United States v. Perry Russell Tunnell (1982)

Salinas and Marmolejo allege that their prosecution under TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.02(a)(1) was improper because a more specific statute, TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.08(b), applies to their conduct. 13 They rely on a well-established rule of construction "that if two legal provisions apply, one general and one specific, the specific takes precedence." United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185 (5th Cir.1982).

Salinas and Marmolejo allege that their prosecution under TexPenal Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(1) was improper because a more specific statute, TexPenal Code Ann. § 36.08(b), applies to their conduct. 13 They rely on a well-established rule of construction “that if two legal provisions apply, one general and one specific, the specific takes precedence.” United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185 (5th Cir.1982).

See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 15, 1974 Amendment; United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir.1982). 6 .

Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2931. 26 .United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (5th Cir.1982) (finding that the services of a prostitute were, under Texas law, an "economic gain” bestowed upon the recipient public official sufficient to sustain a bribery conviction); see also United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (5th Cir.1996) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(1)(B) and finding that the term "anything of value” is broad in scope, not restricted to money, good…

In this Circuit, “an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and, ‘within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.’” Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In this circuit, it is established that the pr…

In this Circuit, “an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and, ‘within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.’” Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In this circuit, it is established 13 Nos. 10-…

See Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d 252 , 259 n. 6 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982); Riley v. Murdock, 156 F.R.D. 130, 131 (E.D.N.C.1994); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 647, 649 (M.D.N.C.1987).

United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982).

United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982).

“Within reasonable limits, the precise date of the offense is not required.” Hultgren, 713 F.2d at 89 (citing United States v. *1087 Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982)).

As such, the camera was constantly on Dr. Guy-ton, thus making it possible for the jury “ ‘to note [the witness’] attitude reflected by his motions, facial expressions, demeanor and voice inflections.’” See Langdon v. Wight, 821 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo.App.1991) (citing United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982)).

Battle v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 554 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1982)).

See also Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d 252 , 259 n. 6 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1185 (5th Cir.1982); Weiss v. Wages, 132 F.R.D. 152, 154-55 (M.D.Pa.1990); Rice’s Toyota World v. S.E.

Cf., e.g., United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982); Weiss v. Wayes, 132 F.R.D. 152, 154 (M.D.Pa.1990). 3 .

Section 1963 has consistently survived constitutional challenges, see, e.g., United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3rd Cir.1993); United States v. Reed, 924 F.2d 1014 , 1017 & 1018 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1037-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub norm.

As stated in United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982), a video deposition makes it possible for the trier of fact “to note [the witness’s] attitude reflected by his motions, facial expressions, demean- or and voice inflections.” Here, defendant argued to the jury that the witness “didn’t come in and appear before you” and “did not come in here and state that here.” These comments did not address the witness’s “appearance, attitude and behavior,” but the w…

See United States v. Crockett, 21 M.J. 423, 428 (C.M.A.1986); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982). .

See United States v. Lizza, 775 F.2d 492, 498 (CA2 1985); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106 (CA3 1984); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 1348 (CA2 1983); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (CA5 1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (CA2 1979).

We thus held in United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982), that evidence of acts of bribery from October 1973 to March 1974 was admissible even though the indictment had charged defendant with bribery “on March 2 or 3, 1974.” We reached a similar result in United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir.1981), in which evidence referring to the middle of 1977 was admitted despite the indictment’s charge of acts “on or about May 27, 1977.” With variance,…

United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1157 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982).

United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1157 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982).

See also United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982) (jury’s special verdict need not identify which rooms of hotel were used in criminal enterprise for whole hotel to be forfeited).

These envelopes provide an evidentiary link connecting that California address to the Packages themselves, which listed “Delilah Maddox, YMI Incorporated” as the sender and had Jackson, 24 646 F.3d 304, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2011). 25 Id. at 316 (quoting Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1981)) (“In this circu…

In this Circuit, “an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and, ‘within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.’” Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982) (“In this circuit, it is established that the pros…

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982); see also Fed.

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir.1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982) (jury not required to determine what part of motel used in prostitution enterprise and what part used legally). 104 . 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (c) (1976). 105 .

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir.1982) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Lyon, 135 Cal. App. 2d 558, 577 , 288 P.2d 57 (1955) (“[t]he fact that there was a delay in payment, or that payment was to be made in the future, is not necessarily material to the issues”).

See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 , 817 n. 4 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 , 97 S.Ct. 1646 , 52 L.Ed.2d 357 (1977).

See, e.g., United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Mann, supra; 2 (Crim.) C.

See, e.g., United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Mann, supra ; 2 (Crim.) C.