Cluster 344417 (1977)

See United States v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 7 , 13 & n. 3 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 861-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (in banc); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 628-29 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225-29 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (8th Cir.2006) (in banc); United States v. Esparza, 876 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. …

Partin at 643.

The government then puts those two definitions together to conclude that “administration of justice” means any and every “performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties [by government actors.]” Gov’t Br. 43 (quoting United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977)).

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 635 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Hall, 523 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir.1975)), ce rt. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); see also United States v. Morgan, 559 F.2d 397, 397-98 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 , 98 S.Ct. 1493 , 55 L.Ed.2d 520 (1978); United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 836-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 93 S.Ct. 539 , 34 L.Ed.2d 494 (1972); see Autry v. McKaskle, …

Although the evidence of Ruggiero's organized crime connections clearly antedated the conspiracy in this case, "[e]vidence of behavior antedating the period covered by the indictment is generally admissible as bearing on the existence and purpose of the conspiracy and the significance of later behavior." United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 634 (5th Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 72 (5th Cir.1975)).

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 642 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Harrington v. United States, 267 F. 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1920) (“It is not an unlawful attempt to influence or impede a witness . . . for one to seek to obtain from a witness a statement of the facts as he believes them to be, without the exercise of undue influence . . .”).

See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 625 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to sever filed by a defendant who was being tried with his twin brother); United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 441 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was convicted on guilt by association” because he was tried with his brother); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1572-73 (5th Cir.1994) (det…

See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 625 (5th Cir.2007) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to sever filed by a defendant who was being tried with his twin brother); United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 441 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that “he was convicted on guilt by association” because he was tried with his brother); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1572-73 (5th Cir.1994) (det…

Thomas argues that the evidence against him was weaker than the evidence against Hodges, but “the jury might have attributed greater knowledge to him of his brother’s actions than in fact was the case, simply because they were brothers.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977).

Thomas argues that the evidence against him was weaker than the evidence against Hodges, but “the jury might have attributed greater knowledge to him of his brother’s actions than in fact was the case, simply because they were brothers.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir.1977).

See, e.g., United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 , 1192 n. 3 (9th Cir.1998) (“Fear of a perjury prosecution can typically form a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment only where the risk of prosecution is for perjury in the witness’ past testimony.”); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (same).

See, e.g., United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 , 1192 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Fear of a perjury prosecution can typically form a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment only where the risk of prosecution is for perjury in the witness' past testimony."); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir. 1977) (same).

Andersen’s argument relies heavily on the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Farrell.18 In Farrell, a divided panel 15 See United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978) (defining “corruptly” as “for an improper purpose” or “an evil or wicked purpose”); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1977). 16 752 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting “corruptly endeavor” as related to obstructing the due administration of the tax laws). 17…

See United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1978) (defining "corruptly” as "for an improper purpose” or "an evil or wicked purpose”); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641-42 (5th Cir.1977). 16 . 752 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir.1985) (interpreting "corruptly endeavor” as related to obstructing the due administration of the tax laws). 17 .

See Peterson, 244 F.3d at 393-95 ; United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1037 (5th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277 , 289 n. 20, 291 (5th Cir.2002); cf. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1573 (5th Cir.1994) (rejecting a similar claim by a defendant “that he was greatly prejudiced by being tried jointly with three family members”); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 640-41 (5th Cir.1977) (rejecting a similar guilt-by-association-with-on…

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 640 (5th Cir. 1977).

We turn next to the district court’s “reasonable cause” determination, which we review for abuse of discretion. *572 See Streetman, 835 F.2d at 1526-27 ; United States v. Morgan, 559 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 636 (5th Cir.1977); see also United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 836-37 (5th Cir.1972) (“In most instances there will be no evidentiary inquiry into the question of reasonable cause.”). - “A district court abuses its disc…

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

See, e.g., United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 838 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 93 S.Ct. 539 , 34 L.Ed.2d 494 (1972); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 635-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); United States v. Morgan, 559 F.2d 397, 398 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 , 98 S.Ct. 1493 , 55 L.Ed.2d 520 (1978).

See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 500 (5th Cir.1980) (jury instructed that only slight evidence needed of defendant’s participation established conspiracy); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 628-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977) (same); United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (5th Cir.1976) (same).

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977). 17 .

United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. London, 714 F.2d 1558, 1567 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 , 99 S.Ct. 116 , 58 L.Ed.2d 130 (1978); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1174 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Beskowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 , 1135 n. 8 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir.1977).

Silverman impedes the due administration of justice within the meaning of Section 1503 because he has suborned perjury, 7 United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 630-31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977), and engaged in contemptuous conduct.

We have defined the term “administration of justice” as including or consisting of “ ‘the performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.’ ” Howard at 1334 n. 4, quoting United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977). 2 .

However, “[djemonstrating that the evidence is stronger against a co-defendant than oneself does not satisfy the burden of showing compelling prejudice.” United States v. Marable, 574 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir.1978) (emphasis in original); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); see also United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127 , 1135 n. 8 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B).

The defense cross-examined Smith extensively about the past benefits he had received from the program as in the case of United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 644-45 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 .

Although we agree with this court’s statement in United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 644-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1979), that references to the witness protection program “must be handled delicately” and that the prosecution should not be permitted to exploit any prejudice, we again find that the probative value of this evidence was relatively high.

Partin, 552 F.2d at 645 (“The defense has a right to show that a witness, while in the [witness protection] program, has received substantial benefits.... ”).

See, e.g., Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 851-52; United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); see also Vesich, 724 F.2d at 454, 457 . 25 29 Appellants were charged with "knowingly, intentionally and corruptly endeavor[ing] to obstruct the due administration of justice by testifying falsely under oath to the grand jury, in a manner that blocked the flow of truthful information" and "impeded justice," in vi…

See, e.g., Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 851—52; United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); see also Vesich, 724 F.2d at 454, 457 . 25 Appellants were charged with “knowingly, intentionally and corruptly endeav- or[ing] to obstruct the due administration of justice by testifying falsely under oath to the grand jury, in a manner that blocked the flow of truthful information” and “impeded justice,” in vio…

To the same effect, see Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 672 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 636-39 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 485 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 , 95 S.Ct. 1339 , 43 L.Ed.2d 432 (1975); United States v. English, 501 F.2d 1254, 1263 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114 , 95 S.Ct. 791 , 42 L.Ed.2d 811 (1975); Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir.1967); Barkan v. Un…

As such, “[r]eduction of the government’s burden of proof . . . is impermissibly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotation omitted); see also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding case where “the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden . . . [b]ecause such a requirement is plainly …

See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 605 F.2d 939, 941-42 (5th Cir.1979); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir.1978); Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511 , 512 n. 1 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 62-64 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 681-82 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 637-39 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265-66 (1st Cir.1976); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1…

California argues that White could have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege if he feared “his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at [the immediately] prior proceeding [outside the presence of the jurors].” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

In addition, as the judge noted, a witness may “not claim the privilege out of fear that he will be prosecuted for perjury for what he is about to say, although he may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Borans, supra at 457 , quoting United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).

Although the reverse is possible, i.e., a witness may claim the privilege to prevent himself from revealing a previous peijury, see, e.g., United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (recognizing that a witness “may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding”), the State fails to detail such circumstances in this case.

However, in United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Circuit), cert. denied 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cogently set forth the law with regard to the use of the privilege to protect against prosecution for perjury for what that -witness was about to say: A witness may not claim the privilege out of fear that he will be prosecuted for perjury for what he is about to say, although he may claim the privilege if …

Cf. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir.) (noting that attempted subornation of perjury “may well” violate witness tampering provision of former federal obstruction of justice statute), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

To the same effect, see United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 , 108 S.Ct. 510 , 98 L.Ed.2d 508 (1987); First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons Steel, 825 F.2d 1475 , 1487 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 , 108 S.Ct. 1015 , 98 L.Ed.2d 980 (1988); In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 838-39 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 , 107 S.Ct. 1625 , 95 L.Ed.2d …

See United States v. Tindle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F.2d 981 (11th Cir.1987).

United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., supra, at 583, 86 S.Ct. at 1710 (1966); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 636-39 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1077 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 , 90 S.Ct. 1262 , 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970); Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 376 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 , 84 S.Ct. 1650 , 12 L.Ed.2d 738 (1964).

“Whether a recusal motion is based on ... [28 U.S.C.] § 455(a) or § 455(b)(1) [the sections upon which R.C.M. 902(a) and 902(b)(1) are based — see note 7, supra], it is clear that a claim of bias or prejudice based on judicial knowledge gained from prior hearings or other cases is not a sufficient ground for disqualification...." See Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1156-57 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 , 101 S.Ct. 207 , 66 L.Ed.2d 89 (1980) (judge’s ex parte con…

See United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 , 100 S.Ct. 2939 , 64 L.Ed.2d 822 (1980); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 636-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977); United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir.1976) (“The fact that the district judge presided over the trial of a codefendant is no ground for his disqualification, especially where no affidavit of bias or prejud…

L. 91-452, § 502 , 84 Stat. 933 (1970), in certain circumstances “[t]he Attorney General ... is authorized to rent, purchase, modify, or remodel protected housing facilities and to otherwise offer to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of witnesses and the persons intended to be called as Government witnesses . . . .” See generally United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 643-645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).

See United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 , 101 S.Ct. 365 , 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980), United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir.1979), rev’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 644-45 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).

A prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence an individual to give false testimony to a grand jury may, however, be brought under the more specific first clause of § 1503 or the broader “due administration” clause for “that clause ‘is broad enough to cover any act, committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impede or *1195 obstruct the due administration of justice.’ ” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 903 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977…

The Court first recalled its decision in United States v. Par-tin, 552 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977), holding that one who conspired to induce a witness to testify falsely could be prosecuted under the omnibus clause of § 1503 because the object of such conspiracy was to obstruct justice.

Amend. 5; United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632[5] (5th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 298 , 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).