Doris Poe v. Commissioner of Social Security (2009)
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· 603 citation events
across 14 courts.
Showing the 50 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Willis v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Cummings v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Adams v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”); Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc.
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 515 F. App’x 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”
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Antanette P. v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”); Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc.
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Bennett v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”
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Leffler v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Stiles v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Thimmes v. Commissioner of Social Security (2024)
See, e.g., Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”); Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc.
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Houk v. Commissioner of Social Security (2023)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Yoder v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Nichol v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 515 F. App’x 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”
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Mason v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 515 F. App’x 583, 587 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 (“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Moreover, an ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”); Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc.
“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”
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Brittany S. v. Commissioner of Social Security (2026)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Tiffany J. v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Cheryl Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”) Thus, an ALJ “is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.” Id.
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Griffin v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Munion v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Thimmes v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”); Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc.
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Boerner v. Commissioner of Social Security (2025)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute [her] opinion for that of a physician, [she] is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity finding.”
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Roddy v. Commissioner of Social Security (2024)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Security (2024)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Fridley v. Commissioner of Social Security (2024)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Aloyo v. Kijakazi (2024)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149 , 157 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician only when the information received is inadequate to reach a determination on claimant's disability status[.]”).
“[A]n ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician only when the information received is inadequate to reach a determination on claimant's disability status[.]”
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Dunlavy v. Commissioner of Social Security (2024)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Reynoso v. Kijakazi (2023)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician . . . .”). 41 Poe, 342 F. App’x at 157 . 42 Sandoval, 2023 WL 4231007 , at *5; see also Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 . 43 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546 (c), 416.946(c) (“If your case is at the [ALJ] hearing level . . . the [ALJ] . . . is responsible for assessing your [RFC].”).
“[T]he ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician . . . .”
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Beard v. Commissioner of Social Security (2023)
Sec., 342 Fed.
“[A]n ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding.”
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Gentry v. Commissioner of Social Security (2023)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149 , 157 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician only when the information received is inadequate to reach a determination on claimant’s disability status[.]”).
“[A]n ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician only when the information received is inadequate to reach a determination on claimant’s disability status[.]”
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Debord v. Commissioner of Social Security (2022)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156-57 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ALJ is entitled to discredit the opinion as long as he sets forth a reasoned basis for her [sic] rejection.”) Just as a judge is a trier of fact in a bench trial, an Administrative Law Judge serves a similar role.
“[T]he ALJ is entitled to discredit the opinion as long as he sets forth a reasoned basis for her [sic] rejection.”
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Warren v. SSA (2022)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinion for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Parisi v. Commissioner of Social Security (2021)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the [treating source opinion] was not entitled to deference because it was based on [the claimant’s] subjective complaints, rather than objective medical data”).
“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the [treating source opinion] was not entitled to deference because it was based on [the claimant’s] subjective complaints, rather than objective medical data”
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Munger v. Social Security (2021)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 158 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The ruling does not require that the ALJ attempt to address or resolve conflicts between the testimony of a vocational expert and the Occupational Outlook Handbook.”) and contends that the conflicts about which Plaintiff now complains “would have been fodder for cross-examination,” but “would not have been ‘apparent’ to the ALJ[,]” (ECF No. 15, PageID.841), Plaintiff convincingly notes that his representative would not know the u…
“The ruling does not require that the ALJ attempt to address or resolve conflicts between the testimony of a vocational expert and the Occupational Outlook Handbook.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Van Pelt v. Commissioner of Social Security (2020)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”); SSR 96- 5p, 1996 WL 374183 , at *5 (“Although an adjudicator may decide to adopt all of the opinions expressed in a medical source statement, a medical source statement must not be equated with the administrative finding known as the [RFC] assessment.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”).
“Although the ALJ may not substitute his opinions for that of a physician, he is not required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in his residual functional capacity finding.”
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Beagle v. SSA (2020)
Sec., 342 F. App'x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”) Thus, the ALJ is never bound by a physician’s statement that their patient is “permanently and totally disabled.” The ALJ also adequately explained his decision to give Dr. Noelker’s opinion little weight.
“The responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 , at *5 (“Although an adjudicator may decide to adopt all of the opinions expressed in a medical source statement, a medical source statement must not be equated with the administrative finding known as the [RFC] assessment.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Graham, III v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 , at *5.
“The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Averweg v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.").
"The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician."
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 , at *5.
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff] presented no other objective medical evidence to explain how or why, in [treating physician’s] opinion, [Plaintiff] was not a candidate for disability in July 2003, but degenerated to the point of being unable to perform sedentary work by August 2006.”); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that ALJ’s rejection of treating 9 physician’s opinion that the claimant lacked the capacity to perform ligh…
“[Plaintiff] presented no other objective medical evidence to explain how or why, in [treating physician’s] opinion, [Plaintiff] was not a candidate for disability in July 2003, but degenerated to the point of being unable to perform sedentary work by August 2006.”
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Chopka v. Social Security Administration (2019)
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”).
“The responsibility for determining a claimant’s [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.”
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Curry v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 342 Fed.Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician.").
"The responsibility for determining a claimant's [RFC] rests with the ALJ, not a physician."
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Gibbons v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) (“substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the opinion of Dr. Boyd, Poe’s treating physician, was not entitled to deference because it was based on Poe’s subjective complaints, rather than objective medical data.”).
“substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the opinion of Dr. Boyd, Poe’s treating physician, was not entitled to deference because it was based on Poe’s subjective complaints, rather than objective medical data.”