United States v. Finch (2014)

Where the record contains factual circumstances that objectively 5 United States v. Ryder, No. ACM 40605 support the guilty plea to a more narrowly construed statute or legal principle, the guilty plea may be accepted.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting Negron, 60 M.J. at 141 ).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F.2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 98 , 190 L.Ed.2d 40 (2014).

R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B); United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 147 (C.A.A.F. 2014); United States v. Beaty, 70 M.J. 39 , 42 n.7 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

While the definition of child pornography in 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (8) "does not distinguish between minors and actual minors,” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F.2014), the clear import of Supreme Court precedent is that statutes under the United States Code may constitutionally criminalize only child pornography that either involves actual children or is obscene.

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). “[W]hen a plea of guilty is attacked for the first time on appeal, the facts will be viewed in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.” United States v. Arnold, 40 M.J. 744, 745 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a sub- stantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)); see also United States v. Phillips, 74 M.J. 20 , 21–22 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citing Finch).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a sub- stantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

Where the record contains factual circumstances that objectively support the guilty plea to a more narrowly construed statute or legal principle, the guilty plea may be accepted.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting Negron, 60 M.J. at 141 ).

An appel- lant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). “[W]hen a plea of guilty is attacked for the first time on appeal, the facts will be viewed in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.” United States v. Arnold, 40 M.J. 744, 745 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994) (citation omitted).

An appel- lant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). “[W]hen a plea of guilty is attacked for the first time on appeal, the facts will be viewed in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.” United States v. Arnold, 40 M.J. 744, 745 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994) (citation omitted).

An appel- lant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). “[W]here a guilty plea is first attacked on appeal, we must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Hub- bard, 28 M.J. 203, 209 (C.M.A. 1989) (Cox, J., concurring).

An appellant bears the “burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). “[W]here a guilty plea is first attacked on appeal, we must construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Hub- bard, 28 M.J. 203, 209 (C.M.A. 1989) (Cox, J., concurring).

The appellant bears the burden of establishing that the military judge abused that discretion, i.e., that the record shows a substantial basis in law or fact to question the plea.” United States v. Phillips, 74 M.J. 20 , 21–22 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citing United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014); United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008)).

The record is not clear if the offenses are precisely the same, but assuming without deciding they are the same, the dual- sovereignty doctrine renders this question moot. 12United States v. Price, 76 M.J. 136, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 74 M.J. 20, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2015)) (citing United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014)) (alteration in original).

We must determine whether the record as a whole shows “a sub- stantial basis in law and fact for questioning the guilty plea.” United States v. 4 AE I at 4. 4 United States v. Spence, NMCCA No. 201800241 Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). 13 United States v. Calloway, No. ACM S32509, Misc.

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

“Appellant has the burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)). 2 United States v. Anderson, No. ACM 38959 The military judge conducted the inquiry required by United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969), and correctly advised Appellant that the ele- ments of the offense of adultery were: (1) at the times…

“Appellant has the burden to demonstrate a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.” United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applicable Legal Principles We review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Finch, 73 M.

Consistent with Beaty and United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014), when all the elements of a federal crime, except the jurisdictional element, are included in a Clause 1 or 2, Article 134, UCMJ, specification, the analogous federal statute provides the maximum punishment.

Finch, 73 M.J. at 148 (ellipses in original).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 98 (2014).

R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B); United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 147 (C.A.A.F. 2014); Beaty, 70 M.J. at 42 n.7.

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F.2014).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (citing United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).

Consistent with Beaty and United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2014), when all the elements of a federal crime, except the jurisdictional element, are included in a clause 1 or 2 Article 134, UCMJ, specification, the analogous federal statute provides the maximum punishment.

Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 322 ; see also United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 149 (C.A.A.F.2014) (holding that a single inconsistent reference to images of virtual minors during the providence inquiry did not “establish that a substantial basis in law or fact exists to reject his plea" where the appellant pled guilty to possessing images of actual minors).

See United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 147 (C.A.A.F. 2014); R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(B).

IV, ¶ 64b.f.; see also United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 2 KING—ARMY 20140574 22 digital images in a folder entitled “2 sisters”; 6 digital images in a folder entitled “Awesome 12yo”; 6 digital images in a folder entitled “Carrie (JB)”; and 31 video files in a folder entitled “Vids”; all images and videos depicting minors, or what appears to be minors, engaging in sexually explicit conduct, such conduct being of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed f…

See United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144, 153 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (noting this provision of the MCM now covers both categories of images and both are treated the same for punishment purposes).

See United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

See United States v. Finch, 73 M.J. 144 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

See Finch, 73 M.J. at 148 ; Rule for Courts-Martial 1003(c)(1)(B)(ii) (an offense not listed in or closely related to one listed in the Manual for Courts-Martial is punishable as authorized by the United States Code).