Cluster 350208 (1977)

But see Marathon Oil Co., supra, 564 F.2d at 1273-74.

“Where an agency’s task is ‘to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases,’ an administrative determination is quasi-judicial.’” Portland Audubon Soc., 984 F.2d at 1540 (quoting Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1262).

Section 1536(h)(1)(A) of the Act mandates that the Committee make its final determination of an exemption application "on the record." Cf. Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d at 1263-64 (even where statute does not specify that agency determinations must be made "on the record", if hearing is required, then nature of administrative proceeding itself may require application of APA sections 554, 556, and 557 nonetheless).

Section 1536(h)(1)(A) of the Act mandates that the Committee make its final determination of an exemption application “on the record.” Cf. Marathon Oil v. EPA, 564 F.2d at 1263-64 (even where statute does not specify that agency determinations must be made “on the record”, if hearing is required, then nature of administrative proceeding itself may require application of APA sections 554, 556, and 557 nonetheless).

Id. at 1272-73 (footnote omitted). .

See Georgia Pacific, 671 F.2d at 1235 (hearings not granted where all petitioner argued was that hearing was needed to "sharpen the issues" and "fully develop the facts"); cf. Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1262 (adjudicatory hearings, with full procedural guarantees, required for determining precise issue whether particular effluent limitation was practicable).

See Georgia Pacific, 671 F.2d at 1235 (hearings not granted where all petitioner argued was that hearing was needed to “sharpen the issues” and “fully develop the facts”); cf. Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1262 (adjudicatory hearings, with full procedural guarantees, required for determining precise issue whether particular effluent limitation was practicable).

The Ninth Circuit found that that definition was possibly “vague” and “may be seen as ambiguous.” 564 F.2d at 1274.

Scott v. City of Hammond, 530 F.Supp. 288, 289 (N.D.Ill.1981) 105 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.1977) 106 Id. at 1266 107 Id 108 See id 109 Id. at 1272 110 Id. at 1272-73 (footnote omitted) 111 Both the technology-focused provisions of Sec. 301(b)(1)(A) and the water quality-focused language of Sec. 301(b)(1)(C) require satisfaction of "limitations." Industry petitioners reason that because both types of limitations are to be met in the same manner, both types should be subject to …

The district court found that Union Oil was entitled to assert the upset defense under Marathon Oil, 564 F.2d at 1253, 1272-73 , and under 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 .

Although we have been urged by the government to adopt this latter holding, we cannot do so because it is inconsistent with this court’s decision in Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-64 (9th Cir.1977) (APA requirements applicable to all adjudicatory proceedings in which there is an “opportunity for a hearing” before the agency determination).

The Ninth Circuit in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , relied principally on the judicial review provision, id. at 1263, though it also found that the "setting of effluent limitations under section 402 of the [Federal Water Pollution] Control Act * * * falls squarely within the mainstream of traditional adjudications," id.

The Ninth Circuit in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , relied principally on the judicial review provision, id. at 1263, though it also found that the “setting of effluent limitations under section 402 of the [Federal Water Pollution] Control Act * * falls squarely within the mainstream of tra ditional adjudications,” id.

Because the parties had no opportunity to rebut this data, the Ninth Circuit held such official notice improper. 564 F.2d at 1270-72. 17 .

Marathon Oil, supra at 1261-62. 48 We cannot say a hearing prior to the June 2, 1977 extension would have served "absolutely no purpose" nor can we say that a hearing subsequent to a remand of this case would be futile.

Marathon Oil, supra at 1261-62.

See, e.g., Com Refiners Assoc., Inc. v. Costle, 594 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir.1979) (EPA need not expressly permit unpreventable discharges under Clean Water Act because EPA can exercise prosecutorial discretion); Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1272-74 (9th Cir.1977) (water permits must contain provisions that excuse “unpreventable” discharge, despite difficulty of administering the rule). 5 .

Ed. 1171 (1945); Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1265 (9th Cir. 1977); Appeal of Nationwide Ins.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1264 (9th Cir.1977); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 , 833-34 (7th Cir.1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1266 (9th Cir.1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d at 1272.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d at 1272.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1260 (9th Cir.1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1260 (9th Cir.1977). 41 The Trustees assert that this denial of their rights continues to cause them harm in the context of succeeding permits which still fail to restrict effluent limitations on arsenic and mercury discharge and require no monitoring for those pollutants.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1271 n. 54 (9th Cir.1977) ("Such comment is often an invaluable source of information to a reviewing court attempting to evaluate complex statistical and technological decisions."). 239 Against these values, we must balance the public interest in expedition and finality.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1271 n. 54 (9th Cir.1977) (“Such comment is often an invaluable source of information to a reviewing court attempting to evaluate complex statistical and technological decisions.”).

See Marathon Oil v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1261-64 (9th Cir. 1977).

See Marathon Oil v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1261-64 (9th Cir. 1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-1264 (9th Cir. 1977).

See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-1264 (9th Cir. 1977).

See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1261 n.25 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing precedent and the APA’s legislative history, concluding that “Section 558(c) does not independently provide that full adjudicatory hearings must be held”); City of W.

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1271, n. 54 (9th Cir.1977) (“Such comment is often an invaluable source of information to a reviewing court attempting to evaluate complex statistical and technological decisions.”) ....

See Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1271-72 and n.54 (9th Cir. 1974) (remand called for where administrator had staff memorandum analyzing data in agency record, but parties had not been given notice or the chance to comment on the memorandum).

In relation to the claim made by FHI that the record does not support a finding that it discharged liquid waste into a landfill with a permeable liner, this court should sustain the EPA’s findings arising out of the administrative hearing if they are supported by “substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(E); see also Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1265-66 (9th Cir.1977).

We have never held, however, that where we can find no explicit or implicit statutory requirement of any hearing at all, a proceeding will he considered a contested case nevertheless, simply because it is adjudicatory in nature. 14 Our understanding of the D.C.A.P.A., as interpreted by our prior cases, is confirmed by the decisions of federal courts interpreting the analogous provision of the federal A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 554 (a) (1982), which requires a trial-type hearing “in …

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 , 1260 n. 25 (9th Cir.1977); see also Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198 , 220 n. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1095 , 1108 n. 14, 63 L.Ed.2d 329 (1980) (“under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) [Los Angeles] may obtain judicial review of prolonged agency inaction with its application for a new permit”).

See, e. g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, supra, 564 F.2d at 1262-63 .

See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, supra, 564 F.2d at 1263; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (c) (specifying that judicial *482 review of section 1342 proceedings shall take place only after “determination . on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing.” (emphasis supplied)).