Cluster 265954 (1964)

Cf. United States v. One 1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283, 286-87 (1st Cir.1982) (burden is on parties to request oral argument pursuant to local rules and, if not requested, argument is waived); but see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3091 [1973] [same]; but see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 [9th Cir.1964] [invalidating local rule not permitting oral argument on request by non-mov-ant to summary judgment motion]; see also Annot., “Federal Courts: Necessity of Hearing and Oral Argument on Motions for Summary Judgment or for Judgment on the Pleadings”, 1 A.L.R.

But cf. Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 461-462 (9th Cir. 1964).

He cites Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.1964), for the proposition that the "failure to permit oral argument on the motions for summary judgment requires that the judgments be reversed and the causes remanded for further proceedings." Id. at 462. 14 Dredge did establish that "a district court may not, by rule or otherwise, preclude a party from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request when made by a party opposing the motion unless the motion for…

See Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 462 n.14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”); cf. United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the view that failure of counsel to appear at oral argument amounts to a per se Sixth Amendment violation, noting that “[o]ral argument on appeal is not required by the C…

Co., 373 F.2d 493, 496-98 (5th Cir.1967) (addressing final judgment granted after court, without prior notice, converted motion to dismiss into summary judgment motion and granted summary judgment after preliminary injunction hearing); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964) (holding that district court could not apply local rule to preclude oral argument); see also Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir.2000) (stating “court does not ordinarily revie…

Although a district court is not permitted to deny a request for oral argument made by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment unless the motion is denied, see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964), in order to justify reversing the district court, Callbreath must show prejudice, see Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir.1998), which he cannot do.

Although AD/SAT argues that oral argument should have been permitted given the complexity of the issues, it presents no basis for concluding that resolving the summary judgment motion solely on the basis of the extensive record and the elaborate motion papers exceeded the District Court's discretion. 30 In support of its argument, AD/SAT relies on the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-2 (9th Cir. 1964), which held that…

In support of its argument, AD/SAT relies on the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964), which held that a court may not deny a request for oral argument on a motion for summary judgment unless the court intends to rule in favor of the party requesting argument.

In Jasinski, we expressly stated, "Rules 56(c), 78, and 83, [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] read together, authorize district courts to provide by rule that a party desiring oral argument on a motion for summary judgment must apply therefor, in the absence of which oral argument will be deemed to have been waived." Id. at 1280 (quoting Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964)); see also Fernhoff v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 803 F.2d 979, 983 (9th …

In Jasinski , we expressly stated, “Rules 56(c), 78, and 83, [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] read together, authorize district courts to provide by rule that a party desiring oral argument on a motion for summary judgment must apply therefor, in the absence of which oral argument will be deemed to have been waived.” Id. at 1280 (quoting Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964)); see also Fernhoff v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 803 F.2d 979, 983 (9th…

In Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964), we held that “in view of the language of Rule 56(c) ... a district court may not ... preclude a party from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request when made by a party opposing the motion unless the motion for summary judgment is denied.” See also Jasinski v. Showboat Operating Co., 644 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (9th Cir.1981).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461 (9th Cir.1964).

Accordingly, Haught's request for oral argument is denied ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3 1 While district courts should not grant summary judgment motions without a hearing if the nonmoving party requests oral argument, see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461 (9th Cir.1964), the failure to conduct a hearing is only reversible error if there is a showing…

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir.1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964) (citing Brown v. Quinlan, Inc., 138 F.2d 228, 229 (7th Cir.1943)).

In Dayco, we held that Fed.R.Civ.P. 83, in combination with Rules 56(c) and 78, “authoriz[ed] district courts to provide by rule that a party desiring oral argument on a motion for summary judgment must apply therefor, in the absence of which oral argument will be deemed to have been waived.” Id. at 391 (quoting Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964)).

McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964)), cert. denied Sub nom.

Hearing — Summary Judgment In Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.1964), we stated that “a district court may not, by rule or otherwise, preclude a party from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request when made by a party opposing the motion unless the motion for summary judgment is denied.” Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 462 (footnotes, citation omitted). 4 12 Third-party defendants Jonny and Johnson argue that noncompliance with local rules does not require reversal unless the appellant demonstrates prejudice resulting from the breach.

Id. at 462 (footnotes, citation omitted). 4 Third-party defendants Jonny and Johnson argue that noncompliance with local rules does not require reversal unless the appellant demonstrates prejudice resulting from the breach.

See McKenna v. Udall, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 340 , 418 F.2d 1171, 1176 (1969); Pruess v. Udall, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303 , 359 F.2d 615, 617 (1965); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir.1964). . 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e)(4) (1976), quoted in text supra at note 9.

See McKenna v. Udall, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 340 , 418 F.2d 1171, 1176 (1969); Pruess v. Udall, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 303 , 359 F.2d 615, 617 (1965); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1964) 22 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e)(4) (1976), quoted in text Supra at note 9.

United States v. Lange, 466 F.2d 1021 , 1025 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1972); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1964).

We disagree with appellant’s contention and hold that F.R.Civ.P. 83 in combination with Rules 56(c) and 78 1 “authorize^] district courts to provide by rule that a party desiring oral argument on a motion for summary judgment must apply therefor, in the absence of which oral argument will be deemed to have been waived.” Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964).

Co., 373 F.2d 493, 496-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 851 , 88 S.Ct. 69 , 19 L.Ed.2d 120 (1967); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964). 3 .

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-462 (9th Cir. 1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 460 (9th cir. 1964). 6 .

If oral argument is ordered, the motion will be deemed submitted at the close of argument unless the court orders additional briefs, in which case the motion will be deemed submitted as of the date designated as the time for filing the final brief. ¶29 On appeal in Cole, we quoted Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964)—a case involving a local rule that effectively precluded an adverse party from requesting a hearing by requiring that such a request be a…

Cir. 1975) (“due process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 464 n.14 (9th Cir. 1964) ( “The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”)).

Cir. 1975) (“[D]ue process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion.”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 464 n.14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”)); see Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (“There is no requirement . . . that a district judge hold a hearing prior to ruling on a motio…

Cir. 1975) (“[D]ue process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion[.]”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 464 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”).

Cir. 1975) (“[D]ue process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion.”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 462 n.14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”).

Cir.1975) (“[D]ue process does not include the right to oral argument on a motion”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 , 464 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1964) (“The opportunity to be heard orally on questions of law is not an inherent element of procedural due process, even where substantial questions of law are involved.”).

Dredge Corp. v. 16 Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964).

Dredge Corp. v. 16 Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964).

See, e.g. [sic] United States v. Lange, 466 F.2d 1021 , 1025 n. 5 (9th Cir.1972); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir.1964).” United States v. Pent-R-Books, Inc., 538 F.2d 519, 527 (2d Cir.1976).

(Dkt. # 105) (title page).) "[A] district court may not ... deny ... a request [for oral argument] when made by a party opposing the motion unless the motion for summary judgment is denied.” Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

P. 41(b), which states “any dismissal not under this rule–except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19–operates as an adjudication on the merits”) (emphasis added); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 464 (9th Cir. 1964) (dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party should rarely if ever result in dismissal of the action with prejudice); 9 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2373 at 752-54 (3d.…

See Local Rule 78-2 (any motion may be decided “with or without a hearing”); Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir.1964) (notwithstanding local rules, a district court may not preclude or deny a request for oral argument at summary judgment unless the motion is denied).

In the Ninth Circuit, a district court deciding a motion for summary judgment may not deny a request for oral argument, but only "when made by a party opposing the motion .... ” Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964). 2 .

At one time, the Ninth Circuit condemned a local rule that prevented parties from requesting oral argument on dispositive motions, see Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir.1964).

Kemp v. Murray, supra; Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 463-64 (9th Cir.1964); Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d at 866 .

Each party has requested oral argument with respect to its own motion only; thus, no hearing would be mandatory under the holding of Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964).

Each party has requested oral argument with respect to its own motion only; thus, no hearing would be mandatory under the holding of Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964).

While there is authority to suggest that it is appropriate to grant oral argument before entering summary judgment, e. g., Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1964), in this uncomplicated case, where the affidavits and other documentary evidence establish that there is no genuine issue of a material question of fact and where the legal questions are sufficiently discussed in the briefs, it is in the interest of judicial economy for the Court to decide this …