Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Muliro (2016)

Co. statutory insurance terms, we look first to the terms as they are defined by the legislature, and in the absence of defini- tion, those terms are presumed to carry a “natural, plain, and ordinary meaning.” Id.; see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”).

Co. statutory insurance terms, we look first to the terms as they are defined by the legislature, and in the absence of defini- tion, those terms are presumed to carry a “natural, plain, and ordinary meaning.” Id.; see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”).

DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 742 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“Determining the intended meaning of a statute is a question of law.”).

See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 742 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“Whether legislation is exact, inexact, or delegative is itself a question of statutory construction * * *.”); OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 590 , 341 P3d 701 (2014) (identifying four relevant consider- ations in deciding whether the legislature intended a term to be delegative).

Under Oregon’s rules of statutory interpretation, the court assumes “that the word or phrase has its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” Matter of Comp. of Muliro, 359 Or. 736, 745-46 (2016) (citation omitted). “[W]hen a term is a legal one,” the court looks to “its ‘established legal meaning’ as revealed by, for starters at least, legal dictionaries.” Comcast Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 282, 296 (2014) (citation omitted).

Instead, we examine word usage in context to determine which among competing definitions is the one Cite as 366 Or 693 (2020) 709 that the legislature more likely intended.” Muliro, 359 Or at 746 (citation omitted).

See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (examining competing plain and technical legal meanings of phrase “receives * * * notice”); State v. McNally, 361 Or 314, 321-22 , 392 P3d 721 (2017) (examining plain and technical legal meanings of “passive resistance”; find- ing same meaning in both contexts); Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 296 , 337 P3d 768 (2014) (rejecting reli- ance on plain meaning of “data transmission services”; look- ing to co…

At the time the robbery statutes were enacted, another standard resource, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, defined “force” in rele- vant part as “[c]apacity to do work or cause physical change; strength; power; and “[p]ower made operative against resistance; exertion[.]” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 513 (1st ed 1969); see, e.g., DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 747 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (consulting American Heritage Dictionary a…

At the time the robbery statutes were enacted, another standard resource, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, defined “force,” in relevant part, as “[c]apacity to do work or cause physical change; strength; power;” and “[p]ower made operative against resistance; exertion[.]” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 513 (1st ed 1969); see, e.g., DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 747 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (consulting American Heritage Dictionary …

See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has its ‘plain, natural, and ordinary’ meaning.” (Quoting PGE, 317 Or at 611 )).

See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (“When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has its ‘plain, natural, and ordinary’ meaning.” (Quoting PGE, 314 Or at 611)).

See DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 753 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (cau- tioning of the risk of misconstruction from relying on the “cherry-picked quotations” of nonlegislator witnesses).

See EAN Holdings, LLC v. Dept. of Rev., 24 OTR 200, 203 (2020) (“If the court discovers a technical meaning that differs from the plain meaning, the court will examine usage in context to determine whether the legislature intended to use the term in that different, technical sense.” (citing DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 745-46 , 380 P3d 270 (2016))).

See, e.g., DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (noting rule in the context of statutory inter- pretation).

See Muliro , 359 Or. at 745 -46 , 380 P.3d 270 ("We frequently consult dictionary definitions of * * * terms on the assumption that, if the legislature did not give the term a specialized definition, the dictionary definition reflects the meaning that the legislature would naturally have intended.").

See DCBS v. Muliro , 359 Or. 736 , 745-46, 380 P.3d 270 (2016) ( "When the legislature has not defined a word or a phrase, we assume, at least initially, that the word or phrase has its 'plain, natural, and ordinary' meaning." (Quoting PGE , 317 Or. at 611 , 859 P.2d 1143 .)).

See Jehly v. Brown, 2014 COA 39, ¶¶ 17-18 , 327 P.3d 351 (actual knowledge is distinct from imputed knowledge); see also In re Comp. of Muliro, 359 Or. 736, 747-48 , 380 P.3d 270 (2016) (imputed *637 notice is not received by the party to whom it is imputed; instead, imputed notice is attributed to a person because it was received by someone with a duty to disclose).

See Black’s Law Dictionary 248, 334 (5th ed 1979) (defining “commit” as “[t]o perpetrate * * * a crime” and “crime” as a “positive or negative act in violation of penal law”); see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746 , 380 P3d 736 (2016) (“When a term is a legal one, we look to its estab- lished legal meaning as revealed by, for starters at least, legal dictionaries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And as ORS 164.377(2)(c) expressly provides, the relevant crime for pur…

See Black’s Law Dictionary 248, 334 (5th ed 1979) (defining “commit” as “[t]o perpetrate * * * a crime” and “crime” as a “positive or negative act in violation of penal law”); see also DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746 , 380 P3d 736 (2016) (“When a term is a legal one, we look to its estab- lished legal meaning as revealed by, for starters at least, legal dictionaries.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)) And as ORS 164.377(2)(c) expressly provides, the relevant crime for pur…

See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1914 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining “rehabilitate” as “to restore (as a delinquent) by a formal act or declaration to a former right, rank, or privilege lost or forfeited”; “to put on a proper basis or into a previous good state,” including by “restor[ing] to a useful and constructive place in society through social rehabilitation”); see also id. (defining “rehabilitation” as “the process of restoring an individual (as a convict * * *…