Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA) LLC (2014)
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· 130 citation events
across 8 courts.
Showing the 50 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2014 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Laith Saud v. DePaul University (2025)
Cung Hnin, 751 F.3d at 507; see also Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e evaluate the honesty of the employer’s explanation, rather than its validity or rea- sonableness ….”).
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Mary Stelter v. Wisconsin Physicians Service (2020)
Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Mary Stelter v. Wisconsin Physicians Service (2020)
Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Margie Reliford v. Advance/Newhouse Partnership (2018)
Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Billie Howard v. Indianapolis Public Schools (2018)
As the judge properly explained, Goldstein was not similarly situated to Howard because they were not “directly comparable . . . in all material respects.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Virginia Mourning v. Ternes Packaging, Indiana, Inc (2017)
To show pretext, Mourning must establish both that a phony reason (not just an unfounded one) was given- for her discharge, Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013); Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005), and that the phony reason was given by an actual decisionmaker, see Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2014); Hill , 724 F.3d at 968—here, Howard Ternes as represented by Dergis and Brown.
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Burkhead v. Cook County Adult Probation Department (2024)
Under Title VII, retaliation claims require “traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.” Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)).
quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)
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Johnson v. Accenture LLP (2023)
See Baines, 863 F.3d at 661 (quoting Greengrass v. Int’l Monetary Systems Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2015)); Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA) LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)).
quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)
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Marcus Hilliard v. Loyola University of Chicago (2026)
Different Treatment of Non-disabled Students To show that nondisabled students were treated more favorably, Plaintiff must present a comparator, or a nondisabled student who experienced different treatment and “must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects,” determined by “a common-sense, flexible analysis of relevant factors.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Ch…
A similarly situated employee “must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects, which is a common- sense, flexible analysis of relevant factors.” Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Buggs v. McNulty (2025)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Bowes-Northern v. Patel (2025)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Trusk v. Rodriguez (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Jackson v. Rellio (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Trustees of the Indiana State Council of Roofers Health and Welfare Fund v. Capital Painting and Coatings LLC (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786 ; Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Lukasik v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Harvey v. Sam's East, Inc. (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Sandoval v. Franciscan Alliance Inc. (2024)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Skains v. Lake Central School Corporation (2023)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Miklas v. Target Corporation (2023)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)) (“[R]etaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”).
quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)
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DeLaGrange v. Weaver Popcorn Manufacturing, Inc. (2022)
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013); see also Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Retaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”) (internal citation omitted).
“Retaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”
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Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company (2022)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Beamon v. Hamed (2022)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Zank v. WalMart Inc (2022)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Martinez v. Johnson & Johnson (2022)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Robinson v. Wawasee Community School Corporation (2022)
Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)) (“Retaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”).
quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)
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Mehrberg v. The State of Illinois (2022)
But Mehrberg has not “pointed to any evidence suggesting that [] the final-decision maker [] did not honestly believe [her] reasons for terminating [plaintiff’s] employment.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 2014).
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HINEITI v. ELI LILLY & COMPANY (2021)
"Under most circumstances, suspicious timing alone does not create a triable issue on causation . . . ." Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014).
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BETHURAM v. CATHEDRAL TRUSTEES INC. (2021)
Univ., 686 F.3d 378 , 389–90 (7th Cir. 2012)). "[R]etaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser 'motivating factor' standard of causation." Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted)). "[T]he ultimate question is not whether the timing is close, but whether the timing is suspicious, that is, whether it 'contributes t…
quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted)
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Dunn v. Chicago Transit Authority (2021)
See Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Under most circumstances, suspicious timing alone does not create a triable issue on causation.”).
“Under most circumstances, suspicious timing alone does not create a triable issue on causation.”
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Beaulieu v. Cigna HealthSpring (2021)
“Under most circumstances, suspicious timing alone does not create a triable issue on causation.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Chen v. Yellen (2021)
Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Fitzgerald v. Lincare Inc (2021)
“Under a pretext analysis, the focus is whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has given for termination.” Id. at 490–91 (citing Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2014)).
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Worden v. FCA US LLC (2021)
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that such similarly situated persons must be “directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects, which is a common-sense, flexible analysis of relevant factors.” Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Pontinen v. United States Steel Corporation (2021)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Morrow v. Oak Lawn Park District (2020)
While the Court is required to make all reasonable inferences in Morrow’s favor, “inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
internal quotations omitted
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Parks v. Phillip Rock Center and School (2020)
To satisfy this element, the “similarly situated employee must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
citations omitted
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Estrada v. BNSF Railway (2020)
As a general matter, “[a] similarly situated employee must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
citations omitted
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Patton v. Forest River Inc (2020)
Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Retaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”) (quoting Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1104 (7th Cir. 2013)).
“Retaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.”
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Martin v. Copeland (2019)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Solomon v. Wardlaw Claim Service, LLC (2019)
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 ; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Finkl v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) (2019)
A genuine issue of “material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
internal quotation and citation omitted
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Boswell v. Envoy Air / American Eagle (2018)
Tool Works Inc., 706 F. App’x 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff’s disrespectful emails, “missed deadlines, failure to keep regular hours, and sleeping on the job” were each legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons supporting termination); Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that coworkers’ reports that the plaintiff “intimidated or threatened” them provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination); Reed v. AMAX…
holding that coworkers’ reports that the plaintiff “intimidated or threatened” them provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination
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Marijan v. The University of Chicago (2018)
However, as we explained in our opinion dismissing plaintiff’s first complaint, the 19-month time gap between the complaint about the sexual harassment and her subsequent termination in 2017 is too remote to establish the requisite nexus between these two events. “[R]etaliation claims under Title VII require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citation…
internal citations omitted
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Marijan v. The University of Chicago (2018)
Defendants assert that there is no reasonable inference of causation here because of the lengthy time gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. . “[R]etaliation claims under Title VH require traditional but-for causation, not a lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard of causation.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
internal citations omitted
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Bader v. United Airlines, Inc. (2018)
Plaintiffs have failed to point to sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find in their favor. 13 The Seventh Circuit has stated that “the more objectively reasonable a belief is, the more likely it will seem that the belief was honestly held,” but “[a]n inquiry into pretext requires that [the Court] evaluate the honesty of the employer's explanation, rather than its validity or reasonableness.” Simpson v. Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 795 (7th …