Cluster 413397 (1983)

However, the result reached by us would not be substantially different whether the class action be considered as a disparate impact or a disparate treatment case.” Id., at 639.

Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 , 648 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[S]tatistical 96 significance as measured by the standards of acceptable statistical principles will not necessarily be legally significant[.]”), rev’d sub nom on other grounds, Cooper v. Fed.

Because it is by general nature circumstantial, see Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 646, it involves a high component of inference, as opposed to “raw” factfinding.

Because it is by general nature circumstantial, see Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 646, it involves a high component of inference, as opposed to "raw" factfinding.

As we stated in Federal Reserve, "the findings must be based on something more than a one-sided presentation of the evidence, ... [because] finding facts under Rule 52(a) requires the exercise by an impartial tribunal of its function of weighing and appraising evidence offered, not by one party to the controversy alone, but by both." Id. at 640.

As we stated in Federal Reserve, “the findings must be based on something more than a one-sided presentation of the evidence, ... [because] finding facts under Rule 52(a) requires the exercise by an impartial tribunal of its function of weighing and appraising evidence offered, not by one party to the controversy alone, but by both.” Id. at 640.

Young, 748 F.2d at 198 ; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir.1983), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3532 , 82 L.Ed.2d 837 (1984); Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 672.

Young, 748 F.2d at 198 ; Anderson v. Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir.1983), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3532 , 82 L.Ed.2d 837 (1984); Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 672.

EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 641.

Rather, the district court in its original Memorandum of Decision confined itself to a “purely eonclusory statement ... of ultimate fact” and directed counsel for the plaintiff to submit proposed findings of subsidiary facts. 698 F.2d at 640.

Rather, the district court in its original Memorandum of Decision confined itself to a "purely conclusory statement ... of ultimate fact" and directed counsel for the plaintiff to submit proposed findings of subsidiary facts. 698 F.2d at 640.

EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 641. 7 Harris first alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in that his attorney (1) did not object to the introduction of Harris' prior record which included offenses over ten years old, and failed to move for suppression of his record; (2) did not try "enthusiastically" to sever the armed robbery of Chambers from the charges relating to Gillespie; (3) did not raise on appeal all the issues Harris wanted him to ar…

Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1982) (use of disparate impact theory in cases involving challenge to multicomponent, subjective criteria hiring system is improper because it unjustly burdens employers); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.1986) (same), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 3227 , 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987), argued Jan. 20, 1988, 56 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1988) and E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 639 (4th Cir.1983) (challenge tha…

Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 668-69.

Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 668-69.

In some of these cases, courts have either dismissed the disparate impact claims or transformed them into “pattern or practice" suits, see, e.g., Carroll v. Sears, 708 F.2d at 190 ; EEOC v. Federal Reserve, 698 F.2d at 639, which are disparate treatment cases brought under Title VII that focus on systemwide discrimination rather than on discrimination against an individual job applicant, see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 and n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 and n. 16.

Any residual embarrassment he may have felt is of no consequence, for ”[t]hat occurs any time an employee is not promoted.” Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 672.

Compare Pegues, 699 F.2d at 765 (treatment only); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.

See Anderson, 717 F.2d at 153 ; Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 672. (25) Defendant has contended that other more qualified applicants were hired instead of the Claimants.

"Causation must also be proved." Walls, 895 F.2d at 191 ; Watson, 487 U.S. at 994, 108 S.Ct. at 2789; Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 , 109 S.Ct. at 2125 ; Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 639.

See Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., at 366; EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 668-69.

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 , 97 S.Ct. at 1856 ; EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 645.

Gairola, 753 F.2d at 1287 ; Young v. Lehman, 748 F.2d at 198 ; EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 672.

But they also comprise more than the two instances found lacking in Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 643.

E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 672. *1462 She has also failed to show that her working conditions were intolerable.

Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 641 (emphasis in original).

Opportunity Comm'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 at 671 (4th Cir.1983).

Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 672.

See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 , 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 , 52 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1977); E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d at 642.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 645 (4th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 645.

EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 672-73.

See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-497 , 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1281-1282 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 647-648 (4th Cir.1983). 10 .

“To sum up, statistical evidence is circumstantial in character and its acceptability depends upon the magnitude of the disparity it reflects, the relevance of its supporting data, and other circumstances in the case supportive of or in rebuttal of a hypothesis of discrimination.” EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supra, at 646-47.

See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 at 639-42; Holsey v. Armour & Co., 683 F.2d 864 (4th Cir.1982); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir.1977).

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 , 647 (4th Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom.

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich- mond, 698 F.2d 633 , 647 (4th Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom.

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.1983); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.1982); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.1984); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.1983); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins.

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.1983); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.1982); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.1984); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.1983); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins.

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 , 638-39 (4th Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 , 638-39 (4th Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 at 639-42; Holsey v. Armour & Co., 683 F.2d 864 (4th Cir.1982); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir.1977).

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 , 638-39 (4th Cir. 1983); Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir.1982); Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 , *482 799-802 (5th Cir.1982); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 824 (10th Cir.1982). 5 .

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond , 698 F.2d 633 , 646 (4th Cir.1983).

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 , 672 (4th Cir.1983); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.1981).

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d at 647-48; Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531, 551 (9th Cir.1982).

See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 , 662 (4th Cir. 1983). 47 .

See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, supra at 672, and Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir.1982).

See E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 , 662 (4th Cir.1983).