Wayne Ernest Barker v. Ben Norman and Jack Ballas (1981)

He has to “demonstrate objective cir- cumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within USCA11 Case: 23-11400 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 03/13/2025 Page: 23 of 31 23-11400 JORDAN, J., Dissenting 2 the scope of his authority.” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. Unit A July 30, 1981) (emphasis added).

III “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard on appeal as that applied below.” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). “[B]efore summary judgment is proper,” however, “it first must be determined precisely what causes of action have been asserted and what issues are thus raised either by the complaint or by any defenses[.]” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).

Servs. for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 , 1129 n.26 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (“[A] district judge . . . is neither required nor permitted to be counsel for any party, whether that party is appearing pro se or through counsel.”).

Cir. 2007); and then citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981)); M.D.

“A ‘bald assertion by the defendant that the complained-of actions were … within the scope of his discretionary authority’ is insufficient.” Estate of Cummings, 906 F.3d at 940 (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124-25 (5th Cir. July 1981)6).

Cir. 2007); and then citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981)); M.D.

Cir. 2007); and then citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1119 (5th Cir. 1981)); M.D.

The qualified immunity defense is appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage when (1) a plaintiff has established that the defendant has engaged in the complained-of conduct or (2) the court “skip[s], for the moment, over ... still-contested matters to consider an issue that would moot their effect if proved.” Haverda v. Hays County, 723 F.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. 2013). “‘If resolution of [qualified immunity] in the summary judgment proceedings turns on what the defe…

The qualified immunity defense is appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage when (1) a plaintiff has established that the defendant has engaged in the complained-of conduct or (2) the court “skip[s], for the moment, over ... still-contested matters to consider an issue that would moot their effect if proved.” Haverda v. Hays County, 723 F.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. 2013). “‘If resolution of [qualified immunity] in the summary judgment proceedings turns on what the defe…

Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022). “[A] government official can prove he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority by showing ‘objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.’” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).

A government official can prove she acted within her discretionary authority by showing her “actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of [her] duties and within the scope of [her] authority.” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).

P. 56(e).” King v. Dogan, 31 F.8d 344 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1981)).

A government official can prove she acted within her discretionary authority by showing her “actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of [her] duties and within the scope of [her] authority.” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).

For an official to discharge his burden that he acted within his discretionary authority, “there must be a showing by competent summary judgment materials of objective circumstances that would compel that conclusion.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Before turning to the Court’s analysis of the Kingsley factors, the Court notes that none of Campbell’s pleadings or filings, including his complaint, were either sworn or made under penalty of perjury.2 See Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding 2 The Court has carefully reviewed the entire record in this matter, paying particular attention to Campbell’s filings.

Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also 20 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 21 Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1120 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Davis and Criswell claim that they enforced the school policy in good faith, and as such, their actions were objectively reasonable.

For an official to discharge his threshold burden of demonstrating that he acted within his discretionary authority, “there must be a showing by competent summary judgment materials of objective circumstances that would compel that conclusion.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing with approval Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a properly verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5"" Cir, 1981), As discussed below, however, even if Scott’s response materials contained proper summary judgment evidence, his claims would nonetheless fail.

“Although pro se litigants are not held to the same standards of compliance with formal or technical pleading rules applied to attorneys, we have never allowed such litigants to oppose summary judgments by the use of unsworn materials.” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); see also King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).

(DE [172] ¶ 4). 5 “[A] verified complaint serves as the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)).

See Munoz v. State Farm Lloyds of Texas, 522 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The invited error doctrine provides that a party may not complain on appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the court to commit.”) (internal quotes and alteration omitted); Cf. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 , 1129 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A Magistrate] judge, however, is neither required nor permitted to become counsel for any party . . . .”). 8 In their Motion for Summary Judgment, t…

Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).

Cal. 24 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Robi v. Five 25 Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue Serv., 878 F.2d 26 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also 2 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 3 Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating that district court should have treated plaintiff’s statements in his verified complaint, sworn response to motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit as if it were testimony); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A July 30, 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves as the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).9 Viewing the record evidence in the light most favo…

Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also 17 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 18 Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). 14Id. 15See Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991)…

Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also 13 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 14 Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009); Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the continued retention of” property seized pursuant to an unlawful search “would be a constitutional violation as well”); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1131 (5th Cir. Unit A July 30, 1981) (“[C]ontinued retention by police officers of allegedly stolen property, as distinct from the initial seizure of that property, may in some circumstances be a con…

Doc. 20-4. 41 Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981). 42 Id. 43 Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 1982). fairgrounds when asked to do so.

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). 14Id. 15See Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991)…

An official “can prove he acted within the scope of his discretionary authority by showing ‘objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.’” Id. at 1564 (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1121 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“[O]ur cases correctly explain that a litigant's self-serving statements based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat summary judgment.”) and Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves as the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment)).

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also 7 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 8 Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989).

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). - 4 - the use of unsworn materials.14 Unsworn pleadings do not satisfy Rule 56(e)’s requirements for summary ju…

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). 14Id. 15See Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991)…

Cf. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1131 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Our case law indicates that continued retention by police officers of allegedly stolen property, as distinct from the initial seizure of that property, may in some circumstances be a constitutional deprivation.”).10 10.

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). 14Id. 15See Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991)…

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (stating that a verified complaint serves the same purpose of an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment).

Ed. 2d 107 (1992) (nonmoving party must show how additional discovery will defeat summary judgment motion, i.e., create genuine dispute as to material fact and that nonmoving party must show that he has diligently pursued discovery of evidence in question). 13Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). 14Id. 15See Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1991)…

See Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. Unit A July 30, 1981) (“[S]ummary judgment may be proper as to some causes of action but not as to others, or as to some issues but not as to others, or as to some parties but not as to others . . . .”); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided prior to September 30, 1981, as binding precede…