Evans v. Buchanan (1977)

"The fashioning of a remedy is committed to 'the exercise of the district judge's discretion.' " Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977).

“The fashioning of a remedy is committed to ‘the exercise of the district judge’s discretion.’ ” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977).

Borelli v. City of Reading, supra, 533 F.2d at 951-52. 22 On the other hand, the district court specifically stated in its opinion supporting the order that its disposition of Counts I, II, and IV was "held in abeyance" pending disposition of United States v. City of Philadelphia ; 23 that this latter case controlled its disposition of the Brace claims; and that it would "delay . . . decision pending recipt (sic ) of all data in the Government's action." 24 These directions …

We will reverse only when the"judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures ar e used." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir . 1977).

A finding of abuse is appropriate only where the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1977).

Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 197 , 200 (3d Cir. 1992) (abstention determination reviewed under abuse of discretion standard); Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa, 872 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.) (balancing of equities involved in application of laches doctrine reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819 (1989); Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 1395, 1402 (3d Cir.) (scope of a remedial order reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (19…

U.S. v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1301 (3d Cir.1986); Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977).

U.S. v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1301 (3d Cir.1986); Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977).

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977). 67 The district court determined that "[t]he Creditors ... would not be placed in the same or similar position which they held with respect to the Raymond Group in 1973 merely by replacing the $4,085,500 of IIT loan proceeds that were misused on November 26, 1973." Gleneagles III, 584 F.Supp. at 681 .

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977).

See also, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F.Supp. 328, 340 (D.Del.1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Where the State has contributed to the separation of races by redrawing school lines, necessarily the districts on both sides of the lines are part of the violation itself." ); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Ed., 429 F.Supp. 229, 266 (S.D.Ohio 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 443 U.S. 449 , 99 S.Ct. 2941 , 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979) ("Actions and omissions by pu…

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d at 384 (Garth, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d at 384 (Garth, J, dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

Borelli v. City of Reading, supra, 533 F.2d at 951-52. 22 On the other hand, the district court specifically-stated in its opinion supporting the order that its disposition of Counts I, II, and IV was “held in abeyance” pending disposition of United States v. City of Philadelphia; 23 that this latter case controlled its disposition of the Brace claims; and that it would “delay . . . decision pending recipt [sic] of all data in the Government’s action.” 24 These directions we…

We may reverse a decision pursuant to this standard “only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d *682 Cir.1977).

We may reverse a decision pursuant to this standard “only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 1977).

Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 327 (4th Cir.1984) (“The Supreme Court has said that appellate courts should give great deference to the district court's findings in school desegregation cases.”) (collecting cases); Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 809, 813 (2d Cir.1983); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Ed., 675 F.2d 787 , 796 (6th Cir.1982) (citing Penick, 443 U.S. at 469-71 , 99 S.Ct. 2941 (Stewart, J., concurring)); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 979 (3d Cir.1981) (citing Eva…

While we typically defer to a bankruptcy court’s discretionary decisions, see Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977) (en banc) (noting that we reverse exercises of discretion “only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used”), we cannot endorse its reasoning here because it failed to discuss a number of factors that, we believe, cause the equities to weigh heavily against the Debt…

An abuse of discretion exists “only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977).

We will reverse only when the "judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1977).

A finding of abuse is appr opriate only where the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or pr ocedures are used." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1977).

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir.1977) (in banc ) (requiring state authorities to file a "formal report of its efforts to carry out the mandate of the district court," but modifying the strict numerical requirement on racial balance: "We expressly disapprove the 10-35% enrollment criterion, and we specifically hold that no particular balance will be required in any school, grade, or classroom") 4 The moving defendants were the Board of Education of the State o…

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir.1977) (in banc ) (requiring state authorities to file a "formal report of its efforts to carry out the mandate of the district court,” but modifying the strict numerical requirement on racial balance: "We expressly disapprove the 10-35% enrollment criterion, and we specifically hold that no particular balance will be required in any school, grade, or classroom”). .

Secs. 31341-31342 (West.Supp.1993) 3 We disturb district court decisions deciding what claims are accorded the status of administrative expenses incurred in custodia legis only if the " 'judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria or procedures are used.' " GREEN STAR, 815 F.2d at 922 (quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977)) 4 While we do not d…

We disturb district court decisions deciding what claims are accorded the status of administrative expenses incurred in custodia legis only if the " 'judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria or procedures are used.’” GREEN STAR, 815 F.2d at 922 (quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977)). .

The district court's decision whether to allow the application for administrative expenses will therefore be disturbed only if the "judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria or procedures are used." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977).

The district court’s decision whether to allow the application for administrative expenses will therefore be disturbed only if the “judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977).

See also, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F.Supp. 328, 340 (D.Del.1976), aff’d, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Where the State has contributed to the separation of races by redrawing school lines, necessarily the districts on both sides of the lines are part of the violation itself.”); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Ed., 429 F.Supp. 229, 266 (S.D.Ohio 1977), aff’d, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 443 U.S. 449 , 99 S.Ct. 2941 , 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979) (“Actions and omissions by pub…

As this court held in Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc), in school desegregation cases "(f)ormulating a realistic, practical, and effective remedy is a job peculiarly within the province of the trial court, whose position gives it a quantum advantage over an appellate court in weighing the 'practicalities of the situation.' " In litigation as long and complex as this, the fashioning of relief should normally "be entrusted in large measure to the s…

As this court held in Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc), in school desegregation cases “[fjormulating a realistic, practical, and effective remedy is a job peculiarly within the province of the trial court, whose position gives it a quantum advantage over an appellate court in weighing the ‘practicalities of the situation.’ ” In litigation as long and complex as this, the fashioning of relief should normally “be entrusted in large measure to the s…

As the Court noted in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. at 770-71 , 96 S.Ct. at 1267 : 14 Albemarle Paper, (422 U.S.) at 416, 95 S.Ct. at 2371 , made clear that discretion imports not the court's "inclination, but . . . its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles." Discretion is vested not for purposes of "limit(ing) appellate review of trial courts, or . . . invit(ing) inconsistency and caprice," but rather to allow the most complete…

Cf. Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 389 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth, J., dissenting) (before grant of injunctive relief can be affirmed, constitutional violations must be identified).

Cf. Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 389 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth, J., dissenting) (before grant of injunctive relief can be affirmed, constitutional violations must be identified). 125 We recognize that WAIC has not specifically attacked this portion, part (4) of the court's order, in its brief. 40 Nevertheless, there can be little question but that the "remedy" afforded to the plaintiffs by the district court runs against WAIC.

After the district court has made that determination, it could then require the parties to submit plans designed to remedy the effects of the constitutional violations.” 555 F.2d at 390 (dissenting opinion).

See, e. g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 , 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3125 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974) (Milliken I); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 24 , 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1280 , 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (no constitutional requirement of a particular racial mix); Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting language of decree that seemed to require 10-35% black enrollment in each grade).

While power rests in a federal court that passes an order or decision to change its position on a subsequent review in the same cause, orderly judicial action, except in unusual circumstances, requires it to refuse to permit the relitigation of matters or issues previously determined on a former review.’ Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 329 U.S. 607, 612 , 67 S.Ct. 583, 585 , 91 L.Ed. 547 (1947) (footnote omitted).” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 3…

The fact that only a possibility of confusion has been proven in this case will have a great impact on the scope of injunctive relief, should this court determine that some form of injunctive relief is appropriate. “ ‘As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.’ ” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d at 380 (constitutional rights case) (quoting Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 , 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276 , 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)).

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977). 9 .

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1977). 6 . 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977). 7 .

Kane, § 2947 (citing, among other cases, Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 387 (3d Cir. 1977)). “[T]he preliminary injunction is appropriate whenever the policy of preserving the court’s power to decide the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an interim restraint before it has done so.” 11A Wright, A. Miller, & M.

In other words, the trial court's fashioning of the appropriate equitable remedy is committed to the exercise of its sound discretion, an analytical framework that "does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable *1248 remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right." Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F. 2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276 , 28 L.Ed. 2d 554, 566 (19…

In addition to the above situations, Hayman recognized an overarching exception: "[a] judge need not follow a previous decision on the same issue in the same case if 'unusual circumstances' exist that permit a different conclusion.” 669 F.2d at 169 (quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977)). 15 . 486 U.S. 800, 803 , 108 S.Ct. 2166 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). 16 .

“A judge need not follow a previous decision of the same issue in the same case if ‘unusual circumstances’ exist that permit a different conclusion.” Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 169 (3d Cir.1982), quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir.1977).

Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 197 , 200 (3d Cir.1992) (abstention determination reviewed under abuse of discretion standard); Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa, 872 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir.) (balancing of equities involved in application of laches doctrine reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 819 , 110 S.Ct. 73 , 107 L.Ed.2d 40 (1989); Bennett v. White, 865 F.2d 1395, 1402 (3d Cir.) (scope of a remedial order reviewed for abuse of discretion),…

The district court’s decision was affirmed on appeal with one significant exception: The Third Circuit expressly disapproved of a 10-35% black student enrollment criterion proffered by the district court and specifically held “that no particular racial balance will be required in any school, grade, or classroom.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 , 98 S.Ct. 235 , 54 L.Ed.2d 160 (1977).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized in this case that “[h]aving once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir.1977) (quoting Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 37 , 91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292 , 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1971)) (emphasis added).

An abuse of discretion exists whenever a judicial action is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.” Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir.1977), citing Lindy Bros.

Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1977); for the relevant text of Part IV, see infra at 840 n. 29. 9 .

See Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir.1977) (en bane) (modifying district court’s interdistrict injunctive remedy in desegregation of public school system).

See Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir.1977) (en banc) (modifying district court's interdistrict injunctive remedy in desegregation of public school system). 65 N.J.A.C. § 7:26-6.5 codifies the designated facilities for waste disposal within each of New Jersey's twenty-two waste management districts. 20 As we have discussed in Part II.B., this regulation is unconstitutional because it has discriminated against out-of-state waste disposal facilities in the process t…