State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co. (1944)

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ refused w.o.m.) (Attorney General may not act beyond powers granted by Constitution and statutes).

We note, however, that the trial court's statement that it considered the motion and the response is not "decretal." See State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (explaining that "decretal" means the granting or denying of the remedy sought). [22] Neimes v. Ta, 985 S.W.2d 132, 138-39 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. dism'd) (holding that if the record does not contain an affirmative indication that the trial co…

State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ.

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (explaining that “decretal” means the granting or denying of the remedy sought).

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (explaining that “decretal” means the granting or denying of the remedy sought).

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex. Civ.

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ.

Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ.

Moreover, under Texas law the “mere construction or interpretation of a judgment does not constitute a collateral attack.” Cadena v. Cadena, No. 04-96-00634-CV, 1998 WL 39168 , *3 (TexApp.-San Antonio February 4, 1998, no pet. h.); Wheeler v. American Nat’l Bank of Beaumont, 338 S.W.2d 486, 500 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1960), aff'd in part, rev’d in part 162 Tex. 502 , 347 S.W.2d 918 (1961); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1944,…

Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio, 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (determining that since the AG’s powers could not be enlarged or restricted except in manner authorized by state constitution, AG lacked power to bring action to remove state officials); Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. 261 , 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (1955) (affirming Harney), State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.— El Paso, 1944, writ refd w.o.m.) (finding that AG…

Warehouses, 352 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (attorney general may not affirmatively waive governmental immunity from suit, even at state agency’s request, as waiver is exclusive prerogative of legislature); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.) (attorney general lacks power to enter agreements determining terms on which public domain may be sold).

App.--Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney general may not affirmatively waive governmental immunity from suit, even at state agency's request, as waiver is exclusive prerogative of legislature); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co. , 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex. Civ.

Co. v. Williams, 603 S.W.2d at 262 ; Guynn v. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, 580 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

Rule 301 mandates that the judgment of the court “shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity,” and Rule 306 contemplates it will contain “the full names of the parties, as stated in the pleadings, for and against whom the judgment is rendered.” 4 This is done in the decretal portion of the judgment, State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 134 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso, 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.), and it…

In the third case, which the Attorney General designates as one interrupting purported recognition by the courts of common law powers vested in the attorney general, the attorney general was held not to have powers beyond the authority “conferred upon him by the Constitution and statutes of the State.” State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.

State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w. o. m.); G.

“While the judgment here under consideration does not purport in the body thereof to have been rendered by agreement, and no express stipulation appears in the record that the judgment be so entered, the fact that the approval of all the attorneys of record appears on the face of the judgment record and the signature of the trial judge appears subscribed thereto on the Minutes, in connection with other circumstances, warrants the holding, we think, the judgment was by agreem…

“An admission, agreement, or waiver made by the attorney general in an action or suit to which the state is a party does not prejudice the rights of the state.” Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 402.004 (Vernon 1988); see also State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1944, writ refd w.o.m.) (“acts beyond the scope of [Attorney General’s] delegated power are not binding on the State”).

"An admission, agreement, or waiver made by the attorney general in an action or suit to which the state is a party does not prejudice the rights of the state." Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 402.004 (Vernon 1988); see also State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.) ("acts beyond the scope of [Attorney General's] delegated power are not binding on the State").

See also State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.), wherein the court recognized that generally the signature of a party’s attorney means merely that the draft proposed truly evidences the judgment rendered by the court, and not that the judgment is agreed.

See State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).

See State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w.m.).

See also State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1944, writ ref’d w. o. m.).