Morris Jackson v. Keith Smith (2014)

Offenses are not the same when, looking at their statutory elements, they each “require[] proof of a fact which the other does not.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)); United States v. Evans, 951 F.2d 729, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1991).

That the state court’s treatment of the issue is brief has no bearing on whether or not it reached the merits—we are required to “presume[] that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011)).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011); see also Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[C]laims not ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by the state court are given plenary review by a federal habeas court, even where AEDPA otherwise applies.”); Burton v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 770 (6th Cir. 2004).

We have held that the Constitution does not “require . . . courts to apply Blockburger to resolve [a] double jeopardy claim.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014).

However, in Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014), we explicitly held that the Supreme Court in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), overruled Danner.

That, in turn, means that “the applicable substantive law is limited to federal law ‘clearly established’ by the holdings of Supreme Court decisions.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).

Because the basis for the state court’s decision “subsumes the [Brady] standard,” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301 , a ruling on the integrated issue was “entirely dispositive” of the Brady claim and “necessarily resolved” it on the merits, Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted).

Because the basis for the state court’s decision “subsumes the [Brady] standard,” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301 , a ruling on the integrated issue was “entirely dispositive” of the Brady claim and “necessarily resolved” it on the merits, Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted). 7 Case Nos. 20-3472/3496, Smith v. Warden, Toledo Corr.

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014).

Id. ; see Jackson v. Smith , 745 F.3d 206 , 209 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[C]laims not 'adjudicated on the merits' by the state court are given plenary review by a federal habeas court ....").

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled on a different issue by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

(Return, ECF No. 9, PageID 1174) (citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2014)).

PAGEID 2556 (citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014) (“What determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.

See also Jackson, 745 F.3d at 211 (“What determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.”); Scott v. Turner, No. 20-4028, 2021 WL 1327145 , *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2021) (noting the state court’s R.C. 2941.25 determination on merger of allied offenses “is conclusive” on habeas review).

See also Jackson, 745 F.3d at 211 (“What determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.”); Scott v. Turner, No. 20-4028, 2021 WL 1327145 , *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2021) (noting that the state-court’s R.C. 2941.25 determination on merger of allied offenses “is conclusive” on habeas review).

Finally—and ostensibly in the alternative—the Magistrate Judge cited to Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014) for the proposition that “the Sixth Circuit has held that an Ohio court of appeals decision of a double jeopardy claim which is limited to the application of Ohio Rev.

(R & R at PageID #227, ECF No. 17 (quoting Volpe v. Trim, 708 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009)).) And because the Ohio court applied Ohio law and determined “that the offenses of felonious assault and voluntary manslaughter are distinct and do nor [sic] merge,” the R & R finds that “this Court is bound to accept its conclusion.” (R & R at PageID #227, ECF No. 17 (citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 213 (6th Cir. 2014)).) Scott filed an Objection (ECF No. 20) to the R & R on …

Jackson (Morris) v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).3 What determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 8 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632 , 705 (1999), overruled prospectively by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010) (see Volpe v. Trim, 708 F.3d 688 F.3d 688, 701 (6th Cir. 2013).

V; Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210-11 (6th Cir. 2014).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2014).

Code § 2941.25 “is entirely dispositive of the federal double jeopardy claim.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2014.) A state court’s incorrect application of Ohio’s allied offenses statute would not be an error of federal law.

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014).

“What determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014).

The Ohio courts' handling of its allied offenses statute is not cognizable on federal habeas review.”) (citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2014)). 4 Rodriguez does not argue that cause or prejudice exists to excuse the procedural default of these claims. 23 Moreover, to the extent Rodriguez’s Petition could be interpreted as raising a double jeopardy claim, any such claim also fails.

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014) (federal courts are to apply heightened standards of review “to ‘any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State Court proceedings.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)).

In support, the Magistrate Judge cited Sixth Circuit precedent holding a state court’s analysis of § 2941.25 “is entirely dispositive of the federal double jeopardy claim.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014).

Stated differently, “[l]egislative intent is the touchstone; it, and not the Blockburger test, determines whether two offenses are the same and, if so, whether multiple punishments are nevertheless intended.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) (“with respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing …

“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)).

Laws § 750 .227a. 78 determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014).

This rule applies where, as here, the state court “confined its analysis to state-law authorities.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Bobby, 656 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 2011)); cf. Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 362 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying de novo review where the state court decided the petitioner’s Brady claim on state procedural grounds by concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim).

Code. § 2941.25; Henley v. Marquis, No. 18-4209, 2019 WL 9047226 , at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2019) (citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014)); State v. Ursic, 7th Dist.

See Nash v. Eberlin, 258 F. App’x 761 , 764 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (“a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument is a state-law argument”); Schwarzman v. Gray, No. 17-3859, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 27193 , at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2018) (“A manifest- weight-of-the-evidence claim in Ohio is a state law claim that is similar to but ultimately different from a federal constitutional claim that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction”); Minor v. Wainwright, No. 19-3206, 2019…

Code § 2941.25 is entirely dispositive of the federal double jeopardy claim (Report, ECF No. 59, PageID 2556, citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014)).

IT IS SO ORDERED Dated: July 21, 2021 JAMES S. GWIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2), (e)(1). 13 , 745 F.3d 206, 214 (6th Cir. 2014) (“At worst, the state court incorrectly applied Ohio’s allied offenses statute to determine the legislature’s intent.

See Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[C]laims not ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by the state court are given plenary review by a federal habeas court[.]”) Although Chapman’s “reasonable doubt” standard applies on direct appeal, federal habeas relief cannot issue unless the alleged error was not harmless under the standard announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014), quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Potts properly preserved his double jeopardy claim for habeas review by raising it before the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court.62 The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids multiple punishments for the same offense.63 Whether two offenses are in fact “the same offense” is a question of legislative intent.64 And in this federal habeas posture, legislative intent is an Ohio law question.65 In evaluating a double jeopardy habeas claim, this Court is accordingly bound by…

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014), quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted).

However, as the Report notes, an Ohio court decision on a claim under Ohio Revised Code § 2941.25 is dispositive of a Double Jeopardy claim based on the same facts (ECF No. 3, PageID 23, citing Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled on a different issue by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010)).

Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014), citing State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St. 3d 632, 705 (1999), overruled by State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St. 3d 153 (2010).

However, “[w]hat determines whether the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated is the state legislature’s intent concerning punishment.” Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 2014).

To the extent that this claim may be liberally construed to raise a claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Jackson v. Smith, 745 F.3d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 2014); Ball v. Knab, No. 2:09-cv-480, 2010 WL 4570226 , at *7-8 (S.D.