Corliss v. O'Brien (2006)

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20- 3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 7 Williams requests both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, althoug…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 7 Williams requests both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, althoug…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20- 3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to stat…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 3 Because Gonzalez is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee for t…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 3 McCary also asserts that the prison grievance system available at SCI Phoen…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment seeking dismissal of Cottle’s constitutional claims for money damages against the DOC and the individually named Defendants in their official capacities.

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20- 3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. …

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 5 Ludwig requests both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 7 McCary does not specify the nature of the injunctive relief he seeks.

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, 855 Fed.Appx. 812 , 815 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 7 As noted, I already denied Austill’s request for preliminary injunctive relief in light …

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”’). ® Because Abrams is a prison, he must still pay the $350 filing fee for this…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 6 McCary does not describe the nature of the injunctive relief he seeks.

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20- 3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

Courts have dismissed declaratory judgment claims where “actual controversies” have already occurred, reasoning that “address[ing] uncertainty as to legal rights between [adverse] parties” following the commencement of litigation does not serve the DJA’s “prophylactic purpose.” See id. at 75; see also Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App’x 80 , 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct[, n]or is declaratory judgment meant simply to…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

Claims for Retrospective Declaratory Relief Declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Plaza’s request for a declaration that his rights have been violated in the past is improper and will be dismissed with prejudice.4 See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also …

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”). 4 Because Ladson is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee for thi…

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

Tenn. Feb. 24, 2021 (quoting Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3% Cir. Pa. 2006)). “‘[T]he usefulness of a declaratory judgment action is significantly curtailed once a subsequent, coercive suit is filed.”” Awesome Prods. v. JoySuds LIC, Civil Action No. 25-50, 2025 U.S. Dist.

Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”)).

NJ 1993); Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App'x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.

See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[The plaintiff] asks that the District Court ‘declare’ that his constitutional rights were violated.

See Corliss v. O’ Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct,” nor is it “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v. Admin.

Allen-Murphy, 2025 WL 1902299 , at *2 (citing Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”)).

For actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983—as this one is—the doctrine applies to Plaintiff's requests for both monetary relief, see Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760 , 768 (3d Cir. 2000), and injunctive relief, see Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006).

(Compl. at 17-18.) Plaintiff asks this Court to: (i) enjoin Judge Casten “from enforcing unconstitutional domestic violence procedures,” (ii) enjoin enforcement of the State TRO; (ii) order Judge Casten “to implement constitutional procedures” during future hearings; (iv) permit Plaintiff access to the Manahawkin home; (v) order the “immediate return of all marital assets constituting the Cavalier Kennels breeding program,” (vi) order the return of his rehomed dog; (vii) dir…

Nor is “declaratory judgment meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006).

See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (standing to pursue injunctive relief depends on whether plaintiff is “likely to suffer future injury”); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to satisfy Article III.” (internal quotations omitted)); Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” …

Glavin, 2024 WL 4338660 , at *2 (citing Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).

See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20- 3574, 2021 WL 1191628 , at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (same); see also Andela v. Admin.

Next, the Court turns to Arrey’s false arrest claim, which Zebley moves to dismiss by arguing that it overly relies upon Arrey’s subjective belief that he successfully completed the field sobriety 1 For the second time, the Court will also dismisses with prejudice Arrey’s request for declaratory relief because “[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.” Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”).

This request will also be dismissed as to Zebley because “[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.” Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, Civ.

See Taggart v. Saltz, 855 F. App’x 812 , 815 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”); Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.”).

Falcey also states that Hill committed “theft” by deducting $40 from his prison inmate account for sick call requests that were never answered. (/d. at 5.) Based on these facts, Falcey alleges Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims and seeks money damages. (/d. at 8.) He also seeks a declaration that the acts he described in his Complaint violated his constitutional rights and seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering the medical staff at the BCCF to “pr…

Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). 56 Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 49 F.4th 302 , 318–19 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 57 Id. at 319 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 58 ECF No. 1 at 10, ¶ G. 59 Id., ¶ C. 60 See Taggart v. Saltz, 855 F. App’x 812 , 815 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[D]eclaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.”); Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 8…

Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2013)). 43 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(1)(A). 44 Id. 45 Victory v. Berks Cnty., 789 F. App’x 328 , 333 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(1)(A)) (footnote omitted). 46 Moneyham v. Ebbert, 723 F. App’x 89 , 92 (3d Cir. 2018). 47 Id. at 92 (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)). 48 Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 49 F.4th 302 , 317–18 (3d Cir. 2022). 49 Taggart v. Saltz, 855 F. App’x 812 …

No. 14 at 12. 58 Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v. Admin.

See Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 861 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] declaratory judgment merely adjudicating past violations of federal law . . . is not an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction.”) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985)); Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.

Mich. Apr. 16, 2018) (“a declaratory judgment is intended to clarify the legal duties for the future, rather than address alleged past harm”); Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 F. App'x 80, 84 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct”).

See Corliss v. O'Brien , 200 F. App'x 80 , 84 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct.