Nancy Graf v. Zynga Game Network, Inc. (2014)

In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014).

Wash. L.Rev. at 1215. 100 . 750 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added). 101 . 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir.2003).

Although the district court dismissed the case on the basis of comity, “[w]e may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record.” In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir.2014) (citation omitted).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Id. at 1107 (“Because the users had communicated with the 14 website by entering their personal medical information into a form provided by the website, the 15 First Circuit correctly concluded that the defendant was disclosing the contents of a 16 communication.”).

See Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1106 (“[R]ecord information . . . includes the 27 ‘name,’ ‘address,’ and ‘subscriber number or identity’ of a subscriber or customer.”). 1 which would reveal the content a user searched for, see Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1108 , or full-string 2 detailed URLs that might contain folder and file names.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted) (“[T]he term ‘contents’ refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication, and does not include record information.”).

Litig., 750 F.3d at 1108 (“IP addresses ‘constitute addressing 26 information and do not necessarily reveal any more about the underlying contents of communication 27 than do phone numbers.’”) (citation omitted). 1 reading of the statute.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting the Federal Wiretap Act).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Federal Wiretap Act).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).5 “Generally, 4 customer information such as a person’s name, address, and subscriber number or identity is record 5 information, but it may be contents when it is part of the substance of the message conveyed to the 6 recipient.” Hammerling v. Google LLC, 615 F. Supp. 3d 1069 , 1093 (N.D.

See Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450 (2011); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Ninth Circuit opined in Zynga that the information in Pharmatrak properly was characterized as contents of a communication “[bjecause the users had communicated with the website by entering their personal medical information into a form provided by a web site.” Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Litig., 750 F.3d at 1106 (holding that 16 “contents” under CIPA does not include customer record information such as name or address). 17 Likewise, “button clicks” are “more akin to the ‘record’ information that the Ninth Circuit has 18 held not to be contents of a communication.” Mikulsky v. Bloomingdale’s, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 19 833, 845 (S.D.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2014) (assessing requirements of the Stored Communications Act, which incorporates the federal Wiretap Act’s definition of “contents”—“any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of [a] communication,” see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 (8), 2711(1); noting that URL is not content even when it discloses that person viewed page of gay support group); In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 925 (N.D.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Gourley v. Google, Inc., 580 U.S. 814 (2016) (referring to Internet exchanges captured by "cookies," which enable transfer of information from web browser to web server, as "communications"); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing how "communications occur between [Internet] 'clients' and 'servers'" in context of Facebook cookies transferring information); Brown v. Google LLC, 525 F. Supp. 3d 1049 , 1068 (N.D.

Plaintiff responds that 1 communications under the CIPA.” ECF No. 25 at 10. 2 “[W]hen users enter URL addresses into their web browser using the ‘http’ web address 3 format, or click on hyperlinks, they are actually telling their web browsers [] which resources to 4 request and where to find them.” In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014). 5 In determining whether URLs constitute “contents” under the CIPA, courts have distinguished 6 between URLs that …

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted) (“[T]he term ‘contents’ refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication, and does not include record information.”).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (9th Car. 2014))). itl.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014); see Yoon v. Lululemon United States, 549 F. Supp. 3d 1073 , 1082 (C.D.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Act further “defines ‘contents’ as ‘includ[ing] 23 any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.’” 24 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (8)). “‘[C]ontents’ refers to the intended message conveyed 25 by the communication, and does not include record information regarding the 26 characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the communication.’” Id. 27 (quoting In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2…

The Ninth Circuit has held that “contents” 10 means “the intended message conveyed by the communication and does not include 11 record information regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the 12 course of the communication.” Graf v. Zynga Game Network, Inc. (In re Zynga Privacy 13 Litig.), 750 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2014).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (8)); see 18 1 U.S.C. §2702 (a)(1)).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]arrantless installation of pen 28 1 registers, which capture only the telephone numbers that are dialed and not the calls 2 themselves, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 3 As such, Plaintiff has alleged enough to survive the Motion to Dismiss. 4 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to 5 Plaintiff’s Section 638.51 claim. 6 2.

“Contents” means “the intended message conveyed by the 24 communication” as opposed to “record information regarding the characteristics of the 25 message that is generated in the course of the communication.” In re Zynga Privacy 26 Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014). 27 As discussed in the “Initial Matters” section above, supra Section III, Plaintiffs do 28 not provide sufficient factual support to plausibly claim their content was intercepted by 1 Meta as a re…

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1107-08 (finding that “information about a user's 9 communication, not the communication itself” does not qualify as protected “content” under 10 ECPA).

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014). 25 While communications such as text messages and URLs containing search terms constitute 26 protected “contents,” user names, contact information, geographic information, PIN numbers, and 27 passwords do not.

Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).

In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘contents’ refers to the intended message conveyed by the communication”); Hill v. MCI 10 WorldCom Communications, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1196 (S.D.

In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098 at 1106 (holding that “record information 5 regarding the characteristics of the message that is generated in the course of the communication” 6 does not qualify as “contents”).

See In re Zynga Privacy Litig. , 750 F.3d at 1106 ("Congress intended the word 'contents' to mean a person's intended message to another").

The Ninth Circuit, analyzing the text and history of the Wiretap Act and subsequent amendments, concluded that “Congress intended the words ‘contents’ to mean a person’s intended message to another (i.e., the ‘essential part’ of the communication, the ‘meaning conveyed,’ and the ‘thing one intends to convey’).” In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2014).

The term has been construed to mean "a person's intended message to another (i.e., the 'essential part' of the communication, the 'meaning conveyed,' and the 'thing one intends to convey')." In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014).

See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 ; In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014); Warshak V.

ECPA addresses “electronic communications services (e.g., the transfer of electronic messages, such as email, between computer users) and remote computing, services (e.g., the provision of off-site computer storage or processing of data and files).” In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014).

In re Zynga Privacy Litigation (9th Cir. 2014) 750 F.3d 1098, 1108 [“courts have long distinguished between the contents of a communication (in which a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy) and record information about those communications (in which a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy)”]; U.S. v. Forrester (9th Cir. 2008) 512 F.3d 500, 510 [computer users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in “to/from addresses of their' messages …

In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir.2014).

In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir.2014).

See Docket No. 311; see also Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1108-09 (“Under some circumstances, a user’s request to a search engine for specific information could constitute a communication such that divulging a URL containing that search term to a third party could amount to a disclosure of the contents of a communication.”).

In order to state a claim for improper disclosure under the SCA, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Yahoo knowingly divulged “the contents of a communication.” See In re Zynga Privacy Litigation, 750 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir.2014).

See In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098 , 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining how “referrer headers” operate). 1 The genesis of the plaintiffs’ complaints is the application of the search protocol, coupled with Google’s “Web History” service, which tracks and stores account holders’ browsing activity on Google’s servers.

A dictionary from the relevant period defines “substance” to mean “[e]ssence; the material or essential part of a thing,” “purport” to refer to “[m]eaning; import; substantial meaning; substance,” and “meaning” to refer to “[t]hat which is, or is intended to be, signified or denoted by act or language.” Substance, Purport, Meaning, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968); see In re Zynga, 750 F.3d at 1106 (looking to the analogous provision of the Wiretap Act and determining t…

See In re 21 Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (name and identity data does not represent 22 “contents”).