700 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1108, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mohamed, 757 F.3d 757, 759-60 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright, 747 F.3d 399 , 408- 09 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 148 (4th Cir. 2014); Awan, 607 F.3d at 317 .

Rather, “an inconsistent verdict can result from mistake, compromise, or lenity, and a jury could just as likely err in acquitting as in convicting.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 305 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that several explanations existed for the jury’s inconsistent verdicts); see United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 , 144 n.36 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[A] jury is permitted to return an inconsistent verdict if it sees fit to do so.”).

See Hassan, 742 F.3d at 132 (“Although linking the appellants to extremist jihadist groups was undoubtedly prejudicial, it would not unfairly so.

Equity Grp., LLC, 413 S.C. 58 , 64–65, 773 S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

“Importantly, the burden to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high—only a prima facie showing is required . . . .” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014).

“A court abuses its discretion if it misconstrues or misapplies the law or otherwise reaches a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair result.” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 10 . ¶ 11 Under CRE 901(a), the requirement that evidence be authenticated “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” “The burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie showing is required . . . .’” Glover, ¶ 13…

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 42 . “[A] ‘[trial] court’s role is to serve as gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.’” Glover, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)). ¶ 45 “A proponent of evidence may establish the authenticity of evidence in numerous ways.” Id. at ¶ 14.

The trial court must assess “whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.” Glover, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)). ¶ 41 Trial courts have broad discretion “to consider a variety of foundational circumstances depending on the nature of the proffered evidence.” Gonzales, ¶ 30.

Evid. 901(a)). “{T]he burden to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high,” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2009)), and can be satisfied by offering testimony of a witness with knowledge of the evidence, Fed.

App. 510, 519 , 782 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2016) (quoting U.S. v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

The burden to authenticate presents a low bar; “only a prima facie showing is required.” Glover, ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

“The burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie showing is required,’ and ‘a district court’s role is to serve as a gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.’” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

In other words, the proposed testimony does not seek to judge the character of any Defendant individually, but rather offers an opinion on the objectives of the October 30 “Trump Train.” Such evidence may be prejudicial in the sense that “all evidence tending to show a defendant’s guilt” is “prejudicial.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2006)).

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

Evid. 5.602. “[T]he burden to authenticate is not high—only a prima facie showing is required, and a district court’s role is to serve as gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation from which a jury could reasonable find that the evidence is authentic.” State v. Goodwin, No. 18-1822, 2020 WL 1551149 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (cleaned up) (relying on and quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

“However, ‘the burden to authenticate under Rule 901 is not high.’” United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230 , 236–37 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Apr. 10, 2014) (citing United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132-33 (4th Cir. 2014)). copy of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections inmate abuse procedures, are relevant to Mr. Gorrio’s excessive force claim.3 The Court will exclude Exhibits 2-4, 79-88, 91, 92, 95, and 96.

Private Equity Grp., LLC, 413 S.C. 58, 64 , 773 S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Evid. 602 (requiring lay witnesses to have “personal knowledge” of the matter about which they are testifying); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 135 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a witness’s opinion about another party’s statement is admissible only if the “witness’s understanding is predicated on his knowledge and participation in the conversation”).

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

Id. at 237 ; see also United States v. Zhu, 854 F.3d 247, 257 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 629 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014).

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

But [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 901 does require that the proponent submit ‘a satisfactory foundation’ from which a jury could ‘reasonably find that the evidence is authentic.’” Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 173 F. Supp. 3d 258, 269 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Equity Grp., LLC, 413 S.C. 58, 64 , 773 S.E.2d 607, 610 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Davis, 918 F.3d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 2019) (considering Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and holding the proponent was required to make "only a prima facie showing that the 'true author' is who the proponent claims it to be").

The Daubert factors are not exhaustive and illustrate the type of factors “that will bear on the inquiry.” United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir. 2014).

“The initial burden on a proponent of an arbitration agreement is not high.” See id. at 269 (quoting United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also Fed.