How cited: Marino v. Bowers · Go Syfert

Marino v. Bowers (1981)

green · 62 citation events across 10 courts. Showing the 23 strongest citers on record (one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
198120032026
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir. · 4 citations in this opinion
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), sets forth three factors that we must consider to determine whether a civil statute of limitations applies retroactively. 4 See Marino v. *585 Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.1982) (en banc).
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir. · 2 citations in this opinion
Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1367 (3d Cir.1981) (in banc).
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir. · 2 citations in this opinion
This approach reinforces the rubric advanced by Blackstone "that judges do not make but merely 'discover' law." Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.1981) (in banc) (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-29 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1733-38 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)).
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir. · 2 citations in this opinion
See also Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581, 584-88 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Chevron factors and applying them); Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.1981) (same analysis for rulings dealing with fundamental personal rights).
Rule Authority · 10th Cir.
Although none of the cited cases specifically concerned a hybrid action under section 301, the district court in this case did not hesitate to apply section 13-80-106 prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in DelCostello. 5 Considering the clear language of the two-year statute, the broad range and reasoning of the cases applying it, and the absence of cases in this circuit employing a contrary analysis, we conclude that clear past precedent existed upon which Colora-' do lit…
Rule Authority · 10th Cir.
Although none of the cited cases specifically concerned a hybrid action under section 301, the district court in this case did not hesitate to apply section 13-80-106 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in DelCostello. 5 10 Considering the clear language of the two-year statute, the broad range and reasoning of the cases applying it, and the absence of cases in this circuit employing a contrary analysis, we conclude that clear past precedent existed upon which Colorado lit…
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir.
Because the defendants have not raised the issue, we are proceeding on the assumption that the Elrod-Branti issue was properly before the district court 4 See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521-34 , 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1296-1303 , 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 376-89 , 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2691-97 , 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting); Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, at 1366-1370 (3d Cir. 1981) (in banc); Loughney v. Hickey,…
in banc
green Laskaris v. Thornburgh (1981)
Rule Authority · 3rd Cir.
See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521-34 , 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1296-1303 , 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 376-89 , 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2691-97 , 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting); Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1366-1370 (3d Cir. 1981) (in banc); Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065-71 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring).
in banc
green Gilmore v. Berg (1992)
Rule Authority · D.N.J.
Gluck v. United States, 771 F.2d 750 , 756 n. 6 (3d Cir.1985) (“Under Chevron Oil, a case is presumed to have retroactive effect unless, as a threshold matter, it established ‘a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed’” (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971))); Marino …
green Walsh v. Ward (1991)
Rule Authority · C.D. Ill.
In considering the second Chevron factor the circuit court in Marino saw “no reason why the prospective application of Elrod would not be sufficient to vindicate the constitutional principle it enunciated.” Id. at 1369.
Rule Authority · N.J.
Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1367 (3rd Cir.1981).
Rule Authority · M.D. Penn.
Second, we must look to the prior history of the decision in question, and to its purpose and effect, to ascertain “whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Id. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 -356 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)); Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.1982).
Rule Authority · D. Del.
See Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d at 521 ; Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc); 10 Mazus v. Department of Transportation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 870 , 873 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 , 101 S.Ct. 945 , 67 L.Ed.2d 113 (1981); 11 see also, Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.1981) (holding law on patronage dismissals settled after decision in Elrod in 1976), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 , 102 S.Ct. 1719 , 72 L.Ed.2d 13
Rule Authority · E.D. Pa.
Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1975); See also Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 , 93 S.Ct. 529 , 34 L.Ed.2d 492 (1972); Local No. 1 (ACA) v. I.B.T., C, W. & H., 419 F.Supp. 263 , 275-77 (E.D.Pa.1976). “ ‘Section [1985(3) ] provides no substantive right itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of rights it designates.’ ” Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1371 (3d Cir. 1981), (quoting Great American Federal…
Cited (see also) · 3rd Cir. · signal: see, e.g.
See, e.g., Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1371 (3d Cir.1981); Howard v. State Dep’t of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 , 585 (10th Cir.1973).
Cited (see also) · 3rd Cir. · signal: see, e.g.
See, e.g., Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1371 (3d Cir. 1981); Howard v. State Dep't of Highways, 478 F.2d 581 , 585 (10th Cir.1973). 12 Due to restrictive, post-Reconstruction-era Supreme Court decisions, including one that held that § 1985(3) only reached public conspiracies, § 1985(3) was not utilized for about 70 years.
green COELLO v. DILEO (2023)
Cited · D.N.J. · signal: see
See Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1371 (3d Cir. 1981).
Cited · E.D. Pa. · signal: see
See Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363 , 1365 n.2. (3d Cir. 1981) (dismissing the § 1988 claim “because that section creates no independent cause of action”).
dismissing the § 1988 claim “because that section creates no independent cause of action”
Cited (see also) · E.D. Pa. · signal: see, e.g.
See, e.g., Marino v. Bowers, 483 F.Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.Pa.1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.1981).
Cited (see also) · D.N.J. · signal: see, e.g.
See, e.g., Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir.1981); Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.1978).
Cited · D. Del. · signal: see
See Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir.1981).
green Stein v. United States (1984)
Cited (see also) · D.N.J. · signal: see also
See also Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1365 (3d Cir. 1981).
Cited (see also) · E.D. Mich. · signal: see also
See also, Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1367-68 (3rd Cir. 1981) (en banc). 16 *1146 In Kikos v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, 526 F.Supp. 110, 115 (E.D.Mich.1981), the court noted that “Mitchell ... overruled past precedent in the Sixth Circuit,” and concluded that the plaintiff had satisfied the first criterion under Chevron.
en banc