Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Etc., and v. Santino D. Meo, And (1974)

Langley , 108 S.Ct. at 401—02; First Nat’l Finance, 587 F.2d 1011 -1012; Musacchio, 695 F.Supp. at 1050-1052 ; but see FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (failure of consideration found to be a valid defense when the note maker was completely unaware of the bank’s failure to provide proper consideration until after the bank had failed).

FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1974).

Cf. FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974) (where defendant "was a completely innocent party with respect to the bank’s improper execution of an agreement” and where the defendant “was not negligent in failing to discover" the improper execution, the estoppel rule of D’Oench, Duhme would not be applied to prevent him from relying on the defense of failure of consideration”).

See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 32 F.3d at 596-97 (common law doctrine is narrower than § 1823 in that non-fault may be asserted as a defense); FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1974) (same). 6 .

Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974) would be appropriate in this case ... [because] [o]ne would hardly expect a bank customer to do more than the ... [plaintiff] did to assure that the letter of credit issued by Universal was valid." Id. 70 This case is distinguishable from Agri Export Co-op on multiple grounds.

Langley, 484 U.S. at 96 . 13 Further, the Landses do not qualify for the Meo "innocent borrower exception." See United States v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974).

FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974).

FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974).

Century Centre contends that it is eligible for the “innocent borrower” exception to D’Oench, first articulated by this court in FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974).

McCullough, 911 F.2d at 600 n. 6 (citing FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974)).

McCullough, 911 F.2d at 600 n. 6 (citing FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974)).

Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.1978) (defendant need not have “knowledge of the specific scheme or fraudulent arrangement to preclude the defense; it is sufficient that he lends himself to a scheme to aid the bank in concealing the true nature of the transaction ..FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974) {D’Oench inapplicable only if defendant is completely “innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence”).

Co., 587 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.1978) (defendant need not have "knowledge of the specific scheme or fraudulent arrangement to preclude the defense; it is sufficient that he lends himself to a scheme to aid the bank in concealing the true nature of the transaction ..."); FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974) (D'Oench inapplicable only if defendant is completely "innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence"). 30 Gemini claims the D'Oench doctrine does not apply because …

Compare FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir.1988) (defendants estopped from raising defense of material alteration when they signed blank signature forms which were later appended to different document); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir.1986) (when maker of note signed blank promissory note and gave it to someone he knew was convicted of bank fraud, he was estopped from raising defenses under D’Oench, Duhme) and FDIC v. Investors Associates X, 775 F.2…

Compare FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir.1988) (defendants estopped from raising defense of material alteration when they signed blank signature forms which were later appended to different document); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir.1986) (when maker of note signed blank promissory note and gave it to someone he knew was convicted of bank fraud, he was estopped from raising defenses under D'Oench, Duhme ) and FDIC v. Investors Associates X, 775 F.…

In allowing Meo to assert failure of consideration as a valid defense, the court specifically noted that he was "neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor negligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense...." Id. at 793 (emphasis added).

Corp. v. Meo, 9 Cir., 1974, 505 F.2d 790, 793, n. 4 , quoting from D’Oench, supra, 315 U.S. at 472 , 62 S.Ct. at 686 (Jackson, J., concurring).

In FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) the court citing the “lent himself to a scheme” test and the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in D’Oench Duhme stating that “ ‘where ordinary and good faith transactions are involved’, the FDIC succeeds ‘only to the rights which the bank itself acquired’ ”, Id. at 793 (emphasis added), held that since “Meo is innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence [t]he special facts present in D’Oench ... should not apply ...

An illustration of the former situation is FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9 Cir.).

Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974), and the lease agreement here permits an award 16 of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.

Corp. v. Meo, the Ninth Circuit reversed a 7 district court decision and remanded “for determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded 8 Meo against FDIC.” 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974).

Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1974).

The Meo Court found that “appellant was a completely innocent party with respect to the bank’s improper execution of [a] stock sale agreement” and held that “a bank borrower who was neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor negligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense to his note is not estopped from asserting such a defense against the bank’s receiver.” Id. at 792, 793 (footnotes omitted).

See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 32 F.3d at 596-97 (common law doctrine is narrower than Sec. 1823 in that non-fault may be asserted as a defense); FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1974) (same) 6 Lesal also argues that Colonial and the RTC cannot invoke the D'Oench Duhme doctrine because the RTC accepted benefits under the settlement agreement.

For D'Oench, Duhme to apply, "there at least must be a showing that 'the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority ... was or was likely to be misled.' " FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974) (quoting D'Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 460 , 62 S.Ct. at 681 ).

For D’Oench, Duhme to apply, “there at least must be a showing that ‘the maker lent himself to a scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority ... was or was likely to be misled.’ ” FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974) (quoting D’Oench, Duhme, 315 U.S. at 460 , 62 S.Ct. at 681 ).

Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1974), would be appropriate in this case.

Only when no federal case law or statute applied was the court “free to apply the traditional common law technique of decision and draw upon all sources of the common law.” 1 FDIC v. Bank of America, 701 F.2d at 834 ; FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793, n. 4 (9th Cir.1974); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 472 , 62 S.Ct. at 686 .

Only when no federal case law or statute applied was the court “free to apply the traditional common law technique of decision and draw upon all sources of the common *30 law.” 1 FDIC v. Bank of America, 701 F.2d at 834 ; FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 793, n. 4 (9th Cir.1974); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. at 472 , 62 S.Ct. at 686 .

Finance Company, 587 F.2d 1009, 1011-1012 (9th Cir.1978); FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 791-793 (9th Cir.1974); FDIC v. Alker, 164 F.2d 469, 470 (3rd Cir.1947); Dasco, Inc. v. Am.

These cases bear a closer resemblance to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 790-93 (9th Cir.1974), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply the equitable estoppel doctrine of D’Oench, Duhme.

D’Oench, supra, 315 U.S. at 460 , 62 S.Ct. at 680 ; FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-92 (9th Cir. 1974); FDIC v. Julius Richman, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 114, 117 (E.D.N.Y.1978).

Id. at 791-92.

See, e. g., D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447 , 62 S.Ct. 676 , 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974).

See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312, 317-19 (3d Cir.1993). 29 Plaintiffs' last contention is that the Ninth Circuit's innocent investor exception to D'Oench, Duhme, as articulated in FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974), protects their claims.

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (D'Oench is inapplicable to one wholly innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence). 65 A review of the record and the law leads us to agree with the district court that the statutory D'Oench doctrine does not prohibit reformation of the contract in this case. 66 (1) Writing 67 Section 1823(e)(1) requires the agreement to be in writing.

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (D’Oench is inapplicable to one wholly innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence).

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (D’Oench is inapplicable to one wholly innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence).

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (D'Oench is inapplicable to one wholly innocent of any wrongdoing or negligence). 63 A review of the record and the law leads us to agree with the district court that the statutory D'Oench doctrine does not prohibit reformation of the contract in this case. 64 (1) Writing 65 Section 1823(e)(1) requires the agreement to be in writing.

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1974).

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792-93 (9th Cir.1974).

See Meo, 505 F.2d at 793 . 20 Finally, we note that the Supreme Court's decision in Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins.

See Meo, 505 F.2d at 793 .

See id.

See id.

See Meo, 505 F.2d at 792 ("We disagree [with FDIC].

See Meo, 505 F.2d at 792 (‘We disagree [with FDIC].

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.1974) (borrower not estopped from avoiding liability on promissory note when bank had improperly executed stock purchase for which loan proceeds were intended).

See, FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790 .

See FDIC v. Meo, 505 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1974).