Eshleman v. Key (2015)

O.C.G.A. § 4-8-21(b) provides that "[n]o dog shall be classified as a dangerous dog or vicious dog [for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7] for actions that occur while the dog is being used by a law enforcement ... officer to carry out the law enforcement ... officer’s official duties.” See also Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364 , 774 S.E.2d 96, 99 (2015) (assuming for purposes of argument that a police canine may qualify as a “vicious or dangerous animal” under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7, wh…

In short, “the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 367 ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015).

In short, “the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 367 ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015).

The Steagalds sued the Easons under OCGA § 51-2-7, which in pertinent part provides: A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. . . . 2 OCGA § 51-2-7 “recognizes that the keeper of an animal known to have vicious or dangerous propensities owes a d…

See Nguyen v. Southwestern Emergency Physicians, 298 Ga. 75, 84 (3) ( 779 SE2d 334 ) (2015). 2 The Steagalds sued the Easons under OCGA § 51-2-7, which in pertinent part provides: A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. . . .[2] OCGA § 51-2-7 “…

Put simply, the question is not merely whether the school officials owed SGT a duty of care, “but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” Eshleman v. Key, 774 S.E.2d 96, 100 (Ga. 2015).

As our Supreme Court also noted in Barnett, “‘the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.’” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II), quoting Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 367 (2) ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015).

Id. at 98.

Given this fact, we begin with the question of whether Everett is entitled to immunity from QCI’s claims. 4 “As a general rule, a county law enforcement officer enjoys official immunity from a lawsuit alleging that she is personally liable in tort for her performance of official functions.” Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 365 (1) ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015) (citations and footnote omitted).

See Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364 , 774 S.E.2d 96, 99 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364 , 774 S.E.2d 96, 98 (2015); see also Ga. Const. art. 1, § 2, para.

See Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 368 (2), n.3 ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015), overruled in part on other grounds, Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016). the owner’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious or dangerous nature, we have nevertheless concluded that scienter was carried over from the common law as an essential element of a claim under OCGA § 51-2-7.

See Eshleman v. Key, 297 Ga. 364, 368, n. 3 ( 774 SE2d 96 ) (2015).

See Eshleman v. Key, 774 S.E.2d 96, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that an officer required to take reasonable measures to restrain a police dog must exercise “personal deliberation and judgment” in deciding whether equipment and training was sufficient).