Smith v. State (2015)

See, e.g., Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (“[N]either fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.”); Rountree v. State, 316 Ga. 691, 694-695 (2) (889 SE2d 803) (2023) (“threatening words and racial epithets” did not amount to serious provocation, “no matter how menacing or offensive they were” to the defendant); Hudson v. State, 308 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (a) (841 SE2d …

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

See Ga. L. 2013, Act 132, § 1-5 (effective July 1, 2013). 7 See Freeman v. State , 329 Ga. App. 429 , 432 (1), 765 S.E.2d 631 (2014) (noting that any fact in a trial can be proven by circumstantial evidence); Bettes v. State , 329 Ga. App. 13 , 15 (1), 763 S.E.2d 366 (2014) ("Both knowledge and intent to defraud may be proven by circumstantial evidence." (punctuation omitted)). 8 See Marks v. State , 280 Ga. 70 , 72-73 (1) (a), 623 S.E.2d 504 (2005) (finding that defendant's…

Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 445 (3) (a) ( 782 SE2d 642 ) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). 9 See also Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 739 (6) ( 864 SE2d 85 ) (2021) (“To warrant a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter, there must be at least slight evidence that the accused was so influenced and excited that he reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt to defend himself.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) ( 770 …

See also Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (“[N]either fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.”).

See also Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (“[N]either fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.”).

Ordinarily, “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).

An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if he fails as to one prong, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“To establish deficient performance, an appellant must overcome the strong presumption that his or her counsel’s 12 conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way considering all circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if one prong fails, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

If an appellant fails to prove one of those prongs, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith, 296 Ga. at 733 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). 1.

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

See Riley, 573 U. S. at 401 (IV) (When ruling that a police officer was not authorized to search an arrestee’s cell phone incident to an arrest without a warrant, the Court stated: “Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”). 20 [W]here the basis for the issuance of a search warrant has been challenged…

“Although both the performance and prejudice 37 See Glass, 255 Ga. App. at 401 (10) (“Absent clear error and harm, we will affirm the trial court’s finding that [the defendant] did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (footnote omitted); see also Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to …

To warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter, there must be “slight evidence” that the defendant “acted solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (2015) (cleaned up).

“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to 22 examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a [weapon] nor fighting are the types of provocation [that] demand a 4 voluntary manslaughter charge.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

A defendant’s failure “to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to 21 defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Although trial counsel could not recall whether the defense argued that he had been hit once or multiple times, he said that “looking at it from two years back, my guess is . . . it was consistent with what we were saying happened, so I didn’t care.” And, in fact, the record reflects that trial counsel never argued that there were multiple blows, stating in closing that Danley “popped [Pritchett] in the nose and popped him good.” To establish deficient performance by his tri…

To establish deficient performance by his trial counsel, Lee must overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct “falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct” and demonstrate that his counsel “performed in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Moreover, where there is a question of self-defense, a charge on voluntary manslaughter is warranted only where there is evidence showing that the accused was so excited that he “reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt to defend himself.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 880 (2) ( 804 SE2d 357 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[N]either fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaug…

“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon [an appellate court] to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

But, “neither fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).

In addition, “[w]hether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s 20 decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 (2) (b) (770 SE2d 610) (2015).

While both have been identified as the type of manifest abuse of discretion that would justify overturning 13 See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon [the reviewing court] to examine the other prong.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 14 See Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 898-899 (4) ( 734 SE2d 23 ) (2012) …

But, “neither fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

But “neither fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types of provocation which demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (3) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

See id. (“Acting out of fear of bodily harm is not the same as acting in the heat of passion, and only evidence of the latter supports a voluntary manslaughter conviction.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56 , 61 10 (2024) (“[T]hreats and insults on their own are not enough to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction.”); Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (2015) (“[N]either fear that someone is going to pull a gun nor fighting are the types …

Because Bradford claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, he has the burden “to make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2015).

Because Bradford claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, he has the burden “to make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2015).

“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 (2) (b) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).

“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 (2) (b) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Prejudice requires demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015).

“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 (2) (b) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).

An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if he fails as to one prong, “it is not incumbent upon [an appellate c]ourt to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

If an appellant fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if one prong fails, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of 31 deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 (2) (b) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

In determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, the magistrate’s task is “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Prince v. State, 295 Ga. 788, 792 ( 764 SE2d 362 ) (2014) (cit…

See Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706, 708 (2) ( 777 SE2d 435 ) (2015) (voluntary manslaughter instruction not warranted where the evidence showed, inter alia, a substantial amount of time between the alleged provocation by the victim, a fellow prison inmate, and the attack, during which interval the defendant went to his cell, had a conversation with his cellmate, located a weapon, and went to find the victim); see also Stork v. State, 303 Ga. 21, 22-23 (1) (b) ( 810 SE2d 81 ) (…

Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015); Stodghill, supra. 7 In attempting to show prejudice, Montgomery contends that without the purported hearsay testimony concerning the informant tips to police that he was selling drugs, there was insufficient evidence that he had any intent to distribute the drugs.

“Whether to object to a particular part of a prosecutor’s closing argument is a tactical decision, and counsel’s decision not to make an objection must be patently unreasonable to rise to the level of deficient performance.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 735-736 ( 770 SE2d 610 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).