National Labor Relations Board v. United Technologies Corporation (1983)

"Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first." United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1260.

“Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1260.

A first -judgment will generally have *1464 preclusive effect only where the transaction or connected series of transactions at issue in both suits is the same, that is “whe[re] the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whe[re] the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d at 1260; see also Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. at 128-30 , 103 S.Ct. at 2917-19 (court must determine whether same “cause of a…

That bar extends both to “issues actually decided in determining the claim asserted in the first action and [to] issues that could have been raised in the adjudication of that claim.” Id. at 1259.

Corp., 706 F.2d at 1260-64 (holding that collateral estoppel barred subsequent suit even when res judicata did not apply).

As was stated by the court in Matter of Howe, 913 F.2d at 1144, n. 10, “[a] party may not avoid the preclusive affect of res judicata by asserting a new theory or a different remedy.” Far from there being only a few “operative facts” which were common to these successive actions, United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1259, it appears the entire basis of contention was the same.

As was stated by the court in Matter of Howe, 913 F.2d at 1144, n. 10 , "[a] party may not avoid the preclusive affect of res judicata by asserting a new theory or a different remedy." Far from there being only a few "operative facts" which were common to these successive actions, United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1259, it appears the entire basis of contention was the same.

“Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1260 (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) (subsequent claim precluded under res ju-dicata when it arises from same t…

Id.; see also Virginia Electric, 703 F.2d at 83 ; Davison-Paxon, 462 F.2d at 368-69 ; cf. NLRB v. United Technologies, 706 F.2d 1254, 1263-64 (2d Cir.1983) (union did have authority to consent through collective bargaining to partial limitation on employees' rights to engage in on-premises union solicitation) (discussing Magnavox, 415 U.S. at 324-27 , 94 S.Ct. at 1101-03 ).

As discussed in United Technologies, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mag-navox focused on “the unions’ power to consent to the total elimination of either distribution or solicitation.” 706 F.2d at 1263.

There, the court held that the second action was not precluded because both suits arose out of events that "occurred at different places, and more than a decade apart; they concerned different employees engaged in different acts; and they involved different employer conduct in response to those acts." Id. at 1260.

Corp., 706 F.2d at 1260.

Collateral estoppel “will bar the ■ relit-igation of an issue of law or fact that was *478 raised, litigated, and actually decided by a judgment in a prior proceeding between the parties, if the determination of that issue was essential to the judgment, regardless of whether or not the two proceedings are based on the same claim.” N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

The determination of “whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” Prime Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1990) (citing N.L.R.B, supra, 706 F.2d at 1254); see also Woods, supra, 972 F.2d at 36 (subseque…

Although no one factor is dispositive, a court considers: (1) whether the same transaction is at issue; (2) whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims; and (3) whether the facts essential to the second action were present in the first, NLRB, 706 F.2d at 1260, Although LDSC alleges that the fraud claim is a dressed up relitigation of the earlier contract claim, this Court has already found that Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient allegations of fraud to withsta…

N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1259-60; Shamrock Assoc. v. Sloane, 738 F.Supp. 109, 117 (S.D.N.Y.1990)..

NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d at 1259-60.

For it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies.” Expert Electric Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 , 98 S.Ct. 300 , 54 L.Ed.2d 190 (1977); see also In re Teltronics Services, Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 193 (2d Cir.1985) (“[n]ew legal theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as to defeat the application of the principle o…

National Labor Relations Board v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.1983) (citations omitted); accord Murphy v. Gallagher, 761 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.1985).

To evaluate this argument, the court must “look to see ‘whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue.” Monahan, 214 F.3d at 289 (quoting United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1260). “‘Transaction’ must be given a flexible, common-sense construction that recognizes the reality of the situation.” Id. (quoting Interoceanica Corp. v. Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1997)). “[T]he pleading of subsequent acts will not defeat res judicata whe…

The claims in Counts 5, 6, and 9 through 13 of the Third Amended Complaint are either identical to claims in Sakon III, or relate to “the same transaction, evidence, and factual issues,” Corbett, 124 F.3d at 89 (citing Sure–Snap, 948 F.2d at 874 ; NLRB, 706 F.2d at 1260), such that they “could have been raised therein.” Envicon, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (quoting Sure– Snap, 948 F.2d at 873 (quoting Miller, 462 F.2d at 360 )); accord Umar Oriental Rugs, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (…

Feb. 12, 2009) (quoting NLRB, 706 F.2d at 1260) (emphasis supplied).

Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir.1983).

Unlike the present cases where the acts complained of occurred during the same time frame, in United Technologies the allegations involved. incidents which happened “more than a decade apart[.]” See id. at 1260.

But the Court of Appeals rejected the argument on the grounds that (1) the Supreme Court's decision focused on "the interplay between two factors — neither of which was at issue in” the prior Second Circuit decision, and (2) there was no indication that the Supreme Court had intended to deal with the issue then before the Court of Appeals. 706 F.2d at 1263-64.

Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.1983); In re Teltronics Servs., 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir.1985) (applying res judicata rules to bankruptcy matter).

See also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 , 238 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 657 , 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998); Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F.3d 94 (2d Cir.1997); National Labor Relations Board v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.1983).

Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether ... the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” United Technologies, 706 F.2d at 1259-60.

The determination of “whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” Prime Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1990) (citing N.L.R.B, 706 F.2d at 1254); see also Interoceanico, 107 F.3d at 90 ; Woods, 972 F.…

“Such a judgment precludes the subsequent litigation both of issues actually decided in determining the claim asserted in the first action and of issues that could have been raised in the adjudication of that claim.” National Labor Relations Board v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254, 1259 (2d Cir.1983) (quoting IB Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.405[3], at 631-62) (emphasis added).

The related, and sometimes overlapping doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the “relitigation of an issue of law or fact that was raised, litigated, and actually *986 decided by a judgment in a prior proceeding between the parties, if the determination of that issue was essential to the judgment, regardless of whether or not the two proceedings are based on the same claim.” Id. at 1260.

“Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first.” Id. at 1260.

NLRB, 706 F.2d at 1260.

Collateral Estoppel Collateral estoppel bars “the relit-igation of an issue of law or fact that was raised, litigated, and actually decided by a judgment in a prior proceeding between the parties, if the determination of that issue was essential to the judgment, regardless of whether or not the two proceedings are based on the same claim.” United Technologies Corp., supra, 706 F.2d at 1260.

NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d at 1260.

Collateral Estoppel In United Technologies, the Court of Appeals also reviewed the elements of collateral estoppel: The doctrine of collateral estoppel ... normally will bar the relitigation of an issue of law or fact that was raised, litigated, and actually decided by a judgment in a prior proceeding between the parties, if the determination of that issue was essential to the judgment, regardless of whether or not the two proceedings are based on the same claim. 706 F.2d at…

N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corporation, supra, 706 F.2d at 1259; Rx Data Corp. v. Department of Social Services, 684 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.1982). *1453 In opposition, Local 945 claims that the parties and issues before the N.J.P.E.

See NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir.1983).

See United Techs., 706 F.2d at 1260.

See N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259-61 (2d Cir.1983) (applying collateral estoppel even though some new developments had occurred, while foreclosing res judicata because the claim at issue was not the same claim previously adjudicated); Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37 , 40 n. 4 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that suit was not barred by a prior action where different circumstances upon which an argument of discrimination could be made were present, and notin…

See id. (quoting NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1260 (2d Cir.1983)).

See National Labor Relations Bd. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir. 1983).

See N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir.1983) (citations omitted).

Securities and Exchange Comm. v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463 (2d Cir.1996), quoting Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-130 , 103 S.Ct. 2906 , 77 L.Ed.2d 509 (1983)(internal quotations omitted); see The Irish Lesbian and Gay Organization v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir.) (“ILGO”) (“[r]es judicata bars litigation of 'any claim for relief that was available in a prior suit between the same parties or their privies, whether or not the claim …

See N.L.R.B., 706 F.2d at 1259-60; accord S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463-64 (2d Cir.1996); Prime Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.1990).

See N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 (1983). i. Plaintiff Has Put the Same Transactions at Issue In at least two prior actions plaintiff litigated his claim that the 1941 easement and the 1924 “franchise agreement” authorized NYSEG to extend electrical service to the property at issue.

See National Labor Relations Bd. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.1983); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir.1994).

See NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir. 1983).

See NLRB v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1259 (2d Cir. 1983).

See N.L.R.B. v. United Technologies Corp., 706 F.2d 1254 , 1260 (2d Cir.1983).