Savage v. State of Georgia (2015)

See id. at 356 (2) (“[W]e afford the constitutional text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 635 (4) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (“We similarly presume that the words used in the Constitution bear their ordinary meanings at the time those words were included.”).

See, e.g., Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641-642 (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (“[S]tare decisis is especially important where judicial decisions create substantial reliance interests, as is more common with rulings involving contract and property rights.”) (citing cases).

See Cook, 313 Ga. at 489 (3) (c) (“[R]eliance interests are at their apex when they involve these types of interests.”); Savage, 297 Ga. at 641 (5) (b) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions).23 “Finally, to the extent that our existing rule is easier to apply, that is insufficient reason to retain 22 Notably, we have cited DOT in onl…

See Cook, 313 Ga. at 489 (3) (c) (“[R]eliance interests are at their apex when they involve these types of interests.”); Savage, 297 Ga. at 641 (5) (b) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions). 23 “Finally, to the extent that our existing rule is easier to apply, that is insufficient reason to retain it.” Lane, 308 Ga. at 17 (1). 22 No…

See, e.g., Olevik, 302 Ga. at 245 (2) (c) (iv); Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015). 54 precedents, the juice is not worth the squeeze.

There are no reliance interests at stake, and Granite State has not become “deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence.” See, e.g., Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation, 309 Ga. 44, 60 (3) (c) ( 844 SE2d 749 ) (2020) (in considering age of precedent and reliance interests, noting that the precedent at issue had not “become deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence”); Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (substantial reliance interes…

See id. at 356 (2) (“[W]e afford the constitutional text its plain and ordinary meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears, and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way[.]” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 635 (4) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (“We similarly presume that the words used in the Constitution bear their ordinary meanings at the time those words were included.”).

“Whether a proposal to issue bonds is sound, feasible, and reasonable is a question for the trial court, and its findings about soundness, feasibility, and reasonableness must be sustained on appeal if there is any evidence to support them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 631-32 (3) (774 SE2d 624) (2015).

See also Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627 , 647–48 (2015) (“There is nothing wrong with [a county relying on prior decision of this Court]: local governments, businesses, and individuals are entitled to rely on our precedents, particularly in organizing their contractual and financial affairs.”).

Thus, there is evidence that the “proposal to issue bonds is sound, feasible, and reasonable,” and given the “any evidence” standard, the superior court’s “findings about soundness, feasibility, and reasonableness must be sustained on appeal[.]” Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 631-632 (3) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015).

Thus, there is evidence that the “proposal to issue bonds is sound, feasible, and reasonable,” and given the “any evidence” standard, the superior court’s “findings about soundness, feasibility, and reasonableness must be sustained on appeal[.]” Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 631-632 (3) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015).

Cf. Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641-642 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 5 See Vickery Falls, LLC v. ASIH, LLC, 354 Ga. App. ___ , ___ (1) n.4 (__ SE2d __) (2020); HA&W Capital Partners, LLC v. Bhandari, 346 Ga. App. 598 , 609-610 (3) (b) ( 816 SE2d 804 ) (2018); Graybill v. Attaway Constr. & Assoc., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 805, 810-811 (2) (a) ( 802 SE2d 91 ) (2017); Cronan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 336 Ga. App. 201, 204 (2) ( 784 SE2d 57 ) (2016); Singh v. Sterling United, Inc.,…

This Court too has recently made plain that “the doctrine of stare decisis strongly counsels adherence to our longstanding, consistent, and workable precedents.” Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) 13 (2015) (emphasis supplied).

This Court too has recently made plain that “the doctrine of stare decisis strongly counsels adherence to our longstanding, consistent, and workable precedents.” Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (emphasis supplied).

See Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 812 ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015) (discussing factors to consider in deciding whether to apply stare decisis); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that “stare decisis is especially important where judicial decisions create substantial reliance interests, as is most common with rulings involving contract and property rights”).

See Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 812 ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015) (discussing factors to consider in deciding whether to apply stare decisis); Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that “stare decisis is especially important where judicial decisions create substantial reliance interests, as is most common with rulings involving contract and property rights”).

See Savage, supra, 297 Ga. at 636 (4) (c) (affirming the validation of bonds issued to construct the new stadium for the Atlanta Braves in Cobb County).

See, e.g., Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) (774 SE2d 624) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions).

See Warren v. State, 294 Ga. 589, 590 ( 755 SE2d 171 ) (2014).” Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 635 (4) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015). “‘Constitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption.’ [Cit.]” Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 166 ( 33 SE2d 425 ) (1945).

See Savage, 297 Ga. at 641-642 .

See Savage, 297 Ga. at 641-642 .

See Savage v. State , 297 Ga. 627 , 641 (5) (b), 774 S.E.2d 624 (2015) (recognizing that substantial *374 reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases).

See Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (recognizing that substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases).

Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310, 365 ( 130 SCt 876 , 175 LE2d 753) (2010); see 34 also Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases).

Election Comm., 558 U.S. 310, 365 ( 130 SCt 876 , 175 LE2d 753) (2010); see also Savage v. State, 297 Ga. 627, 641 (5) (b) ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (substantial reliance interests are most common in contract and property cases).

Compare Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 642 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that overruling the line of precedent at issue would undermine numerous intergovernmental contracts).

Compare Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 642 ( 774 SE2d 624 ) (2015) (explaining that overruling the line of precedent at issue would undermine numerous intergovernmental contracts).